UNIT 1 LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY

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1.0 OBJECTIVES

Logic is the study of inference and argument. Epistemology is the study of the origin, nature and limits of human knowledge. The main objective of this unit is to give details of logic and epistemology in the different systems of Indian Philosophy. The logic and theory of knowledge of Indian systems are largely coloured by their metaphysical tenets. This unit is concerned with the sources, nature, validity and limits of man's knowledge. It also deals with the theories of truth and logic and their relevance in the different schools of Indian thought. By the end of this unit you will have a clear cut idea

* of basic understanding of the theories of knowledge;
* to relate it with the theories of truth and error;
* to know about the system of logic in Indian thought;
* of the different means of knowledge accepted in the different schools of Indian thought;
* of the validity and invalidity of knowledge as given in the schools of Indian thought.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The central questions of epistemology include the origin of knowledge, the place of experience in generating knowledge and the place of reason in doing so; the relationship between knowledge and the responsibility of error and changing forms of knowledge that arise from new conceptualisations of the world. All of these issues link with other central concerns of Indian systems. There are four factors involved in any knowledge

(1) The subject who knows (*pramata*)
(2) the object of knowledge (*prameya*)
(3) the means of valid knowledge (*Pramana*)
(4) the resultant of valid knowledge (*prama*)

Prama is valid knowledge. Knowledge can be valid or invalid; valid knowledge is called *prama* and non-valid knowledge is known as *aprama*. *Pramana* is valid means of knowledge and its important four means include perception (*pratyaksa*), inference (*anumana*), verbal testimony (*sabda*), and comparison (*upamana*). Different schools of Indian thought accept or reject different ones of these methods. All methods are accepted by Mimamsa; only perception, inference and testimony by Yoga; only perception and inference by Buddhism and Vaisesika; and only perception by Carvaka.

Indian theories of knowledge are divisible into two - *Svatahpramanya vada* (self validity of knowledge) and *Paratahpramanya vada*. In the former view knowledge is intrinsically valid. Error occurs only when some outside factors affect it. In the latter case, knowledge by itself is neither valid nor invalid. Its truth or falsity is to be ascertained through some appropriate test.

The general science of inference is logic and its aim is to make explicit the rules by which inferences are drawn. Inferences are rule-governed steps from one or more propositions known as premises, to another proposition, called conclusion. A deductive inference is one that is intended to be valid, where a valid inference is one in which the conclusion must be true if the premises are true. All other inferences are inductive. Hence we can say that logic is the art or philosophy of reasoning. We will be having a detailed study of these concepts of logic and epistemology, introduced above in the context of Indian systems in this unit.

1.2 CARVAKA EPISTEMOLOGY

According to the Carvaka school, *pratyaksa* or perception is the only source of knowledge; i.e., what cannot be perceived through the senses must be treated as non-existent. They refute all other sources of knowledge. They admit only four elements; i.e., earth, water, air and fire. We experience all the four through perception. So, perception is the only authority. There is no space because we cannot perceive any such element. The world of common sense perception is the only world that exists. Again, the physical body is the self of an individual. There is no mind, no consciousness, no soul, over and above the physical body. We do not perceive mind or soul. Hence they are unreal. Even consciousness is a by-product and epiphenomenon of matter. “Matter secretes mind as liver secretes bile.” A particular combination of elements produces consciousness though the elements separately do not possess it. It is similar to the red colour being produced from the combination of betel leaf, areca nut and lime, none of which is red.

The validity of inference is also rejected by Carvakas. Inference is said to be a mere leap into the dark. We proceed here from the known to the unknown and there is no certainty in this, though some inferences may turn out to be accidentally true. A general proposition may be true in unperceived cases. But there is no guarantee that it will hold true even in unperceived cases. Deductive inferences is vitiated by the fallacy of *petitio principii*. It is merely an argument in circle since the conclusion is already contained in the major premise, the validity of which is not proved. Inductive inference undertakes to prove the validity of the major premise of deductive inference. But induction too is uncertain because it proceeds unwarrantedly from the known to the unknown. In order to distinguish true induction from simple enumeration, it is pointed out that the former, unlike the latter, is based on casual relationship which means invariable association or *Vyapti*. *Vyapti*, therefore is the nerve of all inference. But the Carvaka challenges this universal and invariable relationship of concomitance and regards it a mere guess work. Perception does not prove this *Vyapti*. Nor can it be proved by inference, for inference itself is said to presuppose its validity. Testimony too cannot prove it, for testimony itself is not a valid means of knowledge. Secondly, if testimony proves *Vyapti*, inference would become dependent on testimony and then none would be able to infer anything by himself. Hence inference cannot be regarded as a valid source of knowledge. Induction is uncertain and deduction is argument in a circle. The logicians therefore find themselves stuck up in mud of inference.

The Carvaka position has been vehemently criticised by all systems of Indian philosophy all of which have maintained the validity of at least perception and inference. To refuse the validity of inference from the empirical standpoint is to refuse to think and discuss. All thoughts, all discussions, all doctrines, all affirmations and denials, all proofs and disproofs are made possible by inference. The Carvaka view that perception is valid and inference is invalid is itself a result of inference. Carvaka can understand others only through inference and make others understand him only through inference. Thoughts and ideas not being material objects cannot be perceived but can only be inferred.

