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5.1 INTRODUCTION

In response to conflicts, the international community pledged billions of dollars in aid to countries recovering from violent conflicts. By providing a bridge between emergency humanitarian relief and long-term development, these resources are designed to persuade formerly warring parties to resolve conflicts peacefully and intended to lay the foundations for a sustainable transition to economic growth and participatory governance. From Cambodia to Bosnia, El Salvador to Rwanda, and Tajikistan to Lebanon, multilateral and bilateral agencies have supported conflict resolution and peace-building with packages of grants, low-interest loans, debt forgiveness and technical assistance. While these aid packages undoubtedly have contributed to recovery from conflict, it is nonetheless disturbing that the planning and implementation of reconstruction aid has frequently suffered from inadequate preparation, poor coordination and lack of perseverance on the part of donor agencies. At a minimum, these discrepancies produce skepticism among international community, recipients, and public alike about the ultimate value of the vast amounts purportedly committed to reconstruct conflict-torn societies.

Aims and Objectives

After reading this Unit, you would be able to understand the

- issues involved in the post-conflict recovery
- response by international agencies in conflict-torn societies
- importance of co-ordination and capacity-building
- the role of the UN and
- importance of finance in the recovery process.

5.2 POST-CONFLICT RECOVERY

Violence may persist at lower levels within the society, continue unabated in certain regions, or flare sporadically. Moreover, refugees and internally displaced persons may begin to return to their homes or communities, even as conflict continues, thereby triggering the need for international aid. An international effort to reconstruct societies torn by protracted violence falls under the rubric of "post-conflict peace-building." This concept was introduced in *An Agenda for Peace* (1991), Boutros Boutros-Ghali's vision for post-Cold War security. The former UN Secretary-General defined the phrase as collective "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."

Ways for Sustainable Recovery

Although each conflict situation has unique attributes, successful recovery often involves a "triple transition": a security transition from war to peace; a political transition from authoritarianism or totalitarianism to a more participatory form of government; and a socio-economic transition, including the rebuilding of economic capacities and, frequently, the movement from a controlled to a market economy. Sustainable recovery from conflict requires laying new foundations for social peace, political stability, and economic growth in beleaguered countries. To advance this war-to-peace transition, international communities have supported an awesome array of essential activities. They have helped to draft and implement peace accords, plan and monitor disarmament, demobilise and reintegrate combatants, train local police, and restore human security. They have promoted efforts to re-establish the rule of law, conduct democratic elections, and draft new constitutions, reform judicial systems, rebuild state structures, improve local governance, and monitor human rights. And they have provided assistance to reintegrate refugees and displaced persons, provide essential services, restore transportation and communication links, rebuild social capital, repair infrastructure, jump-start industrial and agricultural production, reconstitute financial institutions, and revive commercial activity.

Challenges of Recovery

The end of the Cold War raised hopes that the international community might employ an anticipated "peace dividend" for social and economic development in many impoverished and war-torn societies. In fact, some ninety new conflicts erupted, largely intra-state in nature, demanding huge financial outlays for both humanitarian relief and peace-building. Most of these ranked among the poorest in the world and the **farthest** from international development objectives. The United Nations system found its capacities taxed by complex humanitarian emergencies characterised by recurrent violence, breakdown of governing institutions, destruction of physical infrastructure, displacement of populations, and massive human suffering. The focus of international reconstruction efforts are on laying the foundation for durable peace and recovery. Given the magnitude of the problem, no single state or international organisation could address the multiple needs associated with reconstructing war-torn states as scattered and diverse as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and Guatemala.

Successful recovery in these cases demands multilateral cooperation among the UN agencies, international financial institutions (IFIs), and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as a central role for local actors.

5.3 ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

There is a broad agreement among the international community that the sustainable movement to social, economic, and political stability in societies emerging from conflict cannot occur unless local partners invest in a set of urgent, essential activities. The framework to design, coordinate and deliver aid remains woefully fragmented. Generally, international agencies take tentative steps to formulate common principles and best practices to inform their interventions. These include the OECD guidelines on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation, the UN's "Strategic Framework Approach for Response to and Recovery from Crisis," and the World Bank's official guidelines, Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank. In addition, there have been some efforts at internal reform, particularly within the United Nations system. To make optimal use of scarce resources, post-conflict reconstruction needs to be under-girded by more reliable institutional and financial arrangements. These time-sensitive needs, which often go unmet, reflect the widespread destruction of the social, economic and political fabric of societies following prolonged conflict.

Effective Assessment of the Ground Situation

There is a need to address the problems of societies emerging from conflict in a timely and coherent manner in order to ensure a greater likelihood that they will move toward sustainable peace and development rather than return to conflict. A common needs assessment is essential for effective and efficient programme design and implementation. The assessment should begin even as the conflict is underway, should highlight the essential economic, social and political reintegration elements. It should be sensitive to variations and contingencies in conflict settlement. Situation-specific strategic analyses, based on a clear understanding of local conditions, are essential to setting priorities and sequencing response activities.

5.4 STRENGTHEN UN COORDINATION

The UN Secretary-General's reform programme of July 1997 elevated post-conflict peace-building to the top of the UN's agenda. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) was designated the "focal point" for these activities within the UN System. The funds and programmes of the United Nations, such as UNDP, UNICEF, and UNHCR have been prominent actors in their respective domains in supporting recovery from conflict. The World Food Program conducts extensive relief, recovery and development programmes in conflict situations. Other agencies such as WHO and FAO, also have specialised units in place to address the needs of recovery from conflict. However, these funds remain modest (\$50 million in 1998). For its part, United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has long spearheaded the resettlement of refugees. To finance its operations, UNHCR depends upon core financing from donor governments' appeals for emergency situations. Several efforts are underway to promote joint planning and coordination efforts within the UN and the extended multilateral family to respond to

conflict, complex emergencies, and peace-building. Recent initiatives have been launched, for example, by the Executive Committees on Peace and Security and Humanitarian Assistance by the United Nations Development Group, by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration, and by the ECOSOC humanitarian segment.

The United Nations should redouble its current efforts to strengthen and harmonise those offices critical for effective field coordination: the position of Special Representative of the Secretary General and the function of the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator. The post-conflict recovery often begins in the context of multidimensional peace operations under the UN command. For example, the UN-led peacekeeping or observer missions were in place when international reconstruction efforts began in Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Tajikistan. In cases where the UN has been given a lead role, an SRSG is generally appointed to coordinate the activities of the UN agencies on the ground and to help reconcile the UN's strategies for peace implementation and recovery assistance. Most importantly, the SRSG should be granted direct access and supervision over the resources of these entities. The Secretary-General's innovation of a single "UN House" containing all agencies should improve local coordination.

Strengthening Regional Coordination

Many recent conflicts, although defined as intra-state, possess important international dimensions, including the flows of refugees and arms across borders and the destabilisation of neighbouring economies. As a matter of principle, aid coordination is a task that belongs squarely to the mandate of recipient governments. They alone have the responsibility for deciding what aid to request, from whom to request it, and how to weave external assistance into their own development strategies. However, governance structures are often fragmentary following conflict, and the international community will by default often need to take on a disproportionate role in the coordination process, while over time orchestrating a hand-over of these tasks. Since each bilateral donor, international agency, and IFI has its own mandate and autonomy, it is inherently difficult to formulate a common strategy for reconstruction and peace-building. These tensions and inconsistencies are exacerbated by the simultaneity or overlap of several different transitions. Under such circumstances, the recovering country may be moving all at once from war to peace, from a command to a market economy, from an authoritarian to a pluralistic political system, and from a complex emergency to a more conventional development situation.

5.5 ADOPT REALISTIC TIME FRAMES

In view of formidable challenges, international community needs to be realistic about the length of their engagement. The sustainable transition from conflict requires a commitment significantly longer than the two to three years international community typically allots to reconstruction programmes and perhaps as long as 6-10 years. Where international community confronts an essentially settled conflict, they may wish to negotiate an explicit timetable with the government. In cases where "peace" is more of an

uncertain truce, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, setting firm deadlines for withdrawal may be impractical.

5.6 ENCOURAGING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Reports of corruption within countries emerging from conflict can have devastating consequences for continued donor support for their recovery. International community should thus design aid interventions in ways that maximise transparency in the use of internal and external funds and that hold local officials accountable. At the same time, international community will need to be attentive to the political realities of recovering societies and the requirements of stability. In the past, peace-building concerns have sometimes led international community to tolerate non-conventional economic instruments and to accept policies by aid recipients that depart from normal standards of transparency. This is obviously a delicate issue that creates quandaries for external actors. In the West Bank and Gaza, for example, Yasser Arafat and the Fateh party have stabilised the post-Oslo political situation partly through a massive system of political patronage that rewards loyalists with employment in a bloated civil service and generates income through quasi-official monopolies. The problem, of course, is that such short-term expedients may prevent a stable macroeconomic framework and if unsustainable -- ultimately undermine the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority. The dilemma for international community is, how long to tolerate convenient departures from economic efficiency and political accountability. By injecting large amounts of assistance into war-torn countries, the international community inevitably distorts local systems of production and exchange. Such an aid-driven economy alters social power balances, and rival political elite and factions may exploit foreign assistance to gain leverage over national resources (e.g., lumber in Cambodia, diamonds in Sierra Leone). International community must be attuned to the political economy of conflict and the criminalised nature of many conflict economies, and they should try to direct external resources to local actors who support peace-building goals.

5.7 CREATE COORDINATION MECHANISMS PROMPTLY

The International community should establish structures of local aid coordination as soon as possible in cases where local authorities lack sufficient capacity to do so on their own. Failure to do so can delay essential recovery tasks. Experience in several conflict environments, including the West Bank and Gaza, suggests that there is value in creating multi-tiered coordination mechanisms, with inclusive and exclusive memberships. These might include high-level political fora to oversee progress towards peace-building goals, a committee to coordinate overall assistance, and working groups to supervise aid implementation in particular sectors. It should be noted that political rivalry among international community for leadership of the aid effort and/or disagreements over the application of aid conditions can impair smooth coordination. In the West Bank and Gaza, for example, the European Union sought a coordinating role commensurate with its status as the leading donor to the Occupied Territories. The United States, the leading diplomatic actor in the West Asian peace process, favoured assigning this role to the World Bank. The American position ultimately prevailed. The Donor rivalry also occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the United States clashed with the World Bank over

peace conditionality. There is also a need to improve the internal coherence of their national approaches toward each war-torn country.

The post-conflict countries vary enormously in their ability to manage and absorb foreign assistance. Following extensive violence, recipients may lack the human, technical, and administrative capacities required to make use of large quantities of aid or to coordinate the multiple international community and NGOs that arrive to assist their recovery. International community can nurture recipient capacities in several ways: by acknowledging and supporting the recipient government's central role in planning and coordinating aid; by financing important public sector expenditures; by providing appropriate technical assistance and training; by adjusting pressure for macroeconomic stabilisation; by facilitating the early clearance of arrears; and by prolonging their engagement in the country. The following paragraphs address these points. International community must engage governments and local stakeholders in broad consultations throughout the recovery effort. As early as practicable, though, the local governing authority should assume responsibility for coordinating assistance. To foster healthy political development, international agencies need to balance their efforts to rebuild state capacities with support for private groups and institutions. Particularly in the early period of recovery from conflict, the legitimacy of a new government may be contested by broad segments of society. To foster political reconciliation, local ownership, and indigenous capacities for recovery, international community must bolster the constructive involvement of opposition parties and civil society actors in the political and economic life of the country. Aid interventions should possess a gender dimension to take advantage of the potential role of women as a force for social peace.

