
UNIT 9 NATIONALISM AND THE NATION-STATE*

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9.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this Unit, you shall be able to learn about:

- how the ideas of nationalism evolved in Europe;
- the role of nationalism and modern state in creating the nation-state;
- the role of language and democratic politics in mobilizing people and fostering the growth of nationalism and nation-state; and
- phases in development of national identities in some Eastern European countries.

9.1 INTRODUCTION

Nationalism is a modern phenomenon. Even though its idea is often traced back in time, nationalism in the modern sense emerged only during the eighteenth century in Western Europe. During the 19th and 20th centuries it spread throughout

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the world. Nationalism aligned with the modern state in giving rise to nation-state. In certain cases, the modern state fostered a spirit of nationalism to provide the people inhabiting its boundaries with a viable nationalist ideology. Both together led to popular mobilizations which further strengthened the state and helped the formation of nation-states.

9.2 THE MEANING OF NATIONALISM

In March 1882, during a lecture at the Sorbonne, the French orientalist and historian Ernest Renan argued that the nation was a spiritual community which wished to uphold its sense of unity through a day to day vote of confidence. In a tract entitled *Marxism and the National Question*, Joseph Stalin argued that “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture”. Renan offered an ‘idealist’ definition of the nation as against the ‘materialist’ analysis of Stalin, it is interesting that both authors believed that there was nothing eternal or everlasting about nations. Both believed that nations were historical constructs that had a beginning and would also have an end.

Hans Kohn, regarded as a founder of the academic study of nationalism, argues that “nationalities are products of the living forces of history, and therefore always fluctuating never rigid.” Nationalities are not identical with clans, tribes or folk-groups nor are they the simple outcome of common descent or common habitat. Kohn argues: “Ethnographic groups like these existed throughout history, from earliest times on, yet they do not form nationalities; they are nothing but ‘ethnographic material’, out of which under certain circumstances a nationality might arise. Even if a nationality arises, it may disappear again, absorbed into a larger or new nationality”.

Kohn argued that “both the idea and the form of nationalism were developed before the age of nationalism”. The idea of nationals was traceable to the ancient Hebrews and Greeks. The idea of the chosen people, the consciousness of national history and national Messianism were three traits of nationalism which emerged with the ancient Jews. But he acknowledges that despite their “fierce nationalist ideology”, the Greeks lacked “political nationalism” and there was only a brief period of patriotism during the Persian Wars.

Although it is possible to trace the idea of the nation to the earliest times and certainly to the 16th century – as in the case of the German word *Volk* for people— there is considerable unanimity among historians that nationalism is a modern concept. Despite other disagreements, scholars like Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm agree that nationalism is a phenomenon which emerged in the 18th century in Western Europe and then spread during the 19th and 20th centuries to other parts of the world. **It is the considered view of historians that nationalism in the modern sense emerged with the growth of industrial capitalism or print capitalism and was then sustained by a variety of factors — by notions of community based on language, ethnicity or religion or by the rivalry and competition among states and imagined communities.**

Within the Marxist tradition, the definition of the nation has evolved from the writings of Marx and Engels, through Lenin and Stalin, to those of Hobsbawm. Broadly speaking, within this tradition nation is regarded as a historically evolved phenomenon which emerges only with decline of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. Tribes, clans and peoples existed prior to the emergence of capitalism but it was because of new economic relations produced by the emergence of the capitalist mode of production that nations were created. Nationalism was regarded as an ideological construct which enabled the bourgeoisie to identify its interests as a class with the interests of society.

Hobsbawm also emphasises that nations and nationalist aspirations have to be examined in “the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development.” Though essentially constructed from above, nationalism cannot be understood unless it is also analysed from below “in terms of assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist”.

9.3 IDEA OF NATIONALISM AND NATION-STATE

The modern concept of the nation emerged during the Age of Revolution, the American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789. In America political discourse did not emphasize the unitary aspect of nationalism -the Americans were concerned with the inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, with the proper relation between the American union and the states and with development of a liberal capitalist society. By contrast in France the nation was conceived as “one and indivisible”. The idea of the nation was inextricably linked up with mass participation, citizenship and collective sovereignty of the people or of a given nationality. Hobsbawm draws a distinction between the revolutionary democratic and the nationalist conception of the nation. In the revolutionary democratic view of the nation the sovereign citizen people within a state constituted a nation in relation to others whereas in the nationalist view the “prior existence” of some distinguishing features of a community, setting it apart from others, was necessary to constitute a nation. The French insistence on linguistic uniformity after the Revolution was quite strong but the revolution itself recorded how few people actually spoke it. In the revolutionary French concept of the nation, the willingness to speak French – by non-French speakers in France — was one of the conditions for full French citizenship.

In the case of Italy the only basis for unification and nationalism was the Italian language. In 1860 when Italian unification was achieved only two and a half percent of the population used the language for everyday purposes. The prophet of Italian nationalism, the leader of Young Italy, Mazzini, believed that the popular sovereignty of the nation must be indivisible and that various proposals for a federal Italy were mere mechanism for ensuring the longevity of local ruling classes. Mazzini also believed that the Italian people had to be ‘formed’ so as to overcome the division of Italy, although he had a mystical faith in the sanctity and unity of the popular will. G. Mazzini argued that writers must “explore the needs of the peoples” so that Italian literature could inspire and revive the nation. Literature could precede and help to shape political development.

9.4 STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM

The growth of nationalism can be broadly divided into two phases. The first phase occurs before the late 18th century when certain preliminary notions of national unity can be said to have existed. Its chronology varies from one country to another, but these ideas of geographical or cultural unity are only a precursor to modern nationalism. The latter phase takes shape only in the wake of French Revolution, except perhaps in the cases of Britain and France where the nation-building exercise started in 16th century and 17th century respectively.

9.4.1 Nationalism Before 1789: Proto-nationalism

In historical literature, the emergence of modern nation and nationalism is in the late 18th Century. Nationalism acquires a more democratic character in the period of mass politics in the late 19th century. But it may be useful to look at the earlier epoch to understand the significance of the emergence of nationalism.

Several 19th century observers believe that elements of nationalism, a sense of ethnic or linguistic or national identity, emerged in the medieval period. This may be called patriotism or proto-nationalism. The 19th century French historian and politician Guizot believed that the Hundred Years War between England and France (1397-1453) - provoked by the claim of the king of England to the throne of France - brought together the nobility, burghers and peasantry in a common desire to defeat the foreigner who had attacked and plundered France. Though modern historians regard this as a period of crises marked by war, plague and famine, it did create a sense of patriotism. In a later period the growth of monarchy brought about the creation of a unified French state. Though some historians have emphasized that France was a geographical reality which did not depend on the role of the centralizing monarchy this geographical determinism is not very convincing. Geographically speaking there was no Gallo-Roman predestination of France and there were no real natural frontiers of France. The state of France was the accidental creation of history and there could well have been a southern Mediterranean France, a Franco-English empire or even a Burundian France.