1.3 JAINA LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Jains have also critically examined the valid sources of knowledge. According to Jainism knowledge is of two kinds-*Pramana* and *Naya*. *Pramana* refers to the knowledge of a thing as it is. *Naya* is that particular standpoint from which we deliver our judgement about a particular thing. Both *Pramana* and *Naya* are essential for the full and true knowledge of a thing. *Pramana* is that knowledge which illuminates itself and others without any hindrance. Hence Jains classify knowledge gained through *Pramana* into direct (*aparoksa*) and indirect (*paroksa*).

Direct knowledge:- *Avadhi-jnana, Manah paryaya* and *kevala jnana* are three kinds of direct knowledge which may be called extra-ordinary, and extra-sensory perceptions. *Avadhi* is clarivoyance, *Manah paryaya* is telepathy, and *kevala* is omniscience. *Avadhi* is direct knowledge of things even at a distance of space or time. It is called *Avadhi* or limited because it functions within a particular area and up to a particular time. It cannot go beyond s*Patia*l and temporal limits. *Manah paryaya* is direct knowledge of the thought of others. This too is limited

by s*Pati*al and temporal conditions. In both *Avadhi* and *Manah paryaya*, the soul has direct knowledge unaided by the senses or the mind. Hence they are called immediate, though limited. *Kevala-jnana* is unlimited and absolute knowledge. It can be acquired only by liberated souls. It is not limited by space, time or object.

Indirect knowledge:- Perceptual knowledge which is ordinarily called immediate, and admitted to be relatively so by Jainism and therefore included in mediate knowledge. Pure perception in the sense of mere sensation cannot rank the title of knowledge. It must be given meaning and arranged into order by conception or thought. Perceptual knowledge is therefore regarded as mediate since it presupposes the activity of thought. Mediate knowledge is divided into *mati* and *shruta*. *Mati* includes both perceptual and inferential knowledge. *Mati jnana* springs in the following order:

(1) *Avagraha*-is the first kind of knowledge produced from the contact of sense organs with the objects.

(2) *Iha*-This follows *avagraha* and in it the soul is able to appreciate the qualities of the visible object.

(3) *Avaya*-In this we come to know definitely about the object

(4) *Dharand*-In this, the full knowledge about the object leaves an impression upon the mind of man.

Shruta jnana means knowledge derived from authority. It is to be gained from authoritative books and words of great sages. Perusal of authoritative books and listening to the sermons of saints are essential for this kind of knowledge. *Shruta jnana* is divided into two categories, i.e., *Angavahya* and *angapravistha*. The former is mentioned in the Jaina scriptures while the *shruta jnana* outside the pale of the religious books of the Jains, fall in the latter category. Thus *Mati* and *Shruta* which are the two kinds of mediate knowledge have as their instrument perception, inference and authority- the three *Pramana*s admitted by Jainism.

According to Jaina epistemology indirect knowledge is of five kinds-*Smrti, Pratyabhijna, Tarka, Anumana* and *Agama.*

(1) *Smrti*- To reminisce something known directly in the past as a result of the awakening of some *samskara* is known *sruti*. For Jains, *smrti* is valid knowledge because it is the correct form of things perceived in the past.
(2) Recognition (*pratyabhijna*)- It is the synthetic knowledge contributed by direct perception and recollection (*Smrti*).In it we know resemblance (*samanata*), identity (*tadatmya*), differences (*bheda*), comparison (*Tulana*),etc. In it we know the general (*samanya*) in the form of similar change (*sadrsaparinama*) of different *jivas* and *ajivas*. Recognition is valid knowledge.
(3) Logic (*Tarka*)- It is the knowledge of *Vyapti* between *paksa* and *sadhya*.It depends upon the perception whether two things exist together or not in the past, present, and future. *Vyapti* is of two kinds-- *Anavya Vyapti* and *Vyatireka Vyapti*. In the former the concomitance of two tings is established. In the latter *Vyapti* is shown in the absence. 'where there is fire, there is smoke' is an example of *Anavaya Vyapti*. On the other hand.' where there is no fire, there is smoke', exemplifies *Vyatireka Vyapti*. The relationship of universal accompaniment, gradual or concurrent, exists in *Vyapti*. This relationship is ascertained by logic (*Tarka*).

(4) Inference (*anumana*)-It is the knowledge of *sadhya* with the help of *hetu*. This inference is either *svarthanumana* or *pararthanumana*. The former is the grasp for one's own self. Hence it needs no amplification. For example, the frequent visibility of fire under smoke together suffices to convince us of their concomitance. Afterwards, when we see smoke, we infer the existence of fire also with the help of *Vyapti*, which is already known to us. It is, *svarthanumana*. In it the place of smoke is *paksa*, smoke is *paksa dharma*. In *svarthanumana* both *Vyapti* and *paksa dharma* are essential. *Pararthanumana* is used for convincing others. So it must be more systematised and vivid. It is fivefold. In the fivefold *Pararthanumana* an inference is drawn in five sentences. These sentences are called the propositions (*avayava*) of inference; e.g.,
(a) *Pratijna*-The hill is fiery;
(b) *Hetu*-because of smoke;
(c) *Drstanta*- Wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as in the kitchen;
(e) *Upanaya*- The smoke, which does not exist without fire (*Vyaptivisistdhum*) is in the hill;
(f) *Nigamana*-Therefore the hill is fiery;
(5) *Agama*:- It is the knowledge of a thing through the words of reliable people. A person who knows things in their true form and expresses his views correctly, is a reliable person and an *apta*. He is free from prejudice. His words befit the object which they are seeking to express. *Agama* is of two kinds-*Laukik* and *Alaukik*.