One obvious way for international agencies to build local capacities is to channel aid directly through the national budgets of countries emerging from conflict. Bilateral international community generally resists doing this, preferring to finance projects reflecting their own priorities, to fund service providers of their own nationality, and to procure goods from their own country. The result may be programmes reflecting donor's political agenda and economic interests rather than those of the local actors. The war-to-peace transitions are costly. Besides making "normal" expenditures, recovering governments must deliver on specific peace commitments, finance reconstruction initiatives, and fund projects which reward loyalists and reintegrate enemies. It may be impossible to maintain strict budgetary balance in the face of these competing demands. Precipitate emphasis on fiscal rigour, trade liberalisation, and privatisation may reduce the state's capacity to rebuild and deliver basic services and to achieve the promise of peace accords, threatening reconciliation and undermining social peace. Thus pressure for economic reform must be embedded in the political reality of the transition.

5.8 FINANCING RECOVERY

Societies emerging from conflict require flexible, quick-disbursing funds designed to meet the special tasks of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Unfortunately, unlike funding for the UN's peace-making and peacekeeping missions, which is based on regular budget assessments, contributions for recovery activities are entirely voluntary. Over the past

decade, the international community has realised that there is no simple "continuum" linking relief, recovery, and development. The challenge is to build complementarily into the efforts of different international community by recognising the forward and backward linkages between different types of aid interventions. Relief funds usually need to be disbursed within one year, a time horizon too short to launch sustainable recovery. Recovery is thus forced to rely on slower- disbursing development aid that is often conditioned on political criteria and does not flow seamlessly when relief funding ends — exacerbating the so-called relief-to- development gap. In the absence of a dedicated facility, the international community will continue to create special ad hoc mechanisms for each recovering country. Within the UN system, several tools exist to facilitate collaborative financing, including trust funds, cost-sharing, and parallel financing. Each instrument can involve a variety of multilateral organisations, governments, financial institutions, NGOs, and private sector actors. Each has its own advantages and constraints.

Role of World Bank and International Monetary Fund

The Bretton Woods Institutions have become important actors in supporting recovery from war and preventing the re-emergence of violent conflict. By spring 1998, the World Bank had committed \$6.2 billion in loans to support reconstruction operations in 18 countries and provided post-conflict grants worth \$400 million. The Bank has an important role to play in post-conflict situations by advising parties on the economic dimensions of peace accords; assisting the assessment of local needs; arranging the clearance of arrears; assisting governments in coordinating macroeconomic policy; restoring physical infrastructure; and monitoring aid flows. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) will consider assisting a post-conflict country experiencing severe balance of payments difficulties if the recipient government demonstrates sufficient capacity and commitment to plan and implement an acceptable economic programme. Although the recent innovations by the Bretton Woods Institutions are to be welcomed, these institutional reforms need to be deepened. Firstly, the Bank has not yet given sufficient operational content to its institutional guidelines on post-conflict activities nor has it revised its current operational policy for disaster assistance to address such contexts. Secondly, the Bank's procurement and disbursement procedures often create stumbling blocks to recovery, including untimely aid delivery. Recognising the primacy of the peace-building imperative, the Carnegie Commission report, Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997) calls on the World Bank and the IMF to cooperate with the United Nations, "so that economic inducements can play a more central role in early prevention and in post-conflict reconstruction." Despite their self-described "apolitical" status, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund now condition lending on politically sensitive criteria like "financial transparency," "good governance," and "unproductive expenditures" like high defence spending. They do on the grounds of economic efficiency and sustainable development. The IFIs have also begun to incorporate social impact analyses into their lending practices and safety nets into their stabilisation and structural adjustment packages. The World Bank now realises that structural adjustment programmes must be "peace-friendly" and that the actual sequence of economic policy and governance reforms should be "tailored to avoid threatening the sustainability of

peace agreements." The past decade has witnessed the emergence of a "second generation" of aid conditionality focused on democratic governance, human rights, administrative accountability, and curtailed military expenditures.

Debt Relief for Rebuilding Capacity

One of the most valuable steps that the international community could take to build the capacities of countries emerging from conflict is to provide them with significant debt relief. Many such states find themselves strapped with huge financial obligations to international financial institutions, often incurred by former regimes. Without the early arrears clearance, they cannot receive new resources from either the IDA or the IMF, nor can they hope to attract significant foreign investment. In response to public pressure to reduce debt burdens on the world's poorest countries, the World Bank and the IMF sponsored the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (or HIPC) initiative. Later, the Fund and the Bank extended this programme, partly in recognition of the challenge facing war-torn countries. Nevertheless, the HIPC remains inadequate on several counts. Another possibility under consideration would be to suspend loan repayment requirements for countries that show good faith in developing good governance and rule of law structures, making them eligible for grants and turning negative cash flows into positive ones for a sustained period of time. During this transition period, a longer-term arrears clearance programme could be worked out between the international financial institutions and the debtor country.

Fulfilling Unfulfilled Pledges

Peace accords and the aid commitments that accompany them generate tremendous expectations within societies torn by conflict. By promising to launch economic recovery, pledges of aid can help consolidate fragile peace agreements. Generous promises mean little; however, they can be translated promptly into accessible, flexible resources that make tangible improvements in the daily lives of long-suffering populations. It is of concern that much of the aid pledged by the international community arrives only after considerable delays, or never at all. The International community makes pledges, but there is typically a lag before these are translated into commitments, and still further into disbursements. Unsustainable and unpredictable disbursements can wreak havoc on reconstruction and peace-building efforts and shatter local expectations.

Two examples will help to illustrate a broader pattern of problems. Consider the case of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In October 1993, international community responded to the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles by pledging some \$2.4 billion over five years to lay the economic foundation for self-rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. By June 1997, the top ten donors to the Palestinian Authority had pledged more than \$3.4 billion and committed nearly \$2.8 billion, but less than half of the latter amount had been disbursed. The United States, ostensibly the largest donor, had delivered on only two-fifths of its initial pledge. Cambodia experienced similar difficulties with the uneven disbursement of approximately \$3 billion promised to support its postwar recovery. The donor community pledged \$880 million at the June 1992 Conference on Rehabilitation

and Reconstruction of Cambodia. Only \$200 million had been disbursed by September 1993 (when the new government was formed), and only \$460 million by the end of 1995. Moreover, many donor-driven projects were inappropriate for Cambodia's priority needs and barely touched rural areas outside the capital.

Tracking Aid Delivery

To ensure the efficacy and legitimacy of its efforts, the donor community must improve its capacities to monitor the delivery and implementation of post-conflict assistance. International community urgently needs a standardised accounting system for reporting aid flows, one that can be applied in every circumstance. Such a comprehensive database, broken down by pledges, commitments, and disbursements, should be updated quarterly and be readily accessible to all stakeholders and interested observers.

Making aid flows transparent would allow all stakeholders to assess progress and encourage international community to meet their obligations in a timely fashion. This has certainly been the experience in the West Bank and Gaza. The accurate, accessible database maintained by the World Bank and the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation has spurred international community to make good on their commitments and the Palestinian Authority to improve the implementation of delivered aid.

5.9 ASSESSING PROGRESS

Beyond creating mechanisms to gauge the delivery of promised assistance, the international community needs to develop tools to evaluate its impact. Within aid agencies, incentive structures generally reward the ability to "move money," rather than virtuosity in designing assistance appropriately. Consequently, societies emerging from conflict may receive aid that is redundant, harmful or squandered. The predictable result can be too much of the wrong type of aid. There are general reasons for the current inattention to issues of impact. The agencies lack simple methodologies to assess the results of recovery aid. It is difficult to apply data-hungry econometric models in many conflict-ridden environments, where even baseline data may be lacking. The donor community needs to develop benchmarks and indicators appropriate to war-torn settings.

5.10 SUMMARY

It is clear by the above in-depth analysis of the post-conflict responses by the international community that keeping the conflict-ridden society "peaceful" is a major challenge before the mankind.

Therefore, there is a greater need to make capacity building a measurable activity; the international community should devise benchmarks, appropriate to each country contextually that will allow them to gauge progress towards economic recovery, human security, and participatory governance. In the economic sphere, these indicators would measure the reconstruction of physical infrastructure and utilities, the composition of public spending, the degree of macroeconomic balance, the appropriateness of fiscal instruments, the country's debt position, the distribution of national wealth, the

reintegration of refugees, the provision of basic social services, the rehabilitation of agriculture, and the reactivation of critical industries.

In the security realm, benchmarks should assess the demobilisation of combatants, their reintegration into productive life, the reconstitution of armed forces, the creation of civilian police, the disarmament of the population, and the provision of personal security from crime. In the political arena, they should assess the strength of the rule of law and the judiciary, the protection of human rights, the progress of reconciliation panels and truth commissions, the conduct of democratic elections, the transparency of political institutions, the re-establishment of public administration, and the vigour of civil society. At present, neither the international community nor independent scholars possess sophisticated analytical tools to conduct longitudinal evaluations of recovery assistance. To assess the impact of recovery assistance, analysts will need to develop benchmarks for "success", defined in terms of sustainable economic recovery and the preservation of peace, and tools to evaluate the role that aid players in producing such outcomes. This in turn has implications for programme design, since such benchmarks need to be defined at the outset of a venture, rather than after the fact. Only a rigorous process of goal setting with measurable landmarks at the design stage will allow for corrective action at the stage of implementation — and the avoidance of bitter audit observations after resources have been squandered.

Evaluation efforts are generally assumed to be not only time-consuming but also expensive. In fact, recent experience suggests that evaluation can be done rapidly and in a cost-effective manner. For example, the path-breaking multi-donor evaluation of assistance to Rwanda, involving four teams and fifty-two people, lasted just a year and cost only \$1.8 million dollars, a fairly modest sum given the important lessons derived from the study. Moreover, the hidden costs of ineffective programme management due to the lack of evaluations can far exceed even the most thorough evaluation project and have an impact that is often not only monetary but also political. A final and a more difficult obstacle is that there are few incentives within aid agencies to conduct self-critical evaluations of aid impact. As in most bureaucracies, officials in these institutions are likely to be constrained by concerns of self-preservation. Honest appraisals may bring unwelcome publicity, jeopardising the external credibility and funding. Moreover, they may at times offend the recipient government.

5.11 TERMINAL QUESTIONS

1. 'Post-conflict recovery is an integral element of peace- building'. Discuss it at length.
2. Examine the role of United Nations in strengthening the conflict-ridden societies.
3. Discuss at length the role of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in societies emerging from conflict.

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UNIT 6

OBJECTIVES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Structure**6.1 Introduction****Aims and Objectives****6.2 Methods****6.3 Different Approaches****6.4 United Nations and Conflict Management****6.5 Conflict Management in Cultural Context****6.6 Factors Affecting the Course of Conflict Management****6.7 Social and Environmental Dimensions of Conflict****6.8 Arms Proliferation and Conflict Management****6.9 Criticism of the Concept of Conflict Management****6.10 Summary****6.11 Terminal Questions****Suggested Readings**

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Wars produce the worst violations of human rights worldwide and are the greatest impediments to human development. Most of the more than 50 major armed conflicts since the Cold War have been internal clashes over religion, national or ethnic identity, and/or access to natural resources or wealth. Conflict management works to mitigate such conflicts and build sustainable peace. Conflict management refers to peace, and looks for alternative channels for dialogue and negotiation. Conflict management helps warring parties when traditional dispute management methods fail, filling the space between official diplomacy and unofficial grassroots peace efforts. Some recent wars have been the bloodiest, most devastating of modern times: 4 million people killed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2 million killed in Sudan, and genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 2009, 14 major armed conflicts were active in 13 locations around the world. Over the past decade, the global number of active major armed conflicts has declined overall, but the decline has been very uneven, with major drops in 2005 and 2007, and an increase in 2009. The end of the Cold War brought a new momentum to the study of conflict management. One of the main reasons for this was the proliferation of violent conflicts in regions such as Eastern Europe. The level of domestic ethnic conflicts, as well as of ethnic conflicts between communities and neighbouring states, attracted much interest among researchers.