The struggle of free peasants living in the rural communities and of the large towns against feudal tutelage from the 13th century onwards helped in the emergence of a Swiss national consciousness. The four different nationalities which created a modern state in 1648 managed to create a distinct Swiss national consciousness only by 1848 after the victory of the liberals and the drafting of a new federal constitution.

9.4.2 Modern Nationalism: The 19th Century

The 19th century is regarded as a century of nationalism — a period in which the idea of the nation and nation state based on Britain and France was generalized and perceived as the universal principle for modern societies. Friedrich List in *The National System of Political Economy*, (London 1885) stated that, “a large population and an extensive territory endowed with manifold resources, are essential requirements of the normal nationality ... A nation restricted in the number of its population and in territory, especially if it has a separate language,

can only possess a crippled literature, crippled institutions for promoting art and science. A small state can never bring to complete perfection within its territory the various branches of production". In practice, the principle of nationality applied only to nationalities of a certain size in the liberal period of nationalism because of this faith in the benefits of large scale states. It is this tacit liberal assumption of a certain size of states which Hobsbawm calls the "threshold principle" of nationality which the liberal bourgeoisie broadly endorsed from about 1830 to 1880. It is this threshold principle of nationality which is shared by figures as far apart as John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Engels and Giuseppe Mazzini. It is this principle which explains why Mazzini, the apostle of nationalism, did not support the cause of Irish independence. The principle of national self-determination in the period of Mill and Mazzini was therefore substantially different from that in the period of the American President, Woodrow Wilson. Mazzini's map of Europe drawn up in 1857 based on nations included only a dozen states and federations. By contrast the Europe refashioned after World War II on the basis of the right to national self-determination had 26 nation states. In the post World War II period 42 regionalist movements are identified in Western Europe alone.

The big change in attitude towards nationality and nationalism came about in the late 19th century with the growth of mass political movements in the era of democratic politics. After 1880 the debate about the national question became important with the need to mobilize voters for different political parties and to gain adherents for new ideologies whether among socialist or minor linguistic and national groupings. In the later stage of mass politics and national movements, the state played an active role. Colonel Pilsudski, the liberator of Poland, in fact observed, "It is the state which makes the nation and not the nation the state". Whatever view one takes of the relation between nation and state, it was electoral democracy which undermined the liberal theory of the nation.

9.5 HOW NATIONALISM AND THE MODERN STATE CREATE THE NATION-STATE

Nationalism as an ideal began in the 19th century based on the ideas of the French revolution and the consequences of Napoleonic military victories and the political realignments which these victories produced. The simplification of the political map of Europe by the reduction in the number of states within the German Empire; the quickening of the pulse of Spanish nationalism during the military campaigns of the Peninsular War; and the rise of Italian and German nationalism based on the inspiration of the French armies, the Napoleonic role in nation-state building and the contagion of revolutionary and democratic ideas helped to spread the gospel of nationalism in Europe. It appealed to the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie which spearheaded the movement for Italian and German unification. Mass politics in the late 19th century was to give an additional fillip to nationalism specially in Eastern Europe, a region which was relatively backward compared to the more industrialized parts of Western Europe.

9.5.1 Absolutism and Modern State

The absolutist states, particularly in Western Europe played an important role in the gradual transition from feudalism to capitalism. The dynastic rulers of Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries were responsible for the creation of centralized

states with substantial standing armies. The absolutist states claimed rights to taxation and a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within the boundaries of the state. The emergence of strong centralized states was the product of wars among the absolutist rulers; the growth of state taxation was linked to the costs of waging such wars; and the prime objective of the mercantilist policies of absolutist rulers was to enhance the economic power and thereby the military power of their states vis-a-vis other states. The wars of the 16th and 17th centuries accelerated “all the fundamental state-making processes”. In the economic and military competition of this period, a large number of the 500 or so political entities or states perished but the political unification of Italy and Germany was possible only with the emergence of nationalist ideology in the 19th century. Charles Tilly observes, “the European state-making process minimized the cultural variation within states and maximised the variation among states”. The minimization of internal cultural variation within states was accomplished by the centralization of state power as well as the development of a concept of sovereignty which was absolute and indivisible. The centralizing monarchs tried to overcome obstacles in the way of exercising sovereign rights by local and regional assemblies or by the aristocracy, clergy or bourgeoisie. Ultimately it was the ‘revolutions from below’ in Holland, England and France which removed the barriers in the way of the modern state. Some scholars argue that it was the ‘bourgeois revolutions’ — in the Age of Revolutions — which finally led to rise of the modern capitalist state.

9.5.2 Modern States and System of States

One can approach the study of a system of states which emerged from the period of the 16th and 17th century onwards in terms of the development of the economy — in terms of capitalist development and its uneven spread across Europe during the 19th century.

The industrialization of Britain during the late 18th century and gradual expansion of industries in Europe over the course of the 19th century was uneven process and countries industrialising later had certain disadvantages in terms of competition with those who were ahead in industrial production. Alexander Gerschenkron argues in *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* that countries like Germany and Russia which began to industrialize— after Britain, the first industrial nation—the role of the state was more significant. To compensate for a late start the state played an active role in creating appropriate conditions for industrialization by creating a system of tariff protection even abetting the process of cartelization. The degree of concentration of capital in Germany indicates a much stronger nexus between banks and industrial firms than obtained in Britain. The doctrine of free trade, laissez faire as propounded by Britain, was challenged by the German economist Friedrich List to enable the German economy develop behind protectionist walls to enable it to catch up. The economic challenge presented by England had an enduring impact on German nationalism. The perception of the German bourgeoisie was that the formation of a national state was an essential precondition for German economic development. The German nation was created by official policy and strategy, subsequent to successful wars in 1864-1866 and 1870-71, with Austria and France. German businessmen and industrialists clearly favoured political unification because it would facilitate the creation of a national market.

In Italy the idea of nationalism was associated with literary Italian of Dante, and the youthful idealism of Mazzini's Young Italy before it was linked to the economic ideology of the bourgeoisie. During the 1840s a programme for economic unification was propagated by journalists and intellectuals. This new ideology was linked to the interests of the nascent Italian bourgeoisie influenced by the growing success of German customs union, the Zollverein. The Austrian opposition to the integration of the Italian railway – the linking of Piedmonts and Lombard railway systems fuelled the growth of economic nationalism. Italian industrialists, however, did not have an agenda which championed railway building, customs union, common currency and the creation of a national market. The Piedmontese were perceived as rivals by Milanese industrialists and the latter in fact favoured integration with the larger German market. Industrialists were too weak to profit from the widening of markets and often had genuine reasons to fear the growth of competition. Even commercial interests were not always in favour of the economic unification of Italy. On the other hand, landlords and farmers engaged in production for the market favoured unification consistently. Cavour, Minghetti in Bologna and Rissotto in Tuscany, all improving landlords and moderate liberals, played a leading role in Italian national unification. In Italy the weakness of the bourgeoisie gave greater salience to the role of landlords and urban professionals in the movement towards economic unification.