Naya vada

Naya means a standpoint of thought from which we make a statement about a thing. All truth is relative to our standpoints. Partial knowledge of one of the innumerable aspects of a thing is called '*Naya*'. Judgement based on this partial knowledge is also included in '*Naya*'. There are seven *nayas* of which the first four are called *artha-Naya* because they relate to objects or meanings and the last three are called *shabda Naya* because they relate to words. When taken as absolute, a '*Naya*' becomes a fallacy or *nayabhasa.*

Syad Vada

Syad vada or *saptabhangi Naya* is the most important part of Jaina logic. According to this, we can know only some aspects of reality and so all our judgements are relative. It is a theory of the relativity of knowledge. Therefore, the knowledge of every object is not absolute but relative and *Syad vada* holds all knowledge to be only probable. Every proposition gives us only a perhaps, a may be or a *Syad*. We cannot affirm or deny any thing absolutely of any object. There is nothing certain on account of the endless complexity of things. It emphasises the extremely complex nature of reality and its indefiniteness.

Reality has infinite aspects and we can know only some of these aspects. The infinitely complex reality admits of opposite predicates from different standpoints. It is real as well as unreal. It is universal as well as particular. It is one as well as many. Viewed from the point of view of substance, a thing is real, universal permanent and one. Viewed from the point of view of modes, it is unreal, particular, momentary and many. Those who ignore this truth make simple and unqualified statements about reality. Jains are very fond of quoting the story of the blind men and the elephant. The blind men gave different accounts of the elephant. They are right in what they affirmed, but wrong in what they denied. There is no judgement which is absolutely true

and no judgement is absolutely false. All our judgements are relative, conditional and limited. The statements 'exists and does not exists' may be made from different standpoints. Each is true. The stand from which a thing is known is called '*Naya*'. It is this principle of standpoint (*Naya*) that is made known through the theory of 'may be ism' (*Syad Vada*). It consists of seven steps. Each judgement is meaningful, only if the standpoint from which it is made is taken into account. This is done by adding the expression 'may be' or *Syad* to the judgement. The seven steps are as follows:-

1. May be, a thing is (*Syad asti*);
2. May be, a thing is not (*Syad nasti*);
3. May be, a thing is and is not (*Syad asti nasti*);
4. May be, a thing is inexpressible (*Syad avaktavya*);
5. May be, a thing is and inexpressible (*Syad asti avaktavya*);
6. May be, a thing is not and is inexpressible (*Syad nasti avaktavya*);
7. May be, a thing is and is not and is inexpressible (*Syad asti nasti avaktavya*).

The significance of this doctrine is that our knowledge regarding any thing is relative. Relative knowledge presupposes absolute knowledge. Jainism accepts *Kevala jnana* as the absolute knowledge.

1.4 BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGY

In epistemological ideas also we can see the different opinions among the four schools of Buddhism, Yogacara, Madhyamika, Sautrantika, Vaibhasika. According to Sautrantika the external objects are not known through perception. According to Vaibhasika, on the other hand, the knowledge of the external objects can also be gained through perception. The Vaibhasika philosophers have criticised the Sautrantika view regarding perception.

According to Vaibhasika the inference of things external to knowledge is self-contradictory. If all the external objects are inferred by their knowledge, then nothing can be known by perception. In the absence of perception there can be no relation of concomitance between the major and the minor premise without which no inference is possible. This is opposed to actual experience. The Vaibhasikas accept the presence of the external things and conceive them as subject to perception. According to Vaibhasika that is *Pramana* by which direct knowledge is possible. The *Pramana*s are two types: *Pratyaksa* (perception) and *anumana* (inferential). Both these *Pramana*s are known as *samyagjnana* (right knowledge) and it is by these that all the *purusharthas* are attained. *Pratyaksa* is the knowledge devoid of imagination and error. This knowledge is of four types:

(1) *Indriya jnana*—This is the knowledge attained through senses.

(2) *Mano vijnana*—in this knowledge there is the sensual knowledge in the form of *samanatara pratyaya* after the knowledge through senses. This *samanantara pratyaya* is a mental modification in the absence of which there is no knowledge even after continued seeing. Thus *mano vijnana* is born of both the object and the consciousness.

(3) *Atma samvedana*—It is the manifestation of *chitta* and its *dharmas* are like pleasure and pain in their real form. This is attributeless, without error and of the nature of self-realisation.