Conflict management has become a necessity of the modern international system. Conflicts are monitored, controlled, and prevented from growing into destructive proportions. Conflict control has become both a diplomatic task and a branch of military strategy. This attitude may take even more radical form if developments such as terrorism, extremism, and illegal trade in drugs and arms are not brought under firm legal control. The international community has made significant efforts to find solutions to

conflicts from the past era associated with ideological struggle or national self-determination. It must now find ways to deal with new conflicts as they appear. These have been adjusted in diplomatic practice and have become a part of the international political sphere. They may be roughly labeled as "conflict management," which includes the following:

- Conflict resolution, which looks for models and mechanisms for solving existing conflicts;
- Conflict control, which aims at controlling the state of conflicts, above all the level of violence; and
- Conflict prevention, which stresses the avoidance of conflicts in the future.

This idea of conflict management is strongly supported by practical results from the previous times in international relations, including the following:

The end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, their mutual efforts in strategic arms reductions, joint activities in settling some regional conflicts, and confidence-building in Europe; the end of colonisation, success in the resolution of wars of national liberation, and the accomplishments of nation-building efforts; the end of the North-South confrontation between the rich nations of the West and the poorer developing nations of the South, and the evolution of the World Trade Organisation, one of the strongest elements of the current international system; the end of the oil crisis of 1974, which followed a major conflict of interests between oil consumers and the producers/exporters of oil, and the development of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a reliable vehicle for conflict resolution through market regulation. These accomplishments have proved the validity of conflict management as a realistic goal for policy makers.

Aims and Objectives

After reading this Unit, you would be able to understand

- Conflict management as a discipline diverged from power-based conflict theory
- Conflict Management as a dynamic, interdisciplinary field, evolving as a response to problems in international relations.
- Conflict management as a mechanism concerned with deciding on the distribution of values and resources.
- Conflict management that enables a transformation from conflict to lasting peace by addressing root causes and effects of conflict.

6.2 METHODS

The full range of methods and instruments that constitute conflict management is quite wide. It varies from coercive measures, through legal processes to third party intervention and multilateral conferences. For analytical purposes, it is important to divide these methods to (a) unilateral methods (e.g. one-party threats), (b) bilateral methods (e.g. bargaining and negotiation, deterrence), and (c) multilateral methods (e.g.

third party intervention). We can identify five strategies of conflict management: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-building and state-building.

Each conflict management strategy addresses specific problems that occur during the conflict process:

- Conflict Prevention: politicisation, militarisation, escalation;
- Peacemaking: perceived incompatibility of interests;
- Peacekeeping: violent behaviour/military activity;
- Peace building: negative attitudes/socio-economic structure; and
- State building: collapsed states and weak or non-existing civil and political institutions.

Conflict Prevention is an approach that seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; Peacemaking transforms the conflict from violent **to spoken, ?????** and further, toward the definition of a common peaceful solution; Peacekeeping missions are often required to halt violence and preserve peace once it is obtained. Peacemaking spans activities from the inception of conflict management to the process of agreement and its subsequent implementation. It includes Mediation, Facilitation and Agreement Support. Mediation and Facilitation refer to direct support to a conflict management process (both high-level political negotiation and community-based processes) through the provision of mediators and/or facilitation (e.g., venues, back-up). Agreement Support is designed to capture a range of activities that may arise in the context of supporting the implementation of peace agreements. It is widely recognised that this part of the spectrum of peace making is critical, particularly in light of the fact that over 40% of all peace agreements relapse into conflict within five years. If successful, those missions can strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which should function to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing the root causes of conflict and creating a stable and durable peace.

Peace building reflects the evolution of policy thinking within the international community from the concept of peacekeeping to a more comprehensive approach. It encompasses a range of activities concerned with building a sustainable and lasting peace, particularly focusing on gaps in post-conflict governance. These include security sector reform; institutionalising the rule of law; supporting disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; promoting reconciliation; managing transitional justice; and building institutional capacity. Finally, state-building is the process of reconstructing weak or collapsed infrastructure and institutions of a society - political, economic and civil - in order for civil society and politics to begin to function normally.

6.3 DIFFERENT APPROACHES

6.3.1 CONVENTIONAL APPROACH

Conflict management has been conventionally associated with conflict containment. According to Hugh Miall, conflict management theorists “see violent conflicts as an ineradicable consequence of differences of values and interests within and between

communities.” These theorists regard “resolving such conflicts as unrealistic: the best that can be done is to manage and contain them, and occasionally to reach a historic compromise in which violence may be laid aside and normal politics resumed.” This definition assumes that conflicts are irresolvable and that handling is limited to containing them and ending the violence. However, other theorists believe that it is possible to eliminate conflicts. Therefore, they see conflict management as a stage in the handling of conflicts, which could be followed by later stages. For instance, John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary have divided what they call “ethnic conflict regulations” into two main sections: conflict management and conflict termination. This distinction is based on the idea that the former is concerned with the handling of the consequences of differences between adversaries, whereas the latter is concerned with terminating them.

Strategies of conflict management are largely rooted in realist approaches to international relations. They ignore entirely the psychological dynamics characteristic of confliction relationships. Strategies of deterrence and other forms of coercion may be counterproductive when they encourage targets to reframe the relationship and make resisting foreign pressure their primary goal. Sophisticated strategies of conflict management must avoid this pitfall and find ways of enhancing, not denigrating, the self-esteem of others. In this event, Ned Lebow illustrated these points with historical examples and suggested a more nuanced framework for managing and reducing interstate conflict. Deterrence was another method of managing the Cold War conflict. Again, conflict and dispute were allowed to continue, but open, large-scale confrontation was avoided. Deterrence is based on controlling the behaviour of other actors by the use of threats.

6.3.2 NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY

Normative political theory saw conflict as a competitive struggle to be won by one side. In contrast, needs-based conflict management theorists developed a cooperative approach to conflict management, focusing on fundamental human needs to encourage ‘win-win solutions’. Nonviolence, cooperation and the belief in the essential goodness of humanity are basic principles of this approach to conflict management.

6.3.3 COSER AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Lewis Coser identified positive aspects of conflict. Coser felt the need to correct the balance of analysis, which tended to focus on the “dysfunction” of conflict rather than the potential positive aspects of conflict. Coser provisionally defined conflict as “a struggle over claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise or eliminate their rivals”. Later he defined conflict as a “clash of values and interests”.

6.3.4 GALTUNG AND PEACE RESEARCH

Johan Galtung founded the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964. Galtung, for the purposes of identifying steps to peace, introduced a broader notion of violence which encompasses

those “avoidable insults to basic human needs”. These basic needs included security and identity. Galtung goes on to categorise violence into two forms: direct violence and structural violence. The former includes the everyday notion of violence, whereby an individual or group suffers physical or emotional pain as the result of direct action. Structural violence is caused by the institutions and structures of society which result in inequality or “oppression” among individuals.

6.3.5 JOHN BURTON AND HUMAN NEEDS THEORY

John Burton established the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict, University of London in 1966. His theory operates on the premise that a pre-condition for the management of conflict is that fundamental human needs be met. Burton adopted eight fundamental needs. Those adopted needs included control, security, justice, stimulation, response, meaning, rationality and esteem/recognition. Burton’s additional need was ‘role-defense,’ the need to defend one’s role. Burton called these “ontological needs” as he regarded them as a consequence of human nature, which were universal and would be pursued regardless of the consequence. The principle-based approach aims to resolve conflict by deferring judgment to a moral principle. Such an approach advocates the need for interest-based negotiations in contrast to those based on a ‘position’. For example Fisher would suggest that an interest would include issues like security, esteem and pleasures, whereas positions would define how one achieved those interests.

6.3.6 REALIST PERSPECTIVE OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The ‘power-based’, ‘force-based’ or ‘coercive’ approach to international conflict management is what is called realism. Power-based conflict management includes both violent and nonviolent forms of coercion—war and diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy is often described as “war by other methods,” and as such a win/lose situation. Negotiators advance their own ‘position’ and the process is decided by the most powerful party. John Burton argues that realism ends with “coercive settlement” and not management. Realist theory argues that international security is best achieved through the action of Great Powers which can create regional power balances in unstable regions across the globe, by force or by “geostrategic mediation” (‘diplomacy’).

6.3.7 PERSPECTIVES OF DEUTSCH AND PETER WALLENSTEIN

Deutsch claims that states involved in a negative interdependence, as states in an enduring conflict undoubtedly are, tend to use coercion to manage their conflicts. States in repeated conflicts develop a power orientation and use increasingly more coercive methods of dealing with their conflict with each successive flare up. Neither the attitudes, nor the conflict management behaviour of enduring states are presumed to change much. Enduring conflicts appear to take a life of their own. A conflict punctuated by instances of militarised hostility and cooperation attracts a more varied range of conflict management strategies than other conflicts. Peter Wallenstein emphasizes the containment function of conflict management method and theory: Conflict management typically focuses on the armed aspects of conflict: bringing the fighting to an end,

limiting the spread of the conflict and, thus, containing it. Conflict management is more ambitious, as it expects the parties to face jointly their incompatibility and find a way to live with or dissolve it.

6.4 UNITED NATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

In addition, United Nations development cooperation should aim to strengthen society's capacity for coping, managing and resolving tensions before violent conflict erupts. This includes providing assistance in strengthening governance in areas undergoing development that will help to address unstable situations, the judiciary, traditional conflict management mechanisms, the cultivation of political will and leadership for peaceful management of disputes, the development of conflict management skills and practices, consensus-building and public policy dialogue, and the promotion of participatory and inclusive decision-making on central economic, social and political issues. All development policies, programmes and projects need to be looked at through a conflict prevention lens so that socio-economic inequities and inequalities do not give rise to violent conflict. The conflict prevention lens approach needs to be incorporated into the common country assessment/UNDAF process. At the request of Governments, the UNDP portfolio for governance and rule of law activities in countries prone to conflict now comprise more than half of UNDP programmes and activities, with an annual budget exceeding US\$ 1.2 billion. In addition, a number of UNDP programmes support regional cooperation on cross-border issues (e.g., in the Tumen River Basin in East Asia) that have a clear conflict prevention impact. In post-conflict situations, UNDP area development programmes (e.g., Cambodia and Guatemala), small arms (e.g., Mali, El Salvador, Albania) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes (e.g., Mozambique, Guatemala) are aimed at preventing the reoccurrence of armed conflict.

A new generation of development projects is specifically focused on conflict prevention. For example, several UNDP-led projects in Romania, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Yugoslavia and Ukraine aim to create and strengthen early warning, conflict analysis and management capacities within government and civil society at the national and regional levels. The UNDP project entitled "Preventive development in the south of Kyrgyzstan" is another pilot project which seeks to enhance government capacities to undertake preventive measures as part of the process of nation-building, and identifies the importance of a regional approach to successfully effect preventive development. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)-led Horn of Africa Task Force strongly recommends the creation of capacity in the region for early warning, conflict prevention and management, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and OAU, as part of its Regional Food Security Programme. The UNDP project entitled "Capacity-building for the OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, and management" is another example that addresses the issue from a regional perspective. The UNDP and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs are also collaborating with over 10 African conflict management institutions and practitioners to develop training material in four areas: conflict analysis and early response development, skills development for conflict

transformation, conflict-sensitive approaches to development and national capacity-building in conflict management.

In recent years, there has been increased cooperation between the United Nations system and the Bretton Woods institutions, which have openly acknowledged that conflict seriously affects their development goals, and that understanding and working to prevent conflict should be considered a part of their mandates. This new approach has manifested itself in the establishment of a post-conflict unit in the World Bank and the new Operational Policy on Development Cooperation and Conflict adopted by the World Bank in January of this year. The World Bank's economic research on civil war is another area which has yielded important operational recommendations, which if implemented could reduce the risks of conflict.