9.5.3 Nations and Nation-States

Modern states, nations and nationalism are all territorial in the sense that their claims are based on specific geographical areas. In the 19th century, the idea spread that the state and nation should “coincide geographically in the nation state”. The modern state is often called the “territorial state” since it has a clearly demarcated territory in which it claims sovereign rights over all its citizens. Nationalism is a territorial ideology which is internally unifying and externally divisive. As an ideology nationalism discourages conflicts based on social class or status within a nation but enhances the differences between different peoples and nations.

Authorities as different as Max Weber and V.I. Lenin have argued that nations and nationalism have to be seen “primarily in political terms in relation to statehood”. Nationalism is an ideology which links culturally and historically defined territorial communities called nations, to political statehood. Nationalism as an ideology may produce a demand for an independent state, transformation of a pre-existing state, or merely an attempt to seek political legitimacy for state policy in the higher interests of the nation, i.e. national interest.

Three ways in which nationalism has shaped the modern state have been identified. Firstly, in the early phase, in states like England and France, the rise of nationalism was linked to the development of democratic relationships between state and civil society. Secondly, nationalism fostered the internal unification of culturally and economically diverse regions into a more homogenous cultural identity. Finally, nationalism divided one political community or nation from another and even determined the geographical boundaries of the nation.

Nationalism can support both movements of unification and separation. In Italy and Germany, nationalism with the support of one dominant state (Prussia in the case of Germany and Piedmont in the case of Italy) created a new nation-state.

In Scandinavia, nationalism produced the separation of Norway from Sweden. In the case of Poland, there was both separation and unification which created the Polish nation state. In the late 19th century the doctrine of national self-determination was the basis for creating new nation-states based on language, on an invented tradition, ethnicity or common culture. In Greece, Czechoslovakia and Ireland nationalism necessitated the carving out of nation states from larger territorial units. These new nation states were carved out of the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary and Britain respectively. As the idea of nationalism spread to Central and Eastern Europe—in regions with little industrialization and weak bourgeois cultures the role of middle class and peasantry in the shaping of nationalism increased. By the late nineteenth and early decades of twentieth century rise of working class socialist organisations, the Bolshevik Revolution, inter-imperialist rivalries, nationalism lost its radical force and became associated with conservative and right wing ideologies.

Check Your Progress 1

- 1) Answer the following in 'yes' or 'no'.
 - a) Nationalism existed since time immemorial.
 - b) The French Revolution had no role to play in spreading the idea of nationalism.
 - c) Britain and France were the first nation-states.
 - d) Language played an important role in the growth of nationalism.
- 2) When did the idea of nationalism develop? Answer in 100 words with examples.
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- 3) Discuss in 100 words the role of nationalism and modern states in the development of nation-states.
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9.6 RELATION BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC AND NATIONALIST MOBILIZATIONS

In this section we will discuss the relationship between popular mobilization and the rise of nationalism.

9.6.1 Liberal Democracies and Nationalism

The French Revolution with its ideals of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and the Rights of Man served as a source of inspiration for all subsequent democratic and popular movements. The Jacobins inspired the radical ideology in the 19th century throughout Europe. In fact, the ideal-type of bourgeois revolution was derived from experience of the French Revolution. Although recently, revisionist historians question the significance of the concept of bourgeois revolution, even they concede that it gave a tremendous impetus to democratic movements and radical ideas. Although the democratization of France took place gradually, and the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871 are part of the gradual process of democratization of French politics and society, the significance of the radicalism of the years 1792-95 cannot be denied.

The radicalization of French politics during the years 1792-95 was spearheaded by the sans-culottes (shopkeepers, artisans, wage-earners and unemployed) who were adversely effected by war, poor harvests, food shortages, price rise and collapse of the currency. The sans-culottes were a politically active group in urban area who were adversely effected by war and economic crises. Those designated sans-culottes not only favoured price-control and rationing but also believed in the sovereignty of people and subscribed to the principle of direct democracy.

After the invasion of France in August 1792 and the execution of the King a new constitutional convention was elected by universal adult male suffrage. The Jacobin order established not only a republican government but also initiated a phase of direct democracy dominated by ideas about egalitarian distribution of property, revolutionary justice and right to subsistence. Once the tide of war against France abated by mid-1794 Jacobin societies and militia were brought under control alongwith local government assemblies. Owing to failure of liberal democratic state during 1795-1799, France was eventually taken over by army headed by Napoleon. The division among the electorate and lack of agreement about what constituted the public good, juxtaposed with the successful military exploits of French republican armies helped achieve political ascendancy for the French military. Napoleon subsequently became Emperor of France and produced an Imperial Constitution in 1804. Although the Napoleonic dictatorship was a retreat from the ideals of Revolution it is equally true that his military exploits and conquests simplified the political map of Europe and spread the ideas of nationalism and democracy among conquered people. The Congress of Vienna not only wished to contain France but through the Metternich system the conservative European Powers — represented by Prussia, Austria and Russia — actively tried to suppress all liberal and national movements in Europe which threatened the dominant position of autocratic governments. There were revolutions in Spain, Greece and Italy in 1820. A far more serious outbreak of revolutions affected France, Germany, Belgium and Poland in 1830. Middle class radicals and peasants and workers produced a revolution which won independence for Belgium. Despite the systematic efforts to suppress democracy in Europe the spread of liberal ideas could not be held back indefinitely.

The revolutions of 1848 which engulfed most of Europe led to an accelerated movement towards democracy and nationalism. It brought Napoleon III to power in France, hastened the unification of Germany and Italy and stirred national

sentiments in the multi-national Austrian empire. The process of democratization in the first half of the 19th century was accelerated not only by revolutions but by a gradual process of socio-economic change that is the growth of industries and new social classes of the bourgeoisie and workers. There was also the growth of the modern state and bureaucracy which led to the development of official languages and the growth of public education. There was the growth of press and print which fostered both democratic and nationalist ideas in Europe as the number of publication and the size of the reading public grew steadily.

The policies of governments became matters of public concern as public instruction and public employment increased the size of the middle class and as political movements of different strata began to confront the state. 19th century Britain, inspired by the French revolution witnessed the growth of the Chartist movement and the widening of franchise by the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867. In Britain not only did the Industrial Revolution lead to the development of capitalism largely on the basis of private capitalist accumulation but it also gave civil society a decisive advantage in its relationship with the British state. Nevertheless, the British ruling class and the state represented a compromise between the rising bourgeoisie and the older aristocracy. The capacity of Britain's political elite to adapt to the changing nature of civil society or the balance of social classes has been observed by both liberal and Marxist scholars. Some have seen it as the creation of class alliances essential to perpetuate the dominance of successful commercial landowners, the rising industrialist and finally the finance capitalist based on the export of capital and invisibles. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins developed the concept of 'gentlemanly capitalism', a combination of landed and commercial wealth with a range of service and professional interests, which dominated Britain from 1688 onwards right until the mid 20th century.