(4) *Yogic jnana*—It is the ultimate knowledge of the things perceptible through various *Pramana*s. The object of *pratyaksa* is *svalaksana*. *Svalaksana* is that object in which there is difference in the form of knowledge by the presence and absence of its contact. It is by it that a thing has the capacity to do anything. Hence it is said to be *paramartha satya*.

Inference is of two types: *Svartha* (for the self) and *parartha* (for others).In the former the *linga* is inferential, i. e., in the inference there is fire on the hill, the hill is *linga* and the fire is inferential. In it the *linga* remains in self side (*svapaksa*), just as the kitchen. The *linga* does not remain in the opposite side (*vipaksa*), e.g., a pool of water, etc.

Sautrantika School

According to Sautrantikas they are subject to inference. According to Sautrantikas there are four causes of knowledge.

(1) *Alamban*-It is the cause of external objects like jug etc, because the form of the knowledge is born from it.

(2) *Samanantara*—This is so called because it is only after the previous mental stage that the following stage attains consciousness.

(3) *Adhipat*—The senses have been called as the *Adhipati Pratyaya* of the knowledge. It is the normative cause. Without the senses there can be no external knowledge even after the presence of the first two causes.

(4) *Sahkari Pratyaya*—these are the subsidiary conditions necessary for knowledge, e.g., light, form, etc. without which knowledge becomes almost impossible.

The knowledge of the external objects becomes possible due to the above mentioned four causes or conditions. The Sautrantikas do not admit that the external objects have no existence and all knowledge is in the consciousness. Nor do they believe like the Vaibhasikas that we know anything by direct perception. As opposed to Vaibhasikas , the Sautrantikas maintain that we have no direct perception of the external objects but only the knowledge of their appearance. It is by the distinction in these appearances which are the basis of the knowledge. Hence they are in the mind itself, though the things which they represent as external objects are not known by their perception, but by the inference based upon the mental modifications aroused by them . This view is known as Bahayanumeyavad. It is representationalism or indirect realism.

Yogacara School

According to Yogacara the physical world has no existence apart from consciousness. Even if the existence of anything outside consciousness is admitted it cannot be known. Vijnanavadins believe that all things external to mind are mental modifications. Thus the knowledge of the external things is impossible. Hence the thing which appears to be external, should be taken as a mental concept. It can be questioned here that if the object is a mere concept of the mind why it does not appear, disappear and change as desired. To this the Vijnanavadins reply that the mind is a mere stream in which the past experiences remain in the form of expression and whenever there is favourable condition for a certain impression the same impression manifests and results into knowledge. From the multiple point of view Vijnanavadins admit two types of knowledge - *Grahana* and *Adhyavasaya*. *Grahana* is indirect and *Adhyavasaya* direct inference. The Vijnanavadins believe that the proof of things depends on something else. (*Parartah*

Pramanyavada). They made two distinctions in the empirical truth – *Paratatra* and *Pari-kalpa*. The former is relative while the latter is imaginary.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1. Examine the main contributions of Carvaka epistemology to Indian philosophy.

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2. Expound the Jain theory of *syad vada* and evaluate it as an epistemological theory.

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1.5 NYAYA-VAISESIKA EPISTEMOLOGY

In the Nyaya philosophy knowledge is spoken of as the manifestation of object. Knowledge lights its objects as does a lamp. Knowledge may be valid or invalid. Valid knowledge (*prama*) is defined as the right apprehension of an object. It is the manifestation of an object as it is. Nyaya maintains the theory of correspondence. While Nyaya system recognises all the four *Pramana*s namely perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison, Vaisesika recognises only two *Pramana*s- perception and inference and reduces comparison and verbal testimony to inference.

Perception is divided into ordinary (*Laukika*) and extra-ordinary (*Alaukika*). In ordinary perception knowledge results from the contact of the sense organs with the external objects (*bahya*). Extraordinary perception has three distinctions - perception of classes (*samanyalaksna*), complication (*jnana laksnana*) and intuition (*yogaja*). The Naiyayika maintains two stages in perception- *Nirvikalpa* (indeterminate) and *Savikalpa* (determinate). Gautama accepts this distinction of perception.

According to Nyaya philosophy, the second source of valid knowledge is *anumana* . The term *anumana* literally means 'after-knowledge' i.e., knowledge that follows other knowledge. It is mediate and indirect and are arranged through the medium of some mark which is called '*hetu'* and bears the relation of invariable concomitance with the observed feature. The basis of the inference is invariable concomitance. The invariable relation between the *hetu* and the *sadya* is called *Vyapti*. The knowledge of the qualities of the '*paksa*' through the '*hetu'* is called *paramarsa*. Hence inference or *anumana* is said to be knowledge gained through *paramarsa*, or in other words, the knowledge of the presence of sadhya in the *paksa* through the *linga*, which is in the quality of *paksa* and is invariably related by *Vyapti*.

This may be explained with the help of the typical example of inference, the presence of fire on the perception of smoke. When one sees smoke on distant hill one remembers one's experience of the universal concomitance (*Vyapti*) between smoke and fire and concludes that there is fire on the distant hill. The character which is inferred (fire) is called sadhya; the mark on the strength of which the character is inferred is the *hetu* (smoke); the subject where the character is inferred is *paksa* (hill). The three terms correspond to the major, the middle and the minor terms in the Aristotelian syllogism. The following is a a typical nyaya syllogism.