As each organisation increases its activities in the post-conflict peace-building, which is an aspect of conflict prevention, the relationship has deepened. Examples of such cooperation can be found in East Timor and Haiti, among other places. However, contacts between the respective headquarters in this field have been limited and are only beginning to develop. Such contacts, especially at the working level, can assist both organisations in increasing their understanding of the situations they are both monitoring. Within their mandates and as appropriate, each organisation should participate in the prevention structures of the other organisations. The World Bank's acceptance of the United Nations offer to participate in the Executive Committee on Peace and preventing the internal displacement of civilians can play an important and at times pivotal role in the prevention of conflict. Unemployed and disaffected men and youth who are internally displaced, in particular those in internally displaced persons camps, are very vulnerable to recruitments (often forcible) by belligerents. By ensuring that civilians are able to remain at home and continue with their livelihoods and education, we can reduce the risk that they would become pawns in military action, thereby contributing to further conflict. Advocacy for the protection of civilians should be directed not only at the belligerents but also at members of the international community to take appropriate preventive action.

6.5 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN CULTURAL CONTEXT

In Western cultural contexts, such as Canada and the United States, successful conflict management usually involves fostering communication among disputants, problem solving, and drafting agreements that meet their underlying needs. In these situations, conflict resolvers often talk about finding the win-win solution, or mutually satisfying scenario, for everyone involved.

In many non-Western cultural contexts, such as Afghanistan, Vietnam, and China, it is also important to find "win-win" solutions; however, getting there can be very different. In these contexts, direct communication between disputants that explicitly addresses the issues at stake in the conflict can be perceived as very rude, making the conflict worse and delaying management. Rather, it can make sense to involve religious, tribal or community leaders, communicate difficult truths indirectly through a third party, and make suggestions through stories. Intercultural conflicts are often the most difficult to

resolve because the expectations of the disputants can be very different, and there is much occasion for misunderstanding.

6.6 FACTORS AFFECTING THE COURSE OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Factors affecting the course of conflict management are numerous. They involve the manner of interdependence, type of actors, and kinds of issues. For the students of International Relations, these factors are best conceptualised as (a) contextual factors, and (b) behavioural factors. Contextual factors that affect international conflict management include the character of the international system, the nature of a conflict, and the internal characteristics of the states involved. The character of the international system affects the expectations of states, and the strategies they may use to break out of a conflict. Features such as polarity of the international system, patterns of alignments, and distribution of power capabilities are all associated with different approaches to conflict. A bipolar international environment, for instance, is likely to be more stable than a multipolar system in responding to conflicts. The termination of intractable conflicts can be explicitly linked to the nature of the international environment in which they occur.

6.7 SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Conflict prevention and sustainable and equitable development are mutually reinforcing activities. An investment in national and international efforts for conflict prevention must be seen as a simultaneous investment in sustainable development since the latter can best take place in an environment of sustainable peace. In the ongoing humanitarian crises, advocacy and public information services conducted by the humanitarian community, along with consolidated appeals, are the primary examples of humanitarian action to raise the awareness of a particular conflict and its consequences. Often, humanitarian activities create the only forum for divided groups to meet and to communicate — in itself a useful process for any future reconciliation. Humanitarian agencies have negotiated the creation of humanitarian spaces, routes or zones that have brought about a limited ceasefire to allow humanitarian assistance to reach vulnerable groups.

Active promotion of human rights and support for the enhancement, codification and implementation of human rights is a key feature of Ireland's foreign policy, and an essential element in the maintenance of international peace and security. A commitment to human rights in peacemaking and peace building is embedded in our approach to conflict management. The UNSCR Management 1325 emphasizes the distinct position of women in conflict situations and in peace building. The Management calls for an increase in the participation of women in peacemaking and peace building processes; the provision of special protection to women and girls in armed conflict; and the incorporation of a gender perspective into peacekeeping and peace building processes.

The relationship between climate and conflict is an emerging issue, and one which could have potentially significant consequences. Climate change and conflict may be linked through such issues as access to changing or diminishing water and natural resources,

food security, land tenure and migration. Understanding the relationship between conflict and climate change and advancing the discussion on this are essential to preparing and developing effective relations. The other contextual dimension that affects conflict management is that of the internal characteristics of the actors involved. This refers as to how certain structural properties of states affect their predisposition to engage in coercive or other forms of conflict management. The nature of the polity has attracted the most attention. Democratic states are more inclined to use peaceful methods of conflict management (because of internal norms, liberal experience or electoral constraints), whereas non-democratic states are more likely to utilise coercive methods of management. Another factor here relates to the power capabilities of states. Although, there is not much empirical evidence to suggest a strong relationship, power capabilities can be linked to different conflict management behaviour e.g. a conflict between two equally strong countries may be prolonged because both have the material and human resources to carry on, and the willingness to tolerate high costs. All these contextual factors affect directly the disposition to engage in different forms of conflict management, and how a conflict will terminate.

6.8 ARMS PROLIFERATION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Arms proliferation is not merely a security issue; it is also an issue of human rights and of development. The proliferation of small arms sustains and exacerbates armed conflicts, endangers peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, undermines respect for international humanitarian law, threatens legitimate but weak Governments, and benefits terrorists and the perpetrators of organised crime. Measures to prevent the misuse and illicit transfers of small arms and to address the root causes of the demand for small arms would greatly contribute to the prevention of conflict.

6.9 CRITICISM OF THE CONCEPT OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The earlier view of conflict management clearly limits this concept to a certain level of handling conflicts, that is, containment. As a result, scholars have sought other concepts to express broader processes and other dimensions. Efforts to develop alternative and additional concepts embody explicit and implicit criticism of the conventional narrow meaning of conflict management. In fact, the trend involves suggesting new theories and perspectives for studying conflict. The earlier, narrow definition of conflict management reflects a whole theory. Consequently, an alternative concept forms a new theory. However, it has been subject to some criticism, of which the following points are the most important.

6.9.1 Exaggerated Realism

The conflict management theory assumes that conflicts are irresolvable, or at least very difficult to resolve or rarely resolved. Therefore, only containment and suspension of violence are possible and realistic. This attitude does not satisfy many researchers and such a pessimistic view is considered to be exaggerated.

6.9.2 Unrealistic

On the other hand, there are critics who hold the opposite view, namely, that conflict management theory is unrealistic, because it assumes that conflicts can be contained and suspended. However, in many cases, it appears that “there are frustrations and concerns under the surface”, which can provoke a fresh eruption of conflict at any moment. These scholars think that containing conflict is not possible in the long term, and therefore other strategies are needed to deal with the problem.

6.9.3 The Lack of Analysis

There is a noticeable lack of analysis in works classified as conflict management research, theory and guides. Alan C. Tidwell expresses this view in his discussion of the concept of conflict management, a term that he uses to include conflict management. The literature on conflict management focuses on “how to do it”, with scant attention paid to situational and contextual issues. Yet, a more textured and mature approach to conflict management demands examination of these concepts and situations. The lack of analysis has become largely structural in the theory and practice of conflict management. This situation has been caused mostly by the trend of interpreting conflict management as conflict settlement and containment. The focus is always on action and practical steps, usually in an atmosphere of crisis and urgency. Therefore, very little attention has been given to the analysis of the problem itself and the theoretical framework required to study it, as well as recognising and examining the consequences of the many recommended courses of action and types of settlement suggested by scholars or advisers.

6.9.4 The Problem of Integration

The accusation of a lack of analysis is a severe criticism. Although there are practical examples to support this view, it is important to point out that in other cases there is a problem of separation. This means that an analysis can be made, and mostly on an empirical inductive basis, yet without connecting it to the methods of handling conflict and without a theoretical framework. It is criticised as an agreement between powerful governments, who benefit from the existing balance of power, to prevent the emergence of any new global or regional power as a competitor. Marcelle E. DuPraw notices that “there has been insufficient integration between the body of theory and the intervention decisions practitioners are making in the field.”

6.10 SUMMARY

The Cold War era saw situations where the great powers sought to handle conflicts by accepting a certain status quo. In the view of these governments, conflict management meant preventing widespread violence, though not necessarily resolving the conflicts. Moreover, preserving the status quo that serves the interests of certain governments by declaring a concern for peace and non-violent means of solving problems is a common practice in the world of politics. The fact is that the end of the Cold War era also meant the end of many status quo situations, resulting in the eruption of violent ethnic conflict

in the Balkans and elsewhere. This helped to partly weaken the conventional interpretation of conflict management as conflict containment without dealing with the cause of the problems. An important tool of conflict management is to monitor situations around the world that could erupt into conflict to detect the earliest signs of trouble and identify opportunities to divert violence, which might otherwise be overlooked or recognised too late. Parties in dispute sometimes seek a neutral third party to facilitate dialogue in an effort to avert violence. The nature of a conflict or the characteristics of the issues that are its focus, are clearly crucial in determining how it is managed. Certain issues such as beliefs, core values and territorial integrity have a high saliency, and are apt to encourage decision makers to accept higher levels of costs. This makes it much more difficult to manage such conflicts through traditional diplomatic methods. Conflicts over salient issues are likely to be long-lasting and to entail the use of coercive methods as a way of reaching an outcome.

6.11 TERMINAL QUESTIONS

1. What do you understand by Conflict Management?
2. Discuss the major objectives of conflict management.
3. What are the major factors which affect the course of conflict management?
4. Find out the grounds on which the concept of conflict management is criticised.
5. What are the social and environmental dimensions of conflict management?
6. Examine the concept of conflict management in cultural context.

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UNIT 7 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

Structure

- 7.1 Introduction
 - Aims and Objectives
- 7.2 Analysing Organisational Conflict
- 7.3 Sources of Conflict
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 - 7.3.2.1. Personal
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- 7.5 Modes of Conflict Management
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 - 7.5.5 Smoothing
- 7.6 Summary
- 7.7 Terminal Questions

Suggested Readings

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Life is a series of interruptions and recoveries. If social life has its conflicts, it also has its adjustments. Individuals quarrel, then make it up. Workers strike, but also negotiate for a settlement. This world is suspended in balance between violence and peace. Sometimes there seems to be hope that conflict will be averted after all; sometimes it looks as if it would start very soon. It is probably true that the greater part of human energy is devoted not to out and out antagonism against opponents but to efforts to get along somehow with them. Conflict is not an incidental or abnormal phase of man's behaviour but is intermittent in human society. Intermittent because for one thing opponents may be very unevenly matched, so that the weaker

despairs of victory and accepts victory rather than the risk of being exterminated altogether.

Conflicts sometimes cease because those who have started them become remorseful and make overtures of good will. This is seen in the case of married couples who quarrel, and then make up. In addition to this factor making for peace which is inherent in either the nature of conflict or the nature of man himself, there is the social or objective factor. Peace is essential to organised social life. Societies evolve means for elimination of conflict, or at least for keeping conflict within bounds.

Aims and Objectives

After studying this Unit, you should be able to understand the

- Sources of Conflict
- Methods of Conflict Management
- Modes of Conflict Management

7.2 ANALYSING ORGANISATIONAL CONFLICT

Three distinct criteria define the role of an administrator in an organisation: planning, resource allocation and conflict management. There is no doubt that managing conflict permeates every aspect of the administrative role. Awareness of the various forms of conflict management that can be employed at different stages of the development of a conflict is vital, if administrators are to organise efforts towards influencing the conflict situation, the parties' attitudes or their behaviour. In addition to that, effective conflict management requires a recognition of the sources that generate a conflict. What, then, are the sources or bases of organisational conflicts?

7.3 SOURCES OF CONFLICT

Organisational conflict appears in a variety of forms and has varying causes. These can generally be separated into several categories. Katz identifies three sources of conflict. These are: (1) structural conflict (conflict arising out of the need to manage the interdependence between different organisational sub-units), (2) role conflict (conflict arising from sets of prescribed behaviour) and (3) resources conflict (conflict stemming from interest groups competing for organisational resources). Robbins identifies three sources of organisational conflict and indicates that an understanding of the source of a conflict improves the probability of effective conflict management. The main factors which serve as sources of conflict are identified as (1) communicational (conflicts arising from misunderstandings etc.), (2) structural (conflicts related to organisational roles), and (3) personal (conflicts stemming from individual differences). Methods of conflict management which are appropriate in one case may not necessarily be appropriate when applied to a conflict generated from another source.