While P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins regard Britain's economic performance as satisfactory given its size and resources others argue that Britain failed in the late Victorian period and did not respond satisfactorily to the second industrial revolution of the late 19th century. They add that the marginalisation of the manufacturing sector in policy matters led to the retardation of the British economy. Perry Anderson developed this point in his analysis of the late 20th century crisis of the British economy in terms of the antiquity of the British state and need for major political reform. Whatever the skilful management of social and class conflict might have meant for Britain's economic growth it enabled the successful development of British democracy based on a progressive extension of the franchise. It also enabled a successful integration of the working class and ordinary citizen in British society. Even the labour movement accepted the ideals of the British nation, the value of preserving the monarchy and British Empire.

9.6.2 Factors Affecting National Mobilization and Democratization

As the 19th century advanced, the idea of democracy, despite the reactionary role of the Concert of Europe and the Holy Alliance, grew in popularity. This was associated with the growth of liberalism in Britain and France. It is customary to contrast the experience of the first wave of capitalism of Britain and France with that of Germany and Italy which were part of the second wave. Before going into this issue let us observe the general consequence of economic development, modernization and democratization.

As the economy developed new social classes emerged; the working class in particular posed new problems for the 19th century states and the bourgeoisie. In Britain, after the 1832 Reform Act the liberal middle class parted company with the working class. The inclusion of the propertied middle classes within the framework of electoral democracy was achieved in several European states by mid 19th century. The emergence of labour and socialist movement in late 19th century affected the balance of social forces. The rise of the Social Democratic Party in Germany during the late 19th century affected the politics of the bourgeoisie and the conservatives. Mass participation — even the participation of a broad based socialist party — did not necessarily democratize German society, though the extent of pre-World War I German conservatism has often been exaggerated.

Nationality and Language

The modernization of states was accompanied by the development of a centralized administration and a large bureaucracy based on rational-legal principles. This process was accompanied by the development of a national language, of a language of administration and not merely local communication. The choice of a dialect or language as the medium of official communication led to public or state support for its propagation, specially through the school system. The growth of a professional middle class and of modern state bureaucracies was based on the growth of modern schools, universities, law and journalism. The expansion of the secondary school system and the state choice of the official language of education became a source of great conflict among rival ethnic linguistic groups within multi-ethnic states like Austria-Hungary and in Eastern Europe in general. In earlier periods language was less divisive because literacy levels were low, the elite mass relationship was not based on regular interaction, and the state did not seek legitimation on the basis of some form of representative government. The controversies about language in the 19th century were about “school and office”, and linguistic nationalism was linked to the growth of modern bureaucracy and the aspiration of a rising class of intelligentsia seeking jobs and cultural influence.

Language became an issue in international politics with the dispute between the Danes and the Germans over Schleswig-Holstein and of the Germans and French over the Rhine frontier during the 1840s. Even more significant was the increasing importance of language as a factor in the emergence of national conflicts in the late 19th century. The modern state and its administrative innovations sharpened a sense of linguistic identity among the general population. From the 1860s, census enumeration collected detailed information on language use. This fostered a linguistic identity, a particularly complex one for the Austrian Empire. Language itself was undergoing change and the choice of a language of public use depended on several criteria e.g. the language of state and school, the mother tongue, the ‘family tongue’ or language usually spoken at home. As E.J. Hobsbawm observes, “In truth, by asking the language question censuses for the first time forced everyone to choose not only a nationality, but a linguistic nationality”.

Nationalism, State and Class

In older states like Britain and France a state-based patriotism itself encouraged a sense of nationalism during the course of the 19th century. The processes which turned subjects into citizens helped to encourage a sense of nationalism in several states. Popular perceptions of natural-cultural difference or distinctions, political and national characteristics contributed to both nationalism and national

chauvinism in the late 19th century in countries regardless of whether they were liberal capitalist states like Britain or second wave late industrializing states like Germany. The patriotism of the working classes in Europe did not deny the chasm between classes but affirmed its loyalty to the nation state. The most significant illustration of this is the manner in which the working class and socialist parties of the Second International which had repeatedly passed political resolutions condemning the idea of an imperialist war and emphasizing the international character of the struggle of the socialist parties very quickly identified with their nations and their national interest once the First World War broke out. Despite being opposed to the ruling classes and imperialist cliques of their respective societies the workers and socialist parties patriotically marched into the Great War of 1914-18. V.I. Lenin was surprised to find that the German Social Democrats- the largest socialist party in Europe which controlled about one-third of vote in Germany – had voted for war no sooner than the war was declared. Later day observers have acknowledged that the Socialist and Marxists underestimated the power of nationalism of the working classes and of those groups who professed socialism and identified with Social Democratic parties.

Nationalism, Empire and Imperial Rivalry

The gradual extension of franchise and efforts of liberal states like Britain, modernizing states like Germany, or survival strategies of autocracies like Tsarist Russia to gain legitimacy and popular support, produced a form of patriotism. National pride and national identification was also encouraged by overseas expansion, by the material and psychological rewards which imperial possessions brought to countries like Britain, France, Holland and Spain. In Britain a sense of national identification was encouraged not only because of the “peculiarities” of the English and the glorious tradition of free born Englishmen, but also because of pride in a world wide empire. Britain’s pride in its industrial achievements was celebrated during the Industrial Exhibition of 1851 and its sense of imperial greatness by colourful pageants like the Coronation of Queen Victoria and the Imperial Durbar in India in 1877. Although there was a sense of Scottish nationalism which developed in the 18th and 19th centuries after the Union of 1707, economic development deepened the diversity of regions and social classes within Scotland. Scottish workers, Highland crofters, and hard pressed tenants were at loggerheads with Scottish landlords, and Scottish nationalism was weak and ineffective. The Scots played a major role in both the acquisition and management of the Empire that “their self-esteem and sense of identity may have been fortified rather than weakened by the imperial adventure, even though the bulk of its profits ended in London.” However, as Victor Kiernan argues, the Welsh unlike the Scots, “showed no love of army or empire”.