1. This hill has fire (*pratijna*),
2. Because it has smoke (*hetu*),
3. Whatever has smoke has fire e.g. an oven (*udaharana*),
4. This hill as smoke which is invariably associated with fire (*upanaya*),
5. Therefore this hill has fire (*nigamana*).

The first, the *pratijna*, is the logical statement which is to be proved. The second is *hetu* or reason which states the reason for the establishment of the proposition. The third is *udaharana* which the universal concomitance together with example. The fourth is *upanaya* or application of the universal concomitance to the present case. The fifth is *nigamana* or conclusion drawn from the preceding propositions. These five members of Indian syllogism are called *Avayavas*.

Linga paramarsa: The Nyaya syllogism has five terms. Among them ,middle term works as a bridge between the major and the minor terms. Therefore, the middle term has main responsibility to prove a syllogism valid or invalid. How a middle term is related to major term is *lingaparamarsha*. There are five characteristics of a middle term-

1. It must be present in the minor term (*paksadharmata*); e.g., smoke must be present in the hill.
2. It must be present in all positive instances in which the major terms is present; e.g., smoke must be present in the kitchen where fire exists.(*sapaksasattva*).
3. It must be absent in all negative instances in which the major terms is absent; e.g., smoke must be absent in the lake in which fire does not exist.(*vipaksasattva*).
4. It must be non-incom*Pati*ble with the minor term; e.g., it must not prove the coolness of fire (*abadhita*).
5. It must be qualified by the absence of counteracting reasons which lead to a contradictory conclusion; e.g., 'the fact of being caused' should not be used to prove the 'eternality' of sound (*aviruddha*).

Hetvabhasa:-In Indian logic a fallacy is called *hetvahas*a**.** It means that middle term appears to be a reason but is not a valid reason. All fallacies are material fallacies. We have mentioned the

five characteristics of a valid middle term. When these are violated, we have fallacies. Five kinds of fallacies are recognized:

1. *Assiddha or sadhyasama*- This is the fallacy of unproved middle.
2. *Savyabhicara*- this is the fallacy of irregular middle.
3. *Satpratipaksa*- here the middle term is contradicted by another middle term.
4. *Badhita*- It is the non-inferentially contradicted middle
5. *Viruddha*- It is the contradictory middle.

Comparison with Western Syllogism:-

There are many important points of difference of resemblances as well as difference between Nyaya syllogism and Aristotelian syllogism. The first we shall note the resemblances. Though the Nyaya syllogism has five and the Aristotelian syllogism as three propositions, the terms in both are only three-the *sadhya* or the major, the *paksa* or the minor and the *hetu* or the middle. The Nyaya syllogism can easily be converted into the usual Aristotelian syllogism. The first and the last propositions are the same. The second coincides with fourth. Hence if we leave out the first two members of the Nyaya syllogism, we find that it resembles the Aristotelian syllogism.

All things which have smoke have fire (Major).

This hill has smoke (Minor).

Therefore, this hill has fire (conclusion).

But there are certain real differences between the Nyaya and Aristotelian syllogism.

1. While Aristotle concentrates only on deduction the Nyaya system combines deduction with induction. The example is a special feature of the Nyaya syllogism and illustrates the truth that the universal major premise is the result of inductive reasoning. The Nyaya regards deduction and induction as inseparably related as two aspects of the same process. The third proposition shows that the universal proposition is derived from the particular instances like the oven. Such observation of particular instances is the work of induction. The third proposition where Nyaya combines the Universal with the particular brings out the inseparable connection between deduction and induction.
2. Again while the Aristotelian syllogism is formal, the Nyaya syllogism is formal as well as material. Nyaya syllogism discusses only facts of experience, since it has to suggest examples.

Classification of inference: Inference is twofold-(1) *Svarthanumana*-inference for one's own sake and (2) *Pararthanumana*-inference for the sake of others. The former is not expressed in the form of a syllogistic argument. The latter is a syllogism which helps to direct the mind of the listener to think in the required manner.

Sabda: It is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person (*aptavakya*) and consists in understanding its meaning. It is based on the words of trustworthy persons, human or divine. A person is trustworthy if he knows the truth and conveys it correctly. Testimony is of two kinds-Vaidika and secular (*laukika*). The *vaidika* testimony is perfect and infallible because the Vedas

are spoken by God. Secular testimony, being the words of human beings who are liable to error, is not infallible.

Comparison (*Upamana*): It is knowledge derived from similarity. It has been defined as the knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation.

1.6 SAMKHYA YOGA EPISTEMOLOGY

Samkhya theory of knowledge: In all knowledge three factors are involved.

(a) The subject who knows,
(b) The object known,
(c) The process of knowledge.

Samkhya admits of three *Pramana*s –perception, inference, and verbal testimony.