There is also a different perspective which traces the source of organisational conflict to the unit of analysis involved. Units of analysis are the parties to a conflict. They perceive, initiate and sustain a conflict. Their characteristics specify the conditions which affect the course of a conflict and determine the mode of its management. Thus, we have conflicts that originate in the individual person, conflicts that have their basis in the relationship between individuals, and conflicts that occur as a result of interactions between groups. These may be described as (1) intrapersonal conflict, (2) interpersonal conflict, and (3) interdepartmental conflict. Each of these categories raises different questions about the three interrelated components of conflict and each emphasizes different aspects of conflict management.

7.3.1 Intrapersonal Conflict

Intrapersonal conflict is internal to the individual (though its effects can profoundly influence organisational functioning) and is perhaps the most difficult form of conflict to analyse and manage. Intrapersonal conflict is basically a conflict between two incompatible tendencies. It arises when a stimulus evokes two different and incompatible tendencies and the individual is required to discriminate between these tendencies. In such a situation it is common for individuals to experience frustrations and to allow their conflict situation to be expressed in a range of behavioural strategies ranging from apathy and boredom to absenteeism, excessive drinking or destructive behaviour. If such behavioural consequences are to be avoided, then it is essential to diagnose individual perception and utilise some techniques that would reduce anxiety-eliciting stimuli and increase consonance between individual behaviour and organisational requirements.

7.3.2 Interpersonal Conflict

Interpersonal conflict emphasizes the interaction of human factors in an organisation. Here we are concerned with these factors as they appear in a dyadic relationship. We can broadly suggest two classes of factors as conflict sources. These are:

7.3.2.1 Personal

Individuals are not identical, constant or consistent. When two individuals are brought together and kept together, each with his own qualities, needs and skills, a conflict may ensue if their attributes are not meshed together in a coordinated way. Interaction between individuals with different attitudes, values and needs can produce conflict behaviour and affect organisational performance.

7.3.2.2 Functional

Individuals in organisations have roles which are expected sets of behaviour associated with their position. In theory, individuals are not expected to engage in

any discretionary behaviour. Such specification would be consistent with organisational preferences for consistency and predictability. In practice, however, role specifications tend to be ambiguous and incomplete, and in their interaction with others, some individuals often feel dissatisfied with their role or position, or they may feel that their aspirations for higher positions are being frustrated. Interpersonal conflict can be accounted for, to a great extent, in terms of the incumbents' roles and their expectations in particular situations.

7.3.3 Interdepartmental Conflict

The third major cause of organisational conflict is structural. Organisations are designed around product lines, regions or technical specialities. These activities are assigned to departments that often have mutually exclusive structured interests and goals and that interact within a framework of scarce resources and task dependence. When resources are relatively fixed and when one department's gain is at the expense of another, conflict should be expected. If two sub-units in an organisational system have differentiated goals and are functionally interdependent, conditions exist for conflict. Interdependence produces the need for collaboration, but it also presents occasions for conflict.

Other contextual factors which affect the interaction structure between departments and create the conditions for interdepartmental conflict include: different attitudes between line and staff units, organisational size (directly related to level of conflict) and standardisation (inversely related to conflict), physical or communicational barriers between departments, unequal access to authority, rewards or organisational resources and ambiguity or uncertainty in assigning tasks or rewards to different departments.

7.4 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Ways of managing organisational conflict are as varied as its causes, origins and contexts. The purpose of conflict management, whether undertaken by the parties in conflict or whether involving the intervention of an outside party, is to affect the entire structure of a conflict situation so as to contain the destructive components in the conflict process (e.g. hostility, use of violence) and help the parties possessing incompatible goals to find some solution to their conflict. Effective conflict management succeeds in (1) minimising disruption stemming from the existence of a conflict, and (2) providing a solution that is satisfactory and acceptable.

All organisations, however simple or complex, possess a range of mechanisms or procedures for managing conflict. These are built into the organisational structure and are consciously employed by administrators to influence the course and development of a conflict. The success or effectiveness of such procedures can be gauged by the extent to which they limit conflict behaviour and the extent to which they help to achieve a satisfactory solution.

7.4.1 Managing Intrapersonal Conflict

Intrapersonal conflict is predicated upon an incongruity between individual needs and organisational requirements. Intrapersonal conflict unfolds over time and manifests itself in a complex and multiform range of attitudinal and behavioural consequences. These may vary from psychosomatic consequences (e.g. frustration, emotional instability) to physical consequences (e.g. absenteeism, destructive behaviour). As such consequences are obviously correlated with decreased performance and work-motivation, managing intrapersonal conflict will help the individual to promote his capacity for adaptation and attain equilibrium in his relationship with the organisation.

Personal existence is, inevitably, punctuated by conflicts and other emotionally charged experiences. When a person experiences an inner conflict and feels that he cannot master his situation, or change his environment, a number of methods of conflict management can be employed.

These are conveniently divided into (1) cognitive strategies and (2) behavioural strategies. Cognitive strategies, often called defence mechanisms, help an individual to falsify, distort or deny a particular conflict. Cognitive strategies represent an attempt to control or manage negative and disturbing feelings associated with conflict and to allow an individual to carry on with his normal activities. Cognitive strategies include repression (an attempt to push conflict out of existence), rationalisation (hiding the truth from oneself), fantasy or even denial of reality. Behavioural strategies for coping with intrapersonal conflict include escape, withdrawal and aggression (especially against convenient targets).

These strategies cannot resolve intrapersonal conflict in any permanent way. They can be successful in the short-run. They can help an individual to reduce his level of anxiety and diminish his tension. They can prevent or avoid disruptive behaviour, but they cannot generate a solution. This can come about through the involvement of an expert consultant, acting in an accepting manner and encouraging the individual to evaluate his situation rationally and decide upon more effective responses. Interventions in intrapersonal conflicts entail consideration of substantive issues, discussions and self-observations, helping an individual to unload his burdensome thoughts and reactions and reorienting his thinking towards a more benevolent and self-maintaining pattern of behaviour.

The strength of this approach to conflict management is that it helps an individual to concentrate on his situation and on ways to evaluate alternatives that may have gone unnoticed. The consultant remains detached from an individual, but his intervention, listening, probing, interviewing and explicit confrontation of the conflict issues, sets the basis for self-diagnosis and improved performance. It eliminates distortion and increases self-knowledge. It is a method which seeks not merely an amelioration of the surface symptoms, but a successful change in the situational (e.g. reevaluating a

conflict situation), attitudinal (e.g. reduced anxiety, increased self-esteem) and behavioural (e.g. stimulate productive behaviour) components of a conflict.

Consultants may be internal to an organisation, or they may be introduced by an administrator when circumstances require it. They have several roles to play, all intended to aid a person to be more effective in his organisation. What characterises all these roles is that they are enacted in an informal and flexible fashion and in a facilitative and diagnostic manner. Techniques which are congruent with implementing the consultant's role include (1) facilitative techniques (e.g. facilitating individual exploration and self-observation, giving information, advice, reassurance and encouragement), (2) behavioural modification techniques (e.g. establish, through negative or positive reinforcement, contingencies of behaviour that should be decreased) and (3) cognitive techniques (e.g. learn to undo old values and acquire a new perception of the self).

7.4.2 Managing Interpersonal Conflict

Interpersonal interactions are extraordinarily complex. Individuals are brought together and kept together because of personal attraction or complementary needs. A great deal of individual behaviour takes place in organisations in which they occupy various positions. Such positions are interlocked or interdependent so that the attitudes and behaviour of one individual affect the attitudes and behaviour of another. Indeed, we may describe organisations as networks of repetitive, reciprocal and predictable interactions between individuals.

Although persons in an organisation interact in a relatively consistent way along a stable-cooperative dimension (organisations develop norms to ensure stable interactions), interpersonal conflict is an essential aspect of organisational life. The causes of interpersonal conflict in organisations can be ascribed to personal differences (interaction between dissimilar people maximises conflict potential), perceptual differences (individuals perceive an unfair allocation of organisational resources) and functional differences (conflicts arising from incompatible role requirements). On the whole, interpersonal conflict generates new ideas and work patterns, but when it is augmented by personal distrust, misperception and competition, it can very easily be transformed into destructive and costly behaviour.

Under the prevailing influence of behaviourism, interpersonal conflict management has been directed mainly towards the behavioural components of a conflict situation. Attitudes and perceptions have been considered beyond the realm of conflict management. As a result of this, conflict management has tended to force individuals to choose between fixed and simplified behavioural alternatives, defined in terms of two rigid behavioural goals, winning or losing. The choices and incentives associated with this orientation of victory versus defeat were strongly constrained, forcing individuals into relatively primitive modes of interaction and providing administrators with an untrustworthy vehicle for potential conflict management.

Consultation-based approaches to interpersonal conflict focus on understanding the psychological and operational environment of an individual, utilising behavioural scientists in a supportive-facilitative way and promoting the establishment of problem-solving. Interventions by behavioural consultants may take the form of offering theoretical inputs (e.g. providing individuals with conceptions about conflict), offering content observation (e.g. suggesting various outcome interpretations) and offering process observations (e.g. increasing productive interactions through openness, synchronisation of efforts etc.). They give individuals the freedom, opportunity and motivation to move away from rigid behaviour or from reiterating their positions as prescribed by organisational norms. They address themselves to the attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of interactions and in combining task and socio-emotional activities; they exemplify and help to establish the conditions of problem-solving.

In contrast to other methods of conflict management, the intervention of a behavioural consultant accentuates the positive and highlights commonly held views of the actors. Applications of this approach in the interpersonal sphere rest upon the following assumptions:

1. Deficiencies in perception are the main cause of interpersonal conflict.
2. Barriers to improved information prolong and aggravate a conflict.
3. Inadequate interactions between individuals prevent them from management of their conflict constructively.

Techniques of intervention in interpersonal conflict are closely related to these assumptions and include perceptual, informational and interactional procedures. Perceptual procedures involve (1) identifying conflict issues, (2) defining alternative issues, and (3) "reality-testing". Informational procedures involve (1) clarifying issues, (2) encouraging and gathering information (through interviews, meetings or other instruments), and (3) increasing frequency, openness and accuracy of communication.

Interactional procedures entail (1) regulating the pace of interaction, (2) offering "process" observations to help individuals see how to be more effective, (3) injection inputs in the form of concepts, models or principles which might be useful in understanding a conflict and (4) helping in the design of implementation steps through which conflict resolution would be possible.

Through his interventions, a behavioural consultant becomes the information-gathering instrument and a "resource person". Administrators who are concerned about organisational change and more productive results would be well advised to be aware of the strengths — as well as limitations — of this approach to interpersonal conflict management.

7.4.3 Managing Interdepartmental Conflict

Conflict between departments is a natural consequence of organisational activities. As organisations move towards greater differentiation and complexity, as they change or adapt to new circumstances, the stage is set for incompatibility of goals or competition for scarce resources. The resulting conflict between departments may have ambivalent consequences for an organisation. On the one hand it may have a dysfunctional and counterproductive effect on the organisation, and on the other hand it can be highly functional and stimulate intra-organisational creativity. For conflict to be a vehicle for organisational growth and creativity, there must exist an appropriate method of conflict management between departments. An administrator should know when he is faced with interdepartmental conflict and be informed of the processes for coping with it or resolving it.

Before exploring the methods and techniques for managing interdepartmental conflict, it is pertinent to examine briefly the attitudes and behaviours which characterise interdepartmental conflict. These can be described in terms of the following categories:

1. Effects within each department. When departments are in conflict, individual members tend to bury their differences and display greater loyalty to their department. Departments become more cohesive, more formal in their behaviour and more insistent upon individual conformity and accomplishment of prescribed tasks.
2. Effects between departments. Each department begins to experience perceptual distortions and to develop a strong self-image and a negative stereotype of the other. With the rise of prejudicial attitudes between departments there is an increase in hostility and a decrease in communication. Each department strives to enhance its own image and performance and to downgrade the other's. Under such conditions a conflict becomes a matter of victory or defeat, winning or losing.