The policies of the state designed to achieve greater legitimacy and support for state policies, the spontaneous and state-sponsored support for imperial exploits and colonial profits encouraged a sense of national pride. Some of this form of patriotism was reflected in jingoistic responses in Britain to the Boer War fought against settlers in South Africa at the end of the 19th century, in 1898-1902. In the late 19th century, as imperialist rivalries among the European powers increased, it was possible to use imperial interests to deflect attention from domestic economic difficulties or class conflicts. Though the partition of Africa was accomplished without any war between European powers, the struggle for overseas markets, raw materials, and opportunities for investments, together with territorial expansion, encouraged identification with the nation state among a

broad section of the population. A military adventure of successful commercial achievements overseas always helped to rally support for 19th century states whether among countries with a large overseas empire like Britain or with very limited overseas influence like Germany. Part of the nationalism of the 19th century was linked to the economic and military rivalry of Britain and Germany, the naval building competition between these two Powers and the general desire of the more right wing governments in Germany and Italy to catch up with British and French who had industrialized early and thus acquired vast colonial possessions. The aggressive nationalism of the conservative regimes in the late industrializing countries like Germany helped to rally support for the regime and to encourage nationalist sentiment throughout Europe. The speech by the German Emperor, Wilhelm II, at Tangiers in Morocco in 1905, induced widespread fear in France, encouraged particularly by its publication in a large number of French newspapers. French anxiety about Germany's hostility and memories of the defeat of France at Sedan in the Franco-German War in 1870 helped create a sense of national unity which was able to transcend domestic conflicts in times of acute crisis. Although France was divided into two antagonistic blocs and although ideological and political differences did not vanish with the outbreak of World War I, the French nation was united in the war against Germany. The nationalists were looking for an opportunity to regain French greatness, the Catholics to prove their patriotic credentials, the socialists to defend principles of the French Revolution. The period from 1890 to 1914 is often called the period of armed peace based on creation of rival military and diplomatic alliances, between contenders for industrial and military supremacy, for colonial possessions and profits. The memorialization of major events in national calendars by school texts and nationalist newspapers, the reactions of press and public to diplomatic military rivalry encouraged both the spontaneous and state sponsored support for the nation-state in 19th century Europe.

9.6.3 Ethnic/Linguistic Basis of Nationalism in the Late 19th Century

By the late 19th century processes of modernization and homogenization produced a sense of nationalism in the older states and those large states which had achieved unification by then. The idea of unitary nationalism often produced a counter-nationalism among groups — ethnic or linguistic — which felt either oppressed or excluded by a process of nationalist homogenization. Nationalism in the period 1880-1914 was no longer constrained by the 'threshold principle' which had limited the demands for nation states earlier. Any body of people claiming to be a nation could claim the right to national self-determination. In these "non-state" nationalisms the ethnic linguistic criterion for defining nationalism became a decisive, probably sole, consideration. In E.J.Hobsbawm's view the late emergence of the ethnic-linguistic criterion in defining nations is insufficiently acknowledged in the literature on nationalism. Although linguistic and cultural movements grew in Europe between the 1780s and 1840s it was a body of agitators and mobilisers who spread the idea of nation in the second phase of the national movement. Only in the third stage, according to Miroslav Hroch did mass support for nationalism emerge in late 19th century European nationalist movements.

The reasons for the increasing readiness of imagined communities to make claims of nationhood and national self-determination was because of the pace of change, economic distress and large scale migrations of peoples in this period. Traditional

groups felt threatened by the pace of modernization. Educated middle strata with modest incomes-journalists, school teachers and petty officials were the torchbearers of linguistic nationalism. Migration produced friction and conflicts between groups unused to coexistence with different groups. It was the nationalist, petty bourgeoisie which played a major role in the emergence of new ethnic linguistic nationalism as well as the chauvinist and right wing movements within the older nation states. Contrary to conventional views Hobsbawm argues that in practice it was hard to separate the support which the masses gave to socialism, nationalism or religion since they had “several attachments and loyalties simultaneously, including nationality”. Mass movement could simultaneously express aspirations conventionally regarded as incompatible. The oppressed nationalities of Eastern Europe did become independent states based on Wilson’s support for the principle of national self-determination but it is hardly possible to assert that significant numbers had dreamed of both social revolution and national independence. The collapse of the belligerent states first led to isolated and short-lived revolutionary upsurges and then to fascist and right wing movement. Nevertheless the relation between revolutionary movements and the desire for social transformation requires a more elaborate analysis.

9.6.4 Nationalist Movements and Democracy

Nation and nationalism as an idea has been identified with people, popular sovereignty and democratic rights. J.J. Rousseau’s concept of General Will, of the Rights of Man, of the right to elect governments on the basis of universal adult male franchise constituted some of the democratic ideas which animated politics in the 19th century. Although the French Revolution was an important influence on national movements in the 19th century, towards the late 19th century there was an illiberal or right wing shift in the nature of nationalist politics. This rightward shift within nationalist politics took place even while the level of mass participation based on regular elections increased. In fact the reason for this growth in right-wing orientation of nationalism was the fear of popular participation in politics, specially of the working class and left – wing socialist parties. The liberal intelligentsia and middle class which had championed a republican or liberal nationalism in the first half of the 19th century favoured conservative politics and supported dynastic states after the revolutions of 1848. Since national unification was the primary objective, other ideologies of political rights and economic equality were subordinated to the idea of nationhood. Ideologies of race and empire buttressed this conservative version of nationalism. Although less strident in their support for social imperialism and social Darwinism the working class and even socialist supporters were not immune to such influences.

The relation between democratic and popular movements and nationalism and national movements was always complex. In the late 18th century Britain, Linda Colley has shown that while the common people were in favour of a national mobilization of resources and manpower in the struggle against revolutionary and Napoleonic France, the ruling class of British state were reluctant to unleash popular energies which might endanger their local dominance. On the other hand, the resistance to the French Revolution in the Vendee-as well as in Brittany – was a rejection of orders from Paris and of military conscription. It was not only fomented by the local aristocracy and priesthood but had deep-rooted support within the French countryside. The ideals of the French revolution did not

command universal respect and the armies of revolutionary France, specially Napoleonic armies, were plagued by desertions. Although Mazzini espoused democratic ideals and proposed a people's war of national liberation, the Italian liberals were unable to enthuse the masses and were primarily confined to towns. Though Mazzini derived his notion of people's war from the Spanish war of 1808-13 he failed to learn from this war the major role played by the clergy in winning over the peasants to the cause of Spanish nationalism. Carlo Pisacane, a Neapolitan who played a major role in defence of the Roman Republic and who believed that Italian leadership lagged behind popular initiative and that G. Garibaldi failed to produce a true revolutionary army, was himself slaughtered by local peasants at Sapri in 1857 together with his own small revolutionary force. In Italy the relation between national movement for political unification and popular participation was so weak that Massimo d'Azeglio observed: "We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians".

9.7 NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL CLASS: GERMANY AND BRITAIN

The revolutions of 1848 revealed the weakness of the liberal bourgeoisie in Europe. It compelled the liberals in Germany to accept support for nationalism from the most powerful state Prussia and similarly also led to the ascendancy of Piedmont-Sardinia in Italy. In Europe the revolutions of 1848 revealed the emergence of nationalist sentiment within the Habsburg Empire and Eastern Europe, the emergence of working class and socialist ideology throughout Europe, and the differences within the liberal democratic movement which separated the middle classes from the workers, peasants, and urban poor. During the 1848 revolutions in Europe the struggles of the poor and of the middle classes had distinct features and objectives which were apparent. The middle classes were willing to side with conservative Prussia or the Emperor of the French, Napoleon III, rather than accept a greater pace of change.