Perception: Samkhya believes in 'representative perception'. In knowledge the internal organ mediates the *purusa* and objects when an object comes within the range of vision, the internal organ is so modified as to assume the form of an object. The modification of the internal organ into an object is called *vrtti* or mode. Knowledge means that mode as illuminated by the light of *purusa*. Illumination is a constant feature of perceptual knowledge. The mode varies in accordance with the objects presented.

Inference: There are varieties of inference generally recognised. The first is syllogistic inference which is based on perception. The second corresponds to analogical reasoning in modern logic. Such inference is called *samanyatodrsta*. For e.g., From the observed fact that an effect like a jar requires for its production, an agent like potter, it is concluded that the world also should have been brought into existence by a competent being God.

***Sabda*:** It is interpreted as aptavacana. Testimony is valid if the source is reliable. It may come not only from the scriptures, but also from persons who are trust worthy (*apta*).

1.7 PURVA MIMAMSA EPISTEMOLOGY

According to Kumarila Bhatta, valid knowledge is that which provides the experience of an unknown object, that which is not contradicted by other knowledge and which is free from other defects. The Mimamsakas uphold *svatah pramanya vada* or self validity of knowledge. Knowledge is valid by itself. The conditions of freedom from defects and non-contradiction being satisfied, all knowledge arises as self-valid. Coherence and self-consistency is the nature of valid knowledge. Both Prabhakara and Kumarila regard knowledge itself as *Pramana* or means of knowledge. Jaimini admits three *Pramana*s - perception, inference and testimony. Prabhakara adds two more –comparison and implication. Kumarila further adds non-apprehension.

***Arthapathi* (presumption):**- Prabhakara and Kumarila both, admit *Arthapathi* as an independent means of valid kowledge. Through this *Pramana* we discover a fact as a result of a contradiction

between two facts already known to be well established. A common example is - Devadutta does not take his food during day time. Yet he is quite strong and fat. We presume that he must be taking food at night. The assumption of Devadutta eating at night is a postulation. We have never seen him eating his food at night. Hence the knowledge gained by postulation is not perception. This kind of knowledge is a peculiar or unique kind of knowledge and it has to be considered separately. But some Indian logicians bring this *Pramana* under inference-disjunctive inference.

All fat persons who do not eat during the day are persons who eat during the night.
Devadutta is a fat person who does not eat during the day
Therefore Devadutta is a fat person who eats during the night.

***Anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension):-** *Anupalabdhi* is the immediate knowledge of the non-existence of object. Kumarila admits this but Prabhakara rejects it. It is related to the category of *abhava*. For e.g., an umbrella which is expected to be seen in a particular corner of a room is not seen there. We know about the non-existence of the umbrella through a separate *Pramana*, *anupalabdhi*. Nyaya, though it accepts non-existence as a category has no separate *Pramana* to understand it. According to them, the non-existence of an object can be known by perception itself as in the case of perceiving the bare floor. But according to Mimamsa since there is no sense object contact, we require a new *Pramana* to know the non-existence of an object. This is a unique feature of Mimamsa epistemology.

1.8 VEDANTA EPISTEMOLOGY

According to Vedanta, there are three *Pramana*s- Perception (*pratyksa*), Inference (*tarka*), and Scripture (*sruti*). **Perception:** In perception the subject and object become identical because in fact both are the same consciousness. The subject and the object remain separate due to the covering of ignorance. But by the direct union of Antakarana through the sense it takes the form of the object and shines in the form of that particular object illumined by the self due to the removal of the covering of ignorance. ***Tarka* (inference):** Inference is the knowledge which results by the past impressions based upon the awareness of concomitance. The awareness of concomitance leaves the impressions on the unconscious and when these impressions are awakened by perceiving that object again, the result is inference. Against Nyaya, Sankara admits only three premises of inference-*Pratijna*, *hetu* and *udaharana*. **Sruti or Scripture:**-According to advaita, God is the author of Veda in a special sense. It is not His work in the literal sense. Like everything else, Veda also disappears at the end of the cycle and God repeats it at the beginning of the next cycle. So far as its substance is concerned, it is independent of God, i.e., *Apurusya*. According to Nyaya, God is the sole author of Veda and according to Mimamsa, Vedas are self-existent. In advaita, we find a midway position between these two systems.

According to Ramanuja, all knowledge points to a complex or qualifies object. Knowledge never reveals anything as nirguna. According to Ramanuja, nirguna does not mean having no qualities at all but the absence of evil qualities. Ramanuja admits three *Pramana*s- perception, inference and verbal testimony. He rejects nirvikalpa stage of perception. Inference is treated in the same manner as in Nyaya. With respect to *sabda*, there are two points to be noted- (1) all sections of the Veda are equally important. There is no need to distinguish between the ritual portion and the knowledge portion as is done by Sankara. (2) Ramanuja gives much importance to the Agamas as to the Veda and to the Upanishads.

In Dvaita epistemology the process of knowing is explained as a mode of the internal organ. Knowledge always points to a complex or qualified object. It does not recognise the division of three levels of reality as in advaita. Truth is defined as correspondence with outside reality.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1. State the Nyaya View of Syllogism and compare it with the Western View.

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2. Give a brief account of the *pramanas* accepted by Purva Mimamsa.