The fundamental significance of a win-lose dynamic is that it is, to some degree, intrinsic to any complex and stratified organisation, but that feelings of in-group versus out-group are especially strong in conflict situations. The attitudinal characteristics of such a pattern include a competitive orientation, the evaluative characteristics include antagonistic feelings and the behavioural characteristics include circumscribed interaction and distorted communication. The structural attributes of a conflict relationship must be taken into account in proposing a strategy of conflict management.

Traditional approaches to managing interdepartmental conflict emphasized such methods as (1) conflict avoidance (separating departments by relocating them physically), (2) regulating a conflict by introducing new rules and procedures, (3) seeking a form of "legalistic" solution (by appealing to higher organisational authorities), (3) using departmental representatives to reach a compromise

agreement or (4) seeking mediation or arbitration from an outside body. Such conflict management methods may indeed produce an agreement. They may reduce the level of conflict behaviour between departments and even legitimise new levels of performance. They cannot, though, achieve a genuine conflict resolution because they merely reflect, perpetuate and occasionally aggravate a win-lose pattern of interactions. Separation, withdrawal, institutionalisation, bargaining or legal approaches are essentially forms of a win-lose confrontation. They all start with a polarised, adversary orientation, in which each department tries to attain as much as possible by outsmarting the other. They bury a conflict, ignore it, produce power-based decisions or allow departments to withdraw from it. They do not stimulate a search for conflict resolution.

A range of new approaches to managing interdepartmental conflict may be suggested. These approaches acquire new significance because they become integral parts of an interaction process between departments, because they move away from win-lose type of strategies and because they can meet the need for conflict resolution more effectively. They are best summarised in terms of the social psychologists out of whose experiments these approaches evolved.

Sherif and his associates suggest two broad strategies which are designed to increase cooperation between departments; facilitate mutual communication of needs and minimise the effects of hostility and negative attitudes. Both strategies are broad in their scope. Their target of change is the organisational structure, but changes in individual attitudes and improvement in interpersonal competence may also be involved.

7.4.3.1. Locating a common enemy

When departments are engaged in a conflict, their incentive structure (i.e. conflict of interest) may be changed and a mutual understanding as well as favourable attitudes may be promoted if they perceive a threat from a competing organisation. Shifting the level of interdepartmental conflict to the higher level of inter-organisational conflict will produce a new structural relationship within each organisation, a relationship that would harness departmental efforts and help them to compete more successfully against another organisation.

The perception of an external threat or the identification of a common enemy supersedes any conflict that departments within an organisation may have. As a strategy of conflict management within an organisation, it operates on two levels. First, it affects individual attitudes, perceptions and feelings of trust and distrust. Second, it influences organisational role structure. It transforms interactions which are characterised predominantly by differentiation to accommodative interactions of a collaborative and integrated orientation.

7.4.3.2 Locating a superordinate goal

Superordinate goals are goals which are greatly desired by several departments and can only be achieved by combining the energies and resources of all involved. The introduction of a superordinate goal (e.g. developing a new product-line which would attract great customer demand) will create a cooperative context in which departments may interact on problems of joint interests, develop favourable attitudes and seek to achieve solutions that are mutually satisfactory. The introduction of a superordinate goal converts a conflict between departments to friendly interactions.

The logic of introducing a superordinate goal is related to the very definition of a conflict. If conflict develops from the perception of incompatible goals, then cooperation would be promoted from common goals. To be successful in resolving interdepartmental conflict, a superordinate goal must be of such importance that departments can forget their differences and work together. It must involve several episodes taking into account the time dimension and it must be introduced by a third party. The cumulative efforts of developing cooperative activities are an important determinant of successful conflict management between departments.

Blake and Mouton accept that the most important aspect of a successful conflict management strategy is the attempt to shift the behavioural and attitudinal components of a relationship from a competitive to a cooperative orientation. They do, however, suggest that both the common enemy and the superordinate goal approaches fall short of the need to achieve a genuine conflict resolution. This is because both can be seen as (1) being mainly temporary in character, (2) both are primarily defensive and (3) both strategies may widen a conflict by externalising it.

They offer an approach which emphasizes consultation-based interventions, openness of communication, and greater participation in decision-making and problem-solving interactions.

Blake and Mouton accept that traditional conflict management strategies can only deal with the behavioural component in conflict and bring about a patchwork solution. They suggest an approach to conflict management which involves interventions by organisational consultants (usually applied behavioural scientists), who have no vested interest in the conflict itself, but who have the competence and experience to generate a productive mode of conflict management. They avoid the pitfalls of adjudicating or evaluating which department is "right" or "wrong" (so often the hallmark of traditional conflict management). Nor do they seek to impose a solution. They intervene in order to generate creative thinking and to establish a problem-solving attitude.

7.5 MODES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Conflict situations are an important aspect of the workplace. A conflict is a situation when the interests, needs, goals or values of involved parties interfere with one another. A conflict is a common phenomenon in the workplace. Different stakeholders may have different priorities; conflicts may involve team members, departments, projects, organisation and client, boss and subordinate, organisation needs vs. personal needs. Often, a conflict is a result of perception. Is conflict a bad thing? Not necessarily. Often, a conflict presents opportunities for improvement. Therefore, it is important to understand (and apply) various conflict resolution techniques.

7.5.1 Forcing

It is also known as *competing*. An individual firmly pursues his or her own concerns despite the resistance of the other person. This may involve pushing one viewpoint at the expense of another or maintaining firm resistance to another person's actions.

Examples of when *forcing* may be appropriate

- In certain situations when all other, less forceful methods, do not work or are ineffective
- When you need to stand up for your own rights, resist aggression and pressure
- When a quick resolution is required and using force is justified (e.g. in a life-threatening situation, to stop an aggression)
- As a last resort to resolve a long-lasting conflict

Possible advantages of *forcing*:

- May provide a quick resolution to a conflict
- Increases self-esteem and draws respect when firm resistance or actions were a response to an aggression or hostility

Some caveats of *forcing*:

- May negatively affect your relationship with the opponent in the long run
- May cause the opponent to react in the same way, even if the opponent did not intend to be forceful originally
- Cannot take advantage of the strong sides of the other side's position
- Taking this approach may require a lot of energy and be exhausting to some individuals

7.5.2 Win-Win (Collaborating)

This is also known as *problem confronting* or *problem solving*. Collaboration involves an attempt to work with the other person to find a win-win solution to the problem in hand - the one that most satisfies the concerns of both parties. The win-win approach sees conflict resolution as an opportunity to come to a mutually beneficial result. It includes identifying the underlying concerns of the opponents and finding an alternative which meets each party's concerns.

Examples of when *collaborating* may be appropriate:

- When consensus and commitment of other parties is important
- In a collaborative environment
- When it is required to address the interests of multiple stakeholders
- When a high level of trust is present
- When a long-term relationship is important
- When you need to work through hard feelings, animosity, etc
- When you do not want to have full responsibility

Possible advantages of *collaborating*:

- Leads to solving the actual problem
- Leads to a win-win outcome
- Reinforces mutual trust and respect
- Builds a foundation for effective collaboration in the future
- Shared responsibility of the outcome
- You earn the reputation of a good negotiator
- For parties involved, the outcome of the conflict resolution is less stressful (however, the process of finding and establishing a win-win solution may be very involved – see the caveats below)

Some caveats of *collaborating*:

- Requires a commitment from all parties to look for a mutually acceptable solution
- May require more effort and more time than some other methods. A win-win solution may not be evident
- For the same reason, collaborating may not be practical when timing is crucial and a quick solution or fast response is required
- Once one or more parties lose their trust in an opponent, the relationship falls back to other methods of conflict resolution. Therefore, all involved parties must continue collaborative efforts to maintain a collaborative relationship

7.5.3 Compromising

Compromising looks for an expedient and mutually acceptable solution which partially satisfies both parties.

Examples of when *compromise* may be appropriate:

- When the goals are moderately important and not worth the use of more assertive or more involving approaches, such as forcing or collaborating
- To reach temporary settlement on complex issues
- To reach expedient solutions on important issues
- As a first step when the involved parties do not know each other well or have not yet developed a high level of mutual trust
- When collaboration or forcing do not work

Possible advantages of *compromise*:

- Faster issue resolution. Compromising may be more practical when time is a factor
- Can provide a temporary solution while still looking for a win-win solution
- Lowers the levels of tension and stress resulting from the conflict

Some caveats of using *compromise*:

- May result in a situation when both parties are not satisfied with the outcome (a lose-lose situation)
- Does not contribute to building trust in the long run
- May require close monitoring and control to ensure the agreements are met

7.5.4 Withdrawing

This is also known as *avoiding*. This is when a person does not pursue her/his own concerns or those of the opponent. He/she does not address the conflict, sidesteps, postpones or simply withdraws.

Examples of when *withdrawing* may be appropriate:

- When the issue is trivial and not worth the effort
- When more important issues are pressing, and you do not have time to deal with it
- In situations where postponing the response is beneficial to you, for example
 - o When it is not the right time or place to confront the issue
 - o When you need time to think and collect information before you act (e.g. if you are unprepared or taken by surprise)

When you see no chance of getting your concerns met or you would have to put

- forth unreasonable efforts
- When you would have to deal with hostility
- When you are unable to handle the conflict (e.g. if you are too emotionally involved or others can handle it better)

Possible advantages of *withdrawing*:

- When the opponent is forcing / attempts aggression, you may choose to withdraw and postpone your response until you are in a more favourable circumstance for you to push back
- Withdrawing is a low stress approach when the conflict is short
- Gives the ability/time to focus on more important or more urgent issues instead
- Gives you time to better prepare and collect information before you act

Some caveats of *withdrawing*:

- May lead to weakening or losing your position; not acting may be interpreted as an agreement. Using withdrawing strategies without negatively affecting your own position requires certain skill and experience
- When multiple parties are involved, withdrawing may negatively affect your relationship with a party that expects your action

7.5.5 Smoothing

It is also known as *accommodating*. Smoothing is accommodating the concerns of other people first of all, rather than one's own concerns.

Examples of when *smoothing* may be appropriate:

- When it is important to provide a temporary relief from the conflict or buy time until you are in a better position to respond/push back
- When the issue is not as important to you as it is to the other person
- When you accept that you are wrong
- When you have no choice or when continued competition would be detrimental

Possible advantages of *smoothing*:

- In some cases smoothing will help to protect more important interests while giving up on some less important ones
- Gives an opportunity to reassess the situation from a different angle

Some caveats of *smoothing*:

- There is a risk to be abused, i.e. the opponent may constantly try to take advantage of your tendency toward smoothing/accommodating. Therefore it is important to keep the right balance and this requires some skill.
- May negatively affect your confidence in your ability to respond to an aggressive opponent
- It makes it more difficult to transition to a win-win solution in the future
- Some of your supporters may not like your smoothing response and be turned off.

7.6 SUMMARY

Organisations are social entities segmented into hierarchies of departments and individuals. The basic realities of organisational life cannot but stimulate comparisons, competitions and conflicts between departments and individuals. Conflict is an omnipresent feature at each of these organisational levels. Since conflict may have functional as well as dysfunctional consequences, it is essential that administrators explore various methods and techniques of conflict management. Effective conflict management is indispensable if coordinated efforts and productive achievements are to result. The planned intervention by behavioural scientists represents the most effective method since it can produce organisational change and a sense of personal accomplishment.

A wide range of intervention activities may be utilised to deal with conflicts at various organisational levels. Administrators should be able to ascertain the presence of a conflict, its basic sources, the level at which it manifests itself, its degree of intensity and the ways of furthering the objectives of conflict resolution. From a pragmatic viewpoint, administrators should direct their attention to four issues: Is there a conflict? Where is the conflict? Does it require to be managed? How best to implement an effective conflict management strategy?