In Germany, liberal nationalism which had an anti-feudal orientation acquired anti-clerical and anti-socialist overtones during the Kulturkampf (1871-1887). While anti-clericalism was partly progressive in its support for enlightenment rationalism, it also was regressive in so far as it criticized the "block horde of Romans without a fatherland". During the years 1870-1878 the anti-clerical element in bourgeois nationalism prepared the basis for conflict with the Social Democratic Party and movement after 1878. The new right-wing nationalism which emerged in the late 1870s was hostile to left-wing liberals as well as Social Democrats. In this new phase of right-wing nationalism Prussian large land owners and small manufacturers weighed down by economic competition actively began to collaborate with industrialists favouring protectionist economic policies. In the economic crisis of the 1870s marked by slower growth and international price deflation, social tension multiplied and validated Marxist theories about capitalism and class struggle. The middle classes both old and new, the latter consisting of white collar employers and officials, became anxious to preserve their economic and social standing as well as to distance themselves from Marxist internationalism. H.A.Winkler states, "In the late 1870s to be a nationalist no longer meant being anti-feudal but instead anti-internationalist, and very frequently, anti-Semitic".

In Germany liberalism was not very strong, and though there was indeed a silent bourgeois revolution in Germany in the 19th century, the traditions of political democracy were weaker than in Britain and France. The weakness of liberal democratic movement in 19th century Germany probably led to the growth of right wing nationalism and the containment of Socialist Democracy. It is significant that even the liberal sociologist Max Weber thought that the only way to reduce power of Junkers and authoritarian state was to adopt a prestigious German world policy.

Successful overseas expansion was supported by right wing to secure economic benefits which would not only benefit businessmen, middle class colonial officials, but also the industrial working class, at least in the export industries. Whether or not a labour aristocracy arose in countries with substantial overseas trade and investments or not, it is true that economic prosperity and cheap colonial and overseas produce improved the lot of the industrial workers and the common people in metropolitan countries like Britain, France and Germany. Though experts like L.E.Davis and R.A.Huttenback argue that return on overseas and specifically colonial investments was not very high in the case of British investments, cheap food and raw materials from overseas did have some beneficial consequences. The popular support for overseas expansion and investments was not only about chauvinism and ideology, but also about economic rewards. Although writers like Patrick O'Brien have returned to free trade arguments about economic irrelevance of empire to Britain there is still much merit in a social class analysis of the motivations for imperial expansion and an assessment of the economic benefits of empire. In any case improvement in living standards of workers and urban consumers in industrial nations like Britain and Germany did help in co-opting the labour movements in these countries. Reformist trade unionism in Britain and the combination of repression with co-optation in Bismarckian Germany diluted the challenge of labour and left wing opposition to ideologies of race, empire and right wing nationalism. In Britain the franchise was extended in 1867 and 1884 to incorporate most adult males into a reformist parliamentary democracy. Repressive laws in Germany against trade unions and socialist political parties between 1878-1890 were combined with progressive welfare legislation, the Hohenzollern emperor's 'social message' of 1881 and a system of social insurance for the workers. Though the SDP (Social Democratic Party of Germany) grew under a repressive and right wing regime its weakness cannot be attributed to such restrictive conditions alone. Critics of the SDP have argued that though the party vote grew from 5, 5,000 in 1884 to 2 million in 1898 to nearly 4 million by 1913 it was a party which was weakened by social limitations and ideological beliefs. According to some scholars, the party was weakened by its excessive commitment to parliamentary democracy and the fact that a large number of its members supported revisionism. Given this context, the enthusiastic participation of the SDP and its supports in the Kaiser's war in 1914 is not a matter of surprise. Furthermore an analysis of the failings of the SDP suggests that this was one of the ideological and political factors which allowed German right-wing nationalism to acquire political ascendancy despite powerful counter vailing forces. The German right-wing was able to forge an alliance of land owners, industrialist and middle class to hold in check the growth of the liberal middle class, workers and socialism but this cannot be regarded as an inevitable outcome of Germany's authoritarian modernization and political unification.

9.8 ITALIAN NATIONALISM AND POPULAR MOBILIZATION

In Italy the participation of the masses and the peasantry was limited because of the conservatism of the rulers of states, the reluctance of the landlords to grant concessions to the peasants to draw them into the national movement, the inability of the intelligentsia and the revolutionaries to bridge the gap between town and country and the fear of radical change which affected the elite which dominated Italy in the 19th century.

It has been argued by F.J. Coppa that the 1848 war was an “ideological war” on the Italian side. In the War against Austria, Garibaldi’s volunteers and Milanese revolutionaries fought with troops from Piedmont, the Papal States, Tuscany and Naples.

Yet the participation of rulers was born out of fear of revolution or force of public opinion. The failure of the Republic in Venice and Rome is also the failure of Mazzinian ideals of people’s war. In 1859-61 the motives of Count Cavour were “patriotic rather than nationalist” since his objective was to secure a dominant position for Piedmont more than an ideological commitment to Italian unification. The successful ‘southern initiative’ of Garibaldi produced a revolution in Sicily and after his victory in Naples he seemed to have willingly accepted an auxiliary role in the process of Italian unification which Cavour assigned to him. Garibaldi accepted the need to work with the monarchy long before he launched his movement. It was thus possible to unify Italy both by force and popular consent as manifested in the plebiscites. The centralized form of government of the new Italian state alienated a section of public opinion in both Naples and Sicily. A war with brigands in the Neapolitan provinces between 1861 and 1865 represented the sense of alienation felt in the Italian south from the new centralized Italian nation state. The fact that only a tiny minority of 2.5% spoke Italian at the time of unification, that over 100,000 troops had to be deployed to establish control over the turbulent south soon after unification, the fact that Cavour had to instruct his agents in Central Italy to conduct plebiscites to demonstrate that the people endorsed the decisions of their assemblies to enter into a union with Piedmont, the fact that Napoleon III of France and Cavour of Piedmont conspired to ensure that the plebiscite in the Romagna and the Duchies went in favour of Piedmont, and in Nice and Savoy in favour of the French, revealed the insufficiency of mass participation in the process of Italian unification.

In Italy the divisions between a more industrialized north, a less developed central region and the neglected and backward south actually intensified after Italian unification. The Italian south remained an alienated, almost colonized, region. The Italian unification, due more to military success and international diplomacy rather than people’s war or mass struggles, was based on the low levels of mobilization. Even after the creation of the Kingdom of Italy politics of the nation was dominated by political parties with narrow social bases and limited contact with Italian people. The extension of the franchise, the spread of public education, the growth of industries and towns in Italy was slower than in France and Germany. For these reasons the politics of Italy was regarded as a form of ‘trasformismo’ in which despite frequent political realignments and change there was little substantial change. In Antonio Gramsci’s words, the process of Italian unification was a ‘passive revolution’ in which the Italian elite mobilized the Italian masses

only to the extent necessary to achieve national unification and independence from Austria. The democratic mobilization of the people was slow and the absence of organic intellectuals in Italy impeded the development of more radical movements. With the growth of industries, workers organisations and socialism, the conservative politicians of Italy and land owners and lower middle class in particular, felt endangered. In fact the economic development of Italy and growth of civil society and democratic values was so slow and inadequate that the crisis after World War I created conditions for the growth of fascism and Mussolini's victory. The post-war crisis led to a fascist victory despite the fact that Italy had played a less significant role in the war and joined late. Italian democracy developed slowly even after unification and Italian nationalism did not succeed in winning over Italians in the south.