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1.9 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have given a detailed study of the Logic and Epistemology in the different schools of Indian philosophy. Through this unit it will become evident that valid knowledge is prama and *Pramana* is the means to it. *Pramana* are mainly four including perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison. Schools of Indian thought accept or reject these *Pramana*s and an elaborate picture of the same is given in this unit. As the general science of inference is logic, it is also given due importance while dealing with schools which accept inference. The unit makes it explicit that all schools of Indian thought accept perception as one of the chief instruments of knowledge. To the end of the unit, theories of error of different schools are also mentioned.

1.10 KEY WORDS

Pramana: Criterion of valid knowledge.

Syllogism: It is the inference of one proposition from two premises.

Fallacy: Any error of reasoning.

Antah karana: Internal organ constituted of mind, ego-sense and intellect.

Naiyayika: An adherent of the Nyaya school

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UNIT 2 INDIAN METAPHYSICS

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2.0 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this unit is to provide a sketch of Indian Metaphysics. This unit looks into the fundamental questions raised and answered by Indian metaphysics and outlines its conceptual structure. It will provide a comprehensive account of Indian Materialism, Realism, Dualism, Pluralism, Idealism and Absolutism of different schools of Indian tradition.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Metaphysics is the theory of reality. It raises profound questions about the nature of matter, life, mind, God, space, time, numbers, of causation, freedom and fate, and of objects and events. What sets metaphysics apart from other enquiries is the distinctive method of approach where it seeks to answer the questions only through natural faculties of which reason is the chief. It is not possible to speak of Indian Metaphysics in the singular. Each school of Indian Philosophy has developed a distinct metaphysical view that is consistent with its epistemology and ethics. The motive of metaphysical thinking in the Indian tradition has been practical and not merely theoretical. Questions related to the Universe and creation have been subordinated to the concern for the ultimate destiny of man and its fulfillment.

2.2 INDIAN MATERIALISM (CARVAKA)

The school of the Carvaka or Lokayata held a metaphysics of materialism. The Carvakas were materialists and Naturalists because they believed in the reality of physical Nature alone; every object being a form assumed by Natural elements. The process by which the elements assume the forms are also natural, not guided or controlled by any supernatural agency. Since *pratyaksa* is the only *pramana* accepted by Carvaka, the four elements – earth, water, fire and air – are the only categories accepted by it. The fifth element *akasa* is not accepted as it is not an object of perception. All objects in the world including human beings are made up of the four basic elements. The differences among the types of objects in the world are due to differences among the patterns in which the four elements combine with one another. The atman is nothing but the physical body of man. The living man is conscious, but consciousness emerges when the material particles of the body come together in a particular pattern and form a particular structure. When that pattern deteriorates and the body disintegrates and is destroyed, the constituents separate themselves and the emergent quality disappears. The Carvaka brings in the analogue of the instance when yeast is added to grape juice to make wine which acquires the quality of intoxicating power which is possessed neither by yeast nor grape juice. The Carvaka argues that God or an ethical potency need not be posited to create the world and its forms, because it believes that the elements come together naturally and produce the forms without any specific purpose. This mechanistic and naturalistic model of creation of the objects of the world is called *yadarcavada*.

2.3 REALISM OF NYAYA-VAISESIKA

The Nyaya-Vaisesika classifies reality under a few categories (*padarthas*) in order to facilitate a comprehensive treatment of reality. The Vaisesika recognizes seven such categories. One of them is *abhava* or non-being that stands for all kinds of non-existence, which is classified into four: *pragabhava* (prior non-existence), *pradhvamsabhava* (non-existence after destruction), *anyonyabhava* (mutual non-existence) and *athyanthabhava* (absolute non-existence). The remaining six categories represent various kinds of being (*bhava*) and include *dravya*, (substance), *guna* (quality), *karma* (action), *samanya* (universal), *visesa* (particular) and *samavaya* (inherence). Nyaya had admitted sixteen categories which are *pramana* (source of valid knowledge), *prameya* (objects of knowledge), *samsaya* (doubt), *prayojana* (end), *drstanta* (example), *siddhanta* (doctrine), *avayava* (members of syllogism), *tarka* (hypothetical argument), *nirnaya* (ascertainment), *vada* (discussion), *jalpa* (wrangling), *vitanda* (destructive dialectic), *hetvabhasa* (fallacies of inference), *chala* (quibbling), *jati* (futile objections), and *nigrahasthanas* (points of defeat in a debate). Except *prameya*, the categories of Nyaya are logical and epistemological while the seven categories of Vaisesika are exclusively metaphysical. The important knowables (*prameyas*) according to Nyaya are twelve in number – the atman, the physical body, senses, objects of the world, cognition or consciousness, mind, activity, imperfection, life after death, result, pain and final liberation.

The Nyaya school regards the atman as essentially unconscious. Consciousness arises in the atman as an adventitious property when perception occurs. Nyaya maintains that the atman constitutes an infinite plurality and each atman is the knower, doer, enjoyer and sufferer. God is one of the atmans but the greatest of them. Unlike other atmans, God is by nature conscious and his consciousness is eternal and infinite. God is only the efficient cause of creation, the eternal atoms being the material cause. The atoms are brought together by God in accordance with the ethical merits and demerits of the atmans.