7.7 TERMINAL QUESTIONS

1. Discuss the various sources of conflict.
2. How will you manage the conflicts in your organisations?
3. Discuss the various methods and modes of conflict management

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8.1 INTRODUCTION

Punjab and Nagaland serve as pertinent case studies for the process of conflict management in the Indian context especially in recent times. The settings of Punjab and Nagaland are almost different; the languages spoken and assimilation into the mainstream of the Indian life and society is also quite different. Punjab has been at the centre of attention from the days of partition to the post-recovery phase of militancy that threatened its existence. Nagaland, on the other hand, presents a different problem. A small state in the remote North-east part of India, of which many people are unaware of, it has its unique culture and tradition. The assimilation process has not been easy and the history of the same is wrought with resistance. It is viewed more as an

attack on its cultural and traditional life. Various efforts have been taken up for secession from the Indian Union and represented by different groups that claim to represent the real aspirations of the people of Nagaland. This Unit familiarises the learner with the understanding of these two complex cases and deals extensively with most of the crucial aspects of the cases.

Aims and Objectives

After going through this Unit, you would be able to understand

- The magnitude and causes of Punjab problem;
- The management of the complex problem;
- The genesis of the problem in Nagaland; and
- Recommendations for the conflict management in Nagaland.

8.2 PUNJAB AND NAGALAND: BRIEF BACKGROUND

8.2.1 Punjab

The magnitude of the disorder in Punjab can be appreciated by the scale of violence. Since 1981 almost 25,000 people have been killed, and the number of disappearances and detainees remain unknown although the latter are estimated at from 20,000 to 45,000. At its peak between 1989-92, the insurgency by Sikh militants campaigning for Khalistan, a separate Sikh state, threatened to overwhelm the security forces and effectively sidelined the moderates in the Akali Dal, the mainstream Sikh political party. From May 1987 to February 1992, Punjab was under President's Rule. A series of special laws not only suspended the normal political process in the state but also empowered the security forces to take measures to contain disorder and insurgency. The level of violence increased dramatically from 1987 onward, with the death toll rising steadily from 1,333 in 1987 to 5,265 in 1991 before falling to 3,883 in 1992 and 871 in 1993. During these years, Punjab was often referred to as an area of "darkness" where virtual civil war conditions prevailed.

The Rajiv-Longowal Accord completed against the backdrop of Mrs. Gandhi's assassination, the election of Rajiv Gandhi as Congress (I) leader, and the latter's landslide victory in the 1984 elections. The Accord appeared to mark a new departure in regional policy. The territorial, economic, and religious demands that had fueled the Sikh agitation before 1984, and were held to be non-negotiable by the central Government was now recognised; and for the moderate Akali Dal Longowal AD (L), the accord provided a return to democratic politics. For Rajiv Gandhi, it represented a dynamic breakthrough and a befitting start to his premiership. But the accord could not be implemented.

8.2.2 Nagaland

Nagaland is a small land-locked state that became a state on December 1, 1963. It is bound by Assam in the north and west, Arunachal Pradesh in the northeast, Manipur in the south and Myanmar in the east. Geologically, it is part of the Alpine Himalayan mountain system with thick tropical forests, which used to cover most of the state. Various factors, including indiscriminate logging, have led to large-scale denudation of hillsides and a loss of tree cover. Nagaland is home to 16 major tribes and several sub-tribes each with its own language.

Naga society remains basically rural and a large majority of them live in villages. Each village was an entity to which every resident owed allegiance. The supremacy, dignity, defence, and well being of the village was their pride. Their needs were few and they were self-sufficient, hard working, brave, honest and hospitable. That way of life is fast vanishing and the Nagas today have moved out into urban centers and into varied professions. Yet the basic allegiance that every Naga owes to his village and his clan is still very much a part of their cultural ethos. For most important decisions and at every important occasion in his life, it is to the tribe and the clan and the village that a Naga turns for support and succour.

8.3 PUNJAB: CAUSES OF PROBLEM

Following are the various explanations that are in circulation for the Punjab problem.

8.3.1 Sikh Nationalism

Writing in 1974, Brass observed that "of all the ethnic groups and peoples of north India, the Sikhs come closest to satisfying the definition of a nationality or a nation." The achievement of a "cohesive Sikh identity," he added, had at times the "appearance of an invincible, solidary, national force" (Brass, 1974, p.277). But these compulsions towards nationhood, particularly after 1947, were contained by the parameters of linguistic regionalism set by the new Indian national leadership and its alliance with secular Sikh political elite who successfully divided the community and supported the formation of a Punjabi Suba. By the early 1980s, this delicate equipoise no longer existed; the Dharam Yudh morcha (1982-84), whether by default or design, reopened the Sikh national question, and in the process became the main cause of the Punjab problem.

The rise of Jarnail Singh Bhindernwale, who did not share the political culture of traditional Akalis, provided a critical catalyst in beginning the process of transforming this consciousness of a discriminated minority into the consciousness of a nation. Moreover this movement possessed an overarching ideology in fundamentalism that entrapped the traditional Akali leadership and sought to demonstrate the individuality of Sikhism. By counter posing a new world view,

fundamentalism gradually undermined the existing ground of moderate Akali politics-electoralism, a lubricating corruption, and participation in the regional political system.

8.2.2 Conspiracy Theories

Conspiracy Theories assert that the events that climaxed in June 1984 were the handiwork of those conspiring to dismember India by external aggression and internal extremism through the use of terror. The White Paper on the Punjab agitation published by the Government of India provides an illustrative example.

The essence of the problem in Punjab was not the demands put forward by the Akali Dal . . . but the maturing of a secessionist and anti-national movement. The Akali Dal leadership allowed the initiative and control over the agitation to pass out of their hands [to the secessionists and terrorists]. The terrorists escalated their violence. With each passing day the situation worsened. The subversive activities of groups inside the Golden Temple had assumed menacing proportions in the context of India's security. The influence of external forces, with deep-rooted interest in the disintegration of India, was becoming evident. The Government was convinced that this challenge to the security, unity and integrity of the country could not be met by the normal law and order agencies at the disposal of the State. It was in these circumstances that the decision was taken to call the army in.

8.2.3 Modernising Impact of Green Revolution

Robin Jeffrey concentrated on the modernising impact of the Green Revolution in Punjab. For him, it accelerated the emergence of mass society: face-to-face village communities disintegrated; urbanisation, consumerism, and mass literacy inflated expectations; ethnic identities became firmer emblems of occupational competition; rootlessness, alienation, and graduate unemployment nurtured messianic tendencies, especially fundamentalism; and, above all, a revolution took place in communication, particularly political communication. Social change outpaced familiar political practices and the ability of institutions to regulate them. Politicians accustomed to factional intrigues among elites now became "adrift on a sea of mass politics." In fact, they responded to these changes by launching "a desperate game in which few holds were barred." "Modernisation," asserts Jeffrey, "played a large part in shaping the Sikh unrest (represented in its extreme form in the demand for a sovereign state) which ultimately led to the storming of the Golden Temple, Mrs. Gandhi's assassination and the 'communal violence' that ripped cruelly through New Delhi in November 1984"(Jeffrey, 1986, p.2,8).

8.2.4 Integrated Approach

Another approach is presented by Murray Leaf for whom the Green Revolution also provides a point of departure. The "Punjab problem," he argued, represented a choice between a pluralistic pattern of economic and political development favoured by the Akali Dal and a Sovietized model of political economy followed by the state's-and the nation's administrations. The former stands for decentralisation, ethnic and religious pluralism, and the use of ethical incentives to promote development; the latter, a quasimonopolistic party-government relationship, industrial domination of agriculture, and a distributionist socialist Philosophy. Accordingly, the Akali agitation that crystallised around the Anandpur Sabha Resolution (ASR) should be interpreted as an attempt to create a new developmentalist order. The "Punjab crisis," Leaf concludes, "has not, fundamentally, been a clash between Sikhs and Hindus, nor between Sikhs and Mrs. Indira Gandhi. . . . It has been a clash between two visions of the future and of India's proper political and social constitution"(Leaf,1985, pp.475-89).

The comprehensive outlooks of Jeffrey and Leaf include: the impact of linguistic reorganisation on the Akali Dal's electoral support; the subsequent change in political recruitment to the Akali Dal, in particular the displacement of urban Sikh leadership by Sikh Jats who are held to be the main beneficiaries of the Green Revolution; the Akali Dal's adoption of a broad political and development policy, symbolised by the ASR, to accommodate conflicting caste and group interests while retaining the mobilisatory appeal of religion; the demographic threat to Sikh majority status posed by the growth of migrant labour from other states; and the role of leading personalities, both within the Congress and the Akali Dal, in promoting ethnic conflict.

8.2.5 Marxist Approach

The Marxist interpretations mainly attempt to identify the interaction of three related issues: the "national question," the impact of economic policies in Punjab on the emergence of social classes, and the role of the Indian state. Most Marxist accounts of the "Punjab problem" precede from the "national question," that is, the process of nationality formation in India as an integral part of the development of capitalism. Included in this framework, with the usual dialectical contingencies and ambiguities, are operational definitions of classes, relations of production, and the state. Depending on the assumptions made, India is either categorised as a multinational country, with a concurrent or a desynchronised development of the various nationalities, or is held to possess an "Indian nationality" that is prior to, and transcends, "linguistic regionalism".

8.4 SOME IMPORTANT EFFORTS

8.4.1 Efforts for Normalcy

For the restoration of normalcy the AD (L) government was dismissed in May 1987 and President's Rule was imposed on the grounds that there was "chaos and anarchy in Punjab." Anti-

terrorism became the main instrument of the centre's policy in the state. Despite the misgivings of most analysts, the policy appears to have succeeded without making major political concessions, either to militants or the moderate Akali leadership. What factors account for this success? There are three different interpretations.

8.4.2 Effective Anti- terrorism

The most public explanation for the restoration of order in Punjab credits the security forces' effective anti-terrorist policies. Although anti-terrorism had become the main thrust of the centre's policy after May 1987, it was only in mid-1992 that the security forces achieved an impressive breakthrough. Nevertheless, the policy had been vigorously pursued in what Julius Ribeiro called a form of "bullets for bullets," which led to a number of major changes. The security apparatus in Punjab, particularly the Punjab Police, was reorganised. In addition to the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Border Security Force (BSF), and the regular use of the Army, the Punjab Police was strengthened with the creation of new senior posts and mass recruitment at constable and special constable levels. Anti-terrorist legislation-the National Security Act (1980), Punjab Disturbed Areas Ordinance (1983), Terrorist Areas (Special Courts) Act (1984), and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) (1985)-was rigorously enforced with official approval for a "shoot to kill" policy when known offenders were apprehended. Moreover, counter insurgency was given a high priority with the employment of irregular hit squads intended to infiltrate and liquidate terrorist organisations.

The political backing for anti-terrorism began to waiver with the November 1989 Indian election of the National Front government and eight radical Sikh MPs from Punjab out of the state's 13 Lok Sabha constituencies. While V. P. Singh's National Front government sought to introduce more accountability into the operation of the security forces, its successor led by Chandra Shekhar opened a dialogue with the militants that eventually culminated in the agreement to hold Punjab Legislative Assembly (PLA) elections in June 1991. During this period, the morale of the security forces plummeted as some former terrorists prepared to capture power through the ballot box in a contest that was boycotted by the Congress (I). Thus, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the massacre of 76 passengers on two trains, and the election of a Congress (I) government at the centre in June 1991 with P.V. Narasimha Rao as the Prime Minister, provided a set of circumstances that led to the reinforcement of political will and commitment to antiterrorism.

In the autumn of 1991, several measures were taken to "pacify" Punjab. K. P. S. Gill, the former chief of police who had ruthlessly prosecuted the antiterrorist campaign, was reinstated in that post. Simultaneously, nine more divisions of the Indian Army were moved into the province to contain militancy. The Army's deployment at its peak in February 1992 during the PLA elections blanketed the state with security, for in addition to 120,000 army personnel, it could call on 53,000 Punjab Police, 28,000 Home Guards, 10,000 Special Police, and over 70,000 paramilitary

personnel. Unlike previous deployments, in Operation Rakshak II launched in November 1991, the Army took a backstage role by providing support to the police and administration to re-establish the authority of the state. This was done by freeing the police from routine duties to undertake more offensive actions and by sealing the Indo-Pakistan border.