9.9 PHASES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT: EASTERN EUROPE

The study of nationalism in the small states of Eastern Europe by Miroslav Hroch yielded the notion of three phases in the development of national movements. In the first stage or phase A there was primarily an emphasis on culture, literature and folklore; in phase B pioneers of national ideas and its publicists occupied centre-stage. It was only in the third stage — phase C — that the national movements acquired mass support on any significant scale. There may be problem with this schema but it is suitable for the study of nationalism in Eastern Europe. It may be more useful to club phase A and B together for our purposes.

9.9.1 Cultural Nationalism: Phase A and B

The developments of an European romantic perception of natural and untainted peasantry with a serious study of folklore by the late 18th century provided a basis for many a national movement in Eastern Europe by the late 19th century. The cultural and linguistic movements in Europe between the 1780s and 1840s were the handiwork of scholars and ruling elites anxious to preserve and develop national traditions of forgotten peoples or peasants and were sometimes even the product of foreign scholars and elites. However, language based cultural revival of this early phase has been regarded as a conscious act of constructing a 'national' language rather than rescuing an ancient tongue and culture. Cultural nationalists chose one among the many dialects to produce a national language, standardization of grammar and additions to vocabulary being matters of some importance. Literary Bulgarian was based on the West Bulgarian idiom; literary Ukrainian on its south eastern dialects; Lithuanian was based on one of two dialects and Latvian on one of three. While many of the East European languages developed or constructed their literary culture somewhere between the late 18th and 19th centuries, literary Hungarian emerged in the 16th century.

Although the Croats spoke three dialects, the Croat proponent of Illyrianism, Ljudevic Gaj (1809-72) switched to Slovakian in 1838 since this was also the major dialect of Serbs. This was a conscious effort to unite the southern Slavs. Although Serb-Croat developed as one literary language, the Catholic Croats used Roman characters while the Orthodox Serbs used Cyrillic ones. In the case of Slovak, the choice of one dialect chosen about 1790 was abandoned in favour of another a few decades later as the basis of literary Slovak. In eastern Europe— specially south eastern Europe — the ethnic and linguistic diversity was greater

than in the rest of Europe, specially western Europe, and awareness of distinct linguistic cultural identity emerged late. The Magyars, however, probably had a distinct sense of themselves as an ethnic group with a language of their own even in the 13th century. In fact not only the Magyars, but the Czechs and the Poles too had developed a distinct identity based on ethnicity or language but their concept of nation did not include the peasants and the common people.

Czech Nationalism

The emergence of a common Czech national feeling is attributable to the fear of competition for senior posts from immigrant German clerics felt by the native clergy. The influx of German colonists into Bohemia in the 12th century where they were successfully engaged in mining and handicraft production, led to emphasis on their own language by Czechs in order to draw a distinction between themselves and German migrants. The existence of a reasonably strong state and attachment to their language gave the Czechs a sense of common identity even in the Middle Ages. During the Hussite era language, origin and faith bound the Czech nation.

The Czechs did not have their own independent state during the 18th and 19th centuries. As a consequence, the nobility spoke German, Spanish or French, the townsmen German, leaving only the peasantry and the urban poor to speak the Czech language. The development of capitalism and the migration of Czech workers into towns created the basis for modern Czech nationalism. The revival of Czech language and literature was taken up by the intelligentsia in the late 18th century, by the sons of clerks, handicraftsmen and servants who had received university education. In the 1780s Czech language and theatre was patronized even by craftsmen and workers. The objective of a growing Czech intelligentsia was to “acquire equal rights for the modern Czech nation with that of the German nation in Czech Lands”. Over the first half of the 19th century, the Czech intelligentsia, drawn mainly from small town craftsmen’s families, promoted Czech as a language of instruction in schools. By using newspapers, theatres and public discussion, the Czech cause was promoted and linked with Slav solidarity. The Czechs who constituted about 70 per cent of the population in Bohemia and Moravia in the mid 19th century had almost no political rights while the Germans had full political rights. Discussions in public houses and debates over internal conditions in Russia and Germany led the intelligentsia to opt for equality with Germans in Czech lands within the Austrian framework. In Austria it was possible to live with other Slavs – Poles, Slovaks, Croats – affording both safety in numbers and a better chance for Czechs to achieve their rights than under more authoritarian Tsarist autocracy or more homogenizing German Empire. The Germanization of the Elbe Slavs was a factor influencing Czech thinking in their attitude towards political union with Germany. The doctrine wanted to transform the Austrian absolutist state into “a federal state of nations enjoying equal rights”.

Hungarian Nationalism

In the case of Hungary national awakening among Hungarians took place at about the same time as among other ethnic groups in the late 18th century. E. Niederhauser distinguishes between two phases in the national movement, cultural and political. During cultural nationalist phase, a national language is created from among numerous dialects and a historical consciousness emerges. In the political phase demands for local autonomy and use of national language in administration eventually creates a nation state. In Hungary, diverse ethnic groups

existed – conquering Hungarian tribes settled amongst Slavonic tribes, German settlers, and Turkish ethnic groups; Vlachs in Transylvania added to Hungary's ethnic mix. Ottoman occupation from 1541 until the end of the 17th century of the central part of Hungary affected the ethnic balance just as subsequent Habsburg policy of introducing German settlers in Southern Hungary altered demographic equations. Only the Magyars and the Croats produced a significant feudal elite in Hungary with a legal political life in the Diets, though Transylvania had its own Diet.

9.9.2 Spread of National Idea and Nationalism

E.J. Hobsbawm shows that autonomous popular movements of national defence against foreign invaders had ideologies which were “social and religious” rather than national. In 15th and 16th century European peasants who felt betrayed by their nobles decided to take up cudgels on behalf of their faith against invading Turks. A popular national patriotism arose in Hussite Bohemia or on the military frontiers of Christian states among armed peasant groups, given sufficient freedom to enable them to combat invaders. The Cossacks are an example. Proto-national feeling existed among the Serbs because they kept alive the memory of the old Serb kingdom destroyed by the Turks. Some form of patriotism was also kept alive by the Serbian Church which canonized Serb kings. Although the Cossacks were not drawn from any one ethnic group, they were united by belief. In 17th century Russia, pressures from both Catholic Poland and Muslim Turks made religion and holy icons an important element in popular consciousness. It was only after the growth of a sense of cultural nationalism based on a sense of language, culture and history that nationalism as an idea influenced the smaller nationalities of Eastern Europe.