The Vaisesika school defines substance (*dravya*) as that in which qualities and actions inhere (*samaveta*). Qualities and actions cannot exist except in a substance. The relationship between substance and its qualities and action is the inseparable relation of inherence (*samavaya*). There are nine kinds of substances: earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, spirit and mind. Of the nine substances, the first four, that is, earth, water, fire and air are constituted by atoms. Mind is also atomic in size but the other four substances – ether, time, space and spirit – are infinite. Time and space are indivisible and divisions like the past, the present and future of time and directions like north and south of space, are conventional and artificial. Qualitatively, the atman, mind, and atoms of the elements are different from one another. This difference is made possible because each individual has its own particular (*visesa*) that distinguishes it from others.

Of the four kinds of atoms, each group differs from another qualitatively. They are imperceptible to human beings except yogis. For ordinary human beings, the existence of atoms is proved by inference. All perceptible objects are composed of parts and are therefore divisible. But the division into parts cannot be carried on ad infinitum. Therefore we have to stop at some point where further division is not possible. This fundamental unit is the atom (*anu*). The atoms (*anu*) are imperceptible and so are their qualities. Two atoms combine to form a dyad (*dvayanuka*). Three dyads combine together to form a triad (*trayanuka*). The triad is the least visible unit. It is said to possess the size of mote in the sunbeam.

Quality is defined as the being that is different from substance and activity and that is itself without qualities and activities. The list of twenty four qualities listed in the Vaisesika school are: colour, taste, smell, touch, number, magnitude, distinctness (*prthaktva*), conjunction (*samyoga*), disjunction (*vibhaga*), nearness (temporal and spatial), remoteness (temporal and spatial), cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, hate, effort, weight, fluidity, viscidity, tendency (*samskara*), unseen merit, unseen demerit (*adrsta*) and sound.

Action belongs to finite substances and is the cause of conjunction and disjunction. It can only be a formal (*asamavayi*) and an instrumental (*nimitta*) cause but not a material cause, since only a substance can be a material cause. Actions are of five kinds: throwing upward, throwing downward, contraction, expansion and locomotion.

The universal (*samanya, jati*) is defined as that which is eternal (*nitya*) and which inheres in many. It is dependent on our cognition (*buddhyapeksyam*). It exists in substances, qualities and activities. It is of two kinds, the higher and the lower, the highest (*para*) beyond which there is no higher is Being (*satta*).

The particular (*visesa*) is defined as that which is ultimate and exist in eternal substances. It exists only in substances and that too only in ultimate, eternal substances. The particular is the ultimate differentiator. To illustrate, all the earth atoms are alike, yet they are differentiated from one another by each one having a particular.

Inherence (*samavaya*) is defined as the relation of inseparability. Inherence is found between the whole and its parts, between substance and qualities, between substance and activities, and between the universals on the one hand and substances, qualities and activities on the other. The whole inheres in its parts, qualities and activities inhere in substances and universals inhere in substances, qualities and activities. However, no higher universal inheres in the lower universals. Non-being (*abhava*) is defined as what is not, or as different from the six positive categories. Nyaya-Vaisesika holds that reality is both positive and negative. Non-being is real only with reference to our thought and is not related to any form of being. Yet Nyaya-Vaisesika holds that

non-being is perceived , but only when accompanied by the thought, "Had the object been there, it would have been perceived". Non-being is of two kinds: relational absence (*samsargabhava*) and mutual negation (*anyonyabhava*). Relational absence is the absence of something in something else like the absence of the pen on the table. Relational absence is of three kinds: prior negation (*pragabhava*), posterior negation (*pradhvansabhava*), and absolute or infinite negation (*athyanthabhava*).

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. Define metaphysics. What are the unique features of Indian metaphysics?

2. What are the fundamental tenets of Carvaka metaphysics?

3. What are the categories of reality accepted by Nyaya and Vaisesika?

2.4 REALISM OF THE SAUTRANTIKA AND VAIBHASIKA

The Vaibhasika and Sautrantika schools of Buddhism are affiliated to the Theravada or Hinayana sects of Buddhism. Buddhist realism takes its origin from the Sarvastivadins who are the advocates of the doctrine which says that all things no matter whether they belong to the past, present or future exist (*Sarvastivada*). The Vaibhasikas hold the view that the universe is ultimately constituted by simple, unanalysable elements called *dharmas*. The *dharmas* are regarded as impermanent or momentary (*ksanika*). There is no whole as distinct from the parts; concrete objects are mere aggregates (*skandhas*) of a number of *dharmas*. The aggregation of the elements is effected by the principle of causality conveyed by the doctrine of *pratityasamutpada* (theory of dependant origination). Both matter and mind are considered to be real; they are real in virtue of their simplicity, indivisibility and unanalysability, though they are both impermanent. The Universe is ultimately constituted of 75 elements, 72 of which are conditioned (*samskrta*)

and the remaining three are unconditioned (*asamskrta*). This distinction suggests that the universe is the field where human beings are thrown into a state of bondage and which provides them opportunities to win back their freedom