Further support for the policy came with the Congress victory in the February 1992 Punjab Legislative Assembly (PLA) elections, which were boycotted by the mainstream Sikh political parties. As the *raison d'être* of the new administration was to combat militancy, Sardar Bewaint Singh, the new Chief Minister gave a free hand to security forces to "systematically plan for five years to rid Punjab of militancy." Gill bolstered the police by further recruitment; incentives were offered leading to the elimination of suspected terrorists, and police tactics were reevaluated. Massacres by terrorists were countered by massacres by the security forces, and the new mood of determination was aptly stated by Gill, who declared an "open season on terrorists." The first results of aggressive anti-terrorism became evident in the middle of 1992 when several leading figures of militant organisations were killed. Thereafter, despite the efforts of the militants to regroup and target families of the police, the security forces gained the upper hand. This turnabout was marked by a number of surrender ceremonies of terrorists and the death of Manochahal, the leader of the Bhindernwale Tiger Force, in February 1993. With the latter's death, most top-ranking militants had been eliminated and their organisations rapidly disintegrated.

8.4.3 Punjab's Social Structure

A more interesting perspective on how order was reestablished in Punjab places the role of counter-insurgency in a broader context. It suggests that the success of anti-terrorism was not simply the result of actions taken by the security forces, but rather that the failure of the militants-and therefore the success of the security forces-can be explained by the characteristics of Punjab's social structure, and in particular the values of Jat Sikh society. The militancy was largely based on support within the Jat Sikh peasantry. Historically, studies of Jat Sikhs have shown the continuation of certain types of social behaviour: high propensity toward factionalism, competitiveness, egalitarianism, and pursuit of vertical linkages to enhance the accumulation of property and prestige.

As well as utilising cultural Jat Sikh history-heroism, resistance, and an inevitable will to power-the militants in their daily operations became ensnared in existing social networks, including local feuds and factional enmities, kinship retribution, and the social underworld of criminality as well as in the private accumulation of wealth and personal aggrandisement. Slowly the support, which the militants were getting, vanished.

8.4.4 Managed Disorder

Although the relative ease with which the security forces penetrated the militants can perhaps be attributed to the social structure, it has also revived speculation that troubles in Punjab were carefully orchestrated, representing a form of "managed disorder." Such conspiratorial explanations would be difficult to entertain were it not for the strange congruence of events before and after 1984 and the fact that this view is strongly held by the main Sikh political force in the state-the Akalis. Whereas most serious analysts agree that the role of Pakistan and the Sikh diaspora in supporting the militants' insurgency was a contributing factor to the troubles, few have ever doubted the Indian state's capacity to impose its authority in the province.

8.5 NAGALAND

8.5.1 Violence in Nagaland

Violence slowly began in Nagaland and the second half of the 1950s spilling into the 1960 saw some of the worst acts of violence. The Naga aspiration for a separate homeland in which they themselves determine their own political, administrative and socio-economic affairs is the root cause of the problem. There are also serious allegations of playing into foreign hands and secessionist forces against them. There is increasing antagonism between the Nagas and the Centre. For easier understanding, the history of the ongoing conflict in Nagaland may be broadly divided into these stages.

1. The period up to the early part of 1950s when there was no division among the Naga people and there was no physical violence.
2. The second stage, from around mid-1950s to the latter half of 1970s when armed conflict began and disunity set in among the Nagas.
3. The third stage from around early 1980s when gradually the underground militants began started having differences among themselves. Factions merged and today there are four of them, the most powerful being the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (led by Isak Chisi Swu and Th. Muivah), and which is negotiating for an overall settlement with the Government of India. The others are the NSCN (Khaplang), the Federal Government of Nagaland (Adinno, under the NNC) and a NNC faction under Thinsolie Keyho.
4. Naga society today is ridden with mistrust and violence.

In terms of armed conflict itself, Naga society, today has become the oldest sustained conflict situation in the world. From head hunting to fighting the British, from being a battlefield in World War II to the present confrontation, the entire known history of the Nagas has been one of conflict. Naga society has not experienced the kind of 'normalcy' that is meant when this phrase is used. While there is no difference of opinion in calling the decades old conflict a political one and security forces have been pitted against Naga militants, the situation on the ground is

somewhat more complex. The various factions are not united and there is constant infighting and frequent killings. The clash of interests between the over ground (State political groups) and the underground (Naga militant groups) too has resulted in armed clashes and bloodshed.

8.5.2 Effects of Conflict

Most of the country's development programmes have made little inroad into this remote hill area and although the government has poured millions of rupees for the state's development, there is little evidence of its use. Naga society, on its part, has been unable to demand accountability from its political leaders and bureaucrats as they had their own axe to grind.

People have had to pay an extraordinarily heavy price for the ongoing conflict. Community health has been virtually crippled due to militancy and counter-militancy by state forces. There has been a marked increase in psychiatric disorders, attributable in great part to the highly militarised atmosphere. Immunisation, nutrition, maternal and child health care programmes have suffered and even abandoned in rural areas due to lack of staff, essential medicines and infrastructure. Most district hospitals have become non-functional because they lack facilities, staff or have been partially destroyed.

The exact economic cost of the conflict and militarisation is difficult to calculate but the cost in human lives, infrastructure, education and health is enormous. The people are bothered by the loss of work culture, love, respect and dignity in their everyday social interactions. They can trust no one, not even people they know well. Insecurity is writ large in every aspect of their daily lives and there is a visible increase in crime. Their homes cannot be left unlocked as in the recent past and women cannot move around freely for fear of molestation and extortion. Poor families are apprehensive about the lack of food security too.

Extortion demands by various factions for taxes discourage many young people from setting up business establishments; shops close early due to the same reason. Incidents of extortion and corruption are going up steadily and there is no punitive action or check. Even in government offices, top officials are often harassed by factions, and also those posing as members of factions in their demands for money.

Highly mobile rebel groups take shelter with villagers, ambush security forces and then move on. In many cases, the security forces have retaliated by descending on the village and unleashing what are known as counter-insurgency operations. This has translated into harassment for the local civilian population, including sexual abuse of women and girls and other human rights violations. Villagers are accused of and frequently formally charged with aiding and abetting the militants. State response has, so far, been to see this as a threat to national security and to react

with a number of sweeping laws that enable the suspension of democratic and representative processes.

8.5.3 Conflict Management: The State Efforts

Though the peace talks between the key insurgent groups and the Indian government have been initiated, these decades of insurgency have naturally had a debilitating and disastrous effect in terms of the state's infrastructure and a general feeling of insecurity and fear.

Within a span of six years three Acts were passed: the Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous District) Act was promulgated in the Naga Hills in 1953; the Assam Disturbed Area Act in 1955 and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in 1958. Since then Naga areas have been intermittently under the AFSPA, which was amended in 1972. The AFSPA gives wide discretionary powers to security forces to use force as a method of warning, to search any shelter that could be a hideout and to conduct searches without warrants. The AFSPA was extended to all states and Union Territories. All the laws mentioned have been in force in various parts of the North East at all times since independence and they allow the state to suspend civilian rule for an indefinite period without review.

All these add to the confusion and social unrest in the state. It may be concluded that conflict definitely has a direct or indirect relationship to the growing menace of social problems here.

8.5.4 Human Rights Violations

Human rights groups and activists allege violations by security forces and there are reports of violations by insurgent factions as well. Besides direct violations, citizens, especially women, face regular mistreatment during search operations on roads and in residential areas. The brusque, rude questioning, the touching and feeling up of women during body searches is ugly and humiliating. Besides innumerable incidents of rape, harassment and gendered punishment, the everyday existence of woman has been full of humiliation and terror. In situations of economic and environmental destruction women find themselves totally alone, left to fend for themselves and for traumatised children after the death and torture of husbands, sons or fathers. Many crimes committed against women go unreported. Hence in many cases, culprits go unpunished. In certain cases, if a crime is committed by underground cadres, the authorities in that particular faction take the matter into their own hands, and punish the guilty according to their rules. In some cases this means execution.

8.5.6 Recommendations for Conflict Management

The following are some of the major concerns which must be addressed if peace and normalcy are to return to the state:

1. Strengthening of peace process by creating a conducive atmosphere for peace dialogue; creating democratic space for people to decision making process.
2. A key to change lies in pressing forward strongly with the communitisation process in the education system that involves local teachers, governing groups and villagers in a participatory exercise.
3. The government should help women, especially in the rural areas, in specific ways. A marketing outlet for women in the rural areas, especially for agricultural produce is required desperately. It is also important to help women make use of whatever training they have gone through. NGOs also can come together and help each other in getting together such schemes.
4. Politicians feel that if a political settlement is reached, reconciliation will follow. But the church and prominent independent figures say that peace and reconciliation should come hand in hand and that the first step is to reach an internal settlement among the four armed factions.
5. Review the Armed Forces Special Powers Act especially in the light of the period of ceasefire.
6. Address the issue of mental health seriously. Recognise the need for rehabilitation centres and counselling centres for traumatised people. These counselling centres can be integrated to the church and conform to the culture of the people. Nagas rarely give expression for their emotional sufferings, and they may not readily respond to conventional Counselling centers. So initiation at the church /women/tribal organisations level would be more effective, because these organisations are integral to the Naga way of life.
7. Organisations, Government, Naga national workers, Media, Police and security forces, like the CRPF, BSF, etc to be sensitised about human rights issues.
8. More women cells and recruitment drive for women personnel in the police department.
9. Traditional and customary laws which are discriminatory against women should be identified. In this regard, thorough research involving every tribe and different clans within the tribes need to be carried out and changes made at the earliest.
10. Rehabilitation schemes and compensation for widows and orphans who have been affected by conflict. (This should be done on a case to case basis. Tribal organisations/ Hohos, church or Other voluntary organisations involved in this kind of issues can recommend people in their areas).
11. Government schemes should be made more accessible to genuine cases. Simpler steps should be assumed to implement programmes. More effective communication strategies should be adopted to communicate about these programmes, so that even rural people can avail of the opportunities. There should also be a mechanism to check whether the authorities concerned are carrying out the specifications properly, so as to discourage corruption.

12. Justice corresponding to the severity of the crime committed, particularly crimes against women, should be addressed. Delays and lengthy court procedures should be erased.
13. Coordination must be a central component in the effective implementation of a comprehensive peace building strategy. Different groups involved in peace building initiatives could find a common platform to air their views collectively, which would be more effective.

8.6 SUMMARY

Whatever factors are held to be critical in the undermining of the militancy in Punjab, a number of implications arise for the political system in the state and for the management of regional conflicts generally. First, effective antiterrorism policies should be effectively introduced. Second, if there is some validity in the social structure and "managed dis- order" perspectives, then despite the reservations about the repeatability of effective anti-terrorism, one conclusion is obvious: problems of legitimate governance apart, the government has an enormous capacity to impose and sustain order in the social conditions pertaining in Punjab where the threat from militancy arises. Similarly, the demands for separation have been constant in Nagaland. Therefore, for conflict management to be effective, efforts should be made to address the genuine developmental aspects like infrastructure, welfare of women and children, education and health care that effectively lead to confidence building measures.

Conflicts are devastating to social and cultural forms because they impinge at the level of the whole society. Every person who has lived through the period of conflict and experienced at first hand the effect of the armed conflict is aware of the wide-ranging ramifications that the atmosphere of violence has had and (in some cases) is still having on them. The severity of the damage is often not easy to quantify but there are deep psychological, physical and social scars. The economic scars too are very visible in terms of the low development paradigms. For individuals, as for a society, things can never be the same and a new world view is needed.

8.7 TERMINAL QUESTIONS

1. What were the main causes of problem of terrorism in Punjab?
2. How was the problem managed in Punjab?
3. Give an account of the problem of violence in Nagaland.
4. What are the recommendations for conflict management in Nagaland?

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