Czechoslovakia

The Czech politicians of the late 19th century produced no grand political schemes and settled for small concessions. Economic and cultural advances in Czech Lands by German capital meant that there was little support on economic grounds for Czech nationalism. It was World War I which triggered nationalism in the Czech Lands as elsewhere in Europe. Wartime difficulties produced unrest in towns, desertions on the battle field from 1915 onwards and eventually Czech writers in 1917 published a manifesto supporting a future democratic Europe of free nations. Tomas Masaryk pleaded for the independence of small nations in Europe in October 1915 and rapid political changes during World War I led to the realization of such dreams. In 1915 the demand for an independent Czechoslovak state was made. Czech and Slovak military units joined the enemies of Austria-Hungary during World War I and thus established their claims to recognition by the victorious Entente powers. After a thousand years the Czech Lands were reunited with Slovakia-the result of Czech nationalism, the effects of World War I on large dynastic states, and President Wilson's support for national self-determination.

Hungary

In Hungary the creation of the Dual Monarchy appeased the Hungarians but aroused national sentiment among other nationalities. According to the official census between 1850 and 1910, conducted by the Hapsburgs, the Hungarians constituted an absolute majority only from 1890 onwards. Even including Croatia in 1910, the Hungarians constituted only 51.5 per cent of the whole population.

Under the Nationality Act of 1868, the state gave non-Magyars the rights to schools in their mother tongue and rights to form banks and economic associations but the idea of the nation-state demanded that the Hungarian nation and its claims be paramount. In 1883 the government which made Hungarian compulsory in secondary schools, though it was not compulsory in elementary schools until 1907. Hungarian statesmen tried to assimilate the non-Magyar population by means of state language Hungarian. According to Peter Hanak, between 1890-1914, as a result of modernization and industrialization more than a million people were successfully assimilated by the Magyars. Budapest, which in the mid-19th century had a German speaking and non-Magyar population, became a Hungarian speaking city by the early 20th century. In fact Magyarisation was in fact encouraged by the government to reduce the non-Magyar population. Approximately three million people migrated to the USA, mainly Slovaks and Serbs.

The government could not however influence the economic performance of various nationalities. It could not thwart the rise of Romanian-owned savingsbanks. The Churches supported secondary schools where students were taught in their mother tongue. Since the Church prelates had representation in the Upper House, they could represent their nationalities there. All the Churches were considered 'national' Churches with the exception of those of Slovaks and Germans since these nationalities were divided between Catholicism and Lutheranism. The Orthodox Church took up the cause of Serbs and majority of Romanians, and the Uniate Church for the Ruthenes and minority of Romanians. The high electoral census was intended not merely to keep out the non-Magyars from the political system but also Magyar parties hostile to the regime. By the early 20th century a new more active political elite emerged among the Romanians and Slovak.

The break-up of the Hapsburg Empire of Austria-Hungary led to the creation of new nation states of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. Owing to problems involved in demarcating precise national frontiers-which plagued the post-war settlement-over three million Magyars became a minority in the newly independent neighbouring states of a truncated Hungary. It was a "great reversal of roles" which made the dominant Magyars a minority in new states, since the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 forced one in three Magyars to live outside the country. Hungarian ruling elites lost big estates, banks and factories, and therefore they used discounted produce by the reduction of Hungary to one-third of its former size to mobilize opposition to the unjust Treaty of Trianon. The conservative elites, utilizing this Treaty to deflect popular discontent into nationalist channels, eventually carried Hungary into the camp of fascist Germany and Italy during World War II.

Poland

In Poland the nobility by the 18th century developed a sense of Polish identity based on the acceptance of Polish language and culture. The Polish nobility, constituting 8 per cent of the country's population was large by European standards. The peasants and even burghers were not included in the political nation at the end of the 18th century.

As for the peasantry, they spoke Polish dialects in the western provinces, Ruthenian dialects in the east, and Lithuanian in the north-east. Language was

not yet in the 18th century a basis for national consciousness. The religious differences of the Polish population played a significant role in this period. Peasants did not have a developed national consciousness but they participated in the battle for Polish independence in late 18th century. It was during the 19th century that abolition of serfdom and enfranchisement-the ending of villeinage-took place at different points in time under the auspices of three Great Powers-Prussia, Austria and Russia, which partitioned Poland among themselves in the 18th century. National consciousness was speeded up by granting civil and democratic rights to burghers and later Jews; by movements and parties demanding agricultural reform; and by the gradual elimination of legal inequalities between classes.

The second half of the 19th century saw the emergence of a Belorussian and Ukrainian national consciousness based on language and literature which resisted domination by Polish language and literature. Polish writers from Belorussian lands also wrote in Belorussian and helped to create a national literary tradition. These differences of language were linked to social differences. Polish was linked to nobility and intelligentsia while Belorussian and Ukrainian consciousness emerged from within a plebeian tradition opposed to the Polish state. In so far as Polish was a language of upper classes or those seeking upward mobility it was considered a natural step for the peasant to accept Polish as granting higher status because of cultural language. Therefore Belorussian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian, regarded as peasant languages, were considered inferior. While Polish national consciousness developed as a response to oppressive German nationalism after creation of an independent Poland in 1918 the nationalism of the Poles too, became oppressive towards minority groups

The Polish Republic which came into being in 1920 was a product of revolutionary changes which swept the whole of central and eastern Europe stirring national consciousness of several groups. In the new Polish state over one-third of the population was non Polish: the Ukrainians constituting 16 per cent, the Jews 10% and the Belorussian 6 per cent of the population in 1931. It was during the inter-war years that national consciousness developed among Ukrainians and Belorussian although simultaneously processes of assimilation were also at work and many people “belonged to groups of intermediate or incipient national consciousness”.

The growth of fascism intensified national antagonisms throughout Europe in the 1930s and thus helped to undermine the settlement at Versailles based on the principle of national self-determination at the end of World War I. The development of national movements and nationalism in Eastern Europe during the inter-war period, the course of World War II, and the final post-war settlement devised at Tehran, Potsdam and Yalta by the Victorious Allies, shaped the post World War II map of nation states in Eastern Europe and the political map of all Europe.

Check Your Progress 2

- 1) How did liberal democratic ideas foster the growth of nationalism in Europe?

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- 2) What was the role of language in the development of nation-states?

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- 3) Discuss the emergence of nationalism in Eastern Europe in about 150 words.

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9.10 LET US SUM UP

In the preceding discussion about nationalism and nation-state you have seen that in most cases nationalist idea preceded the growth of nation-state. The democratization of polity in Europe helped popular mobilizations around issues like language and empire-building which strengthened the feeling of nationalism among people. The modern states also played a crucial role in giving shape to nationalist feelings and forging nation-states. We have also discussed that in Eastern Europe, excepting Russia, cultural issues proved to be more important than economic ones in giving rise to nationalist sentiment.

9.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISES

Check Your Progress 1

- 1) (a) no; (b) no; (c) yes; (d) yes
- 2) See the Sections 9.2 and 9.3
- 3) See Section 9.5

Check Your Progress 2

- 1) See Sub-section 9.6.1
- 2) See Sub-sections 9.6.2 and 9.6.3
- 3) See Section 9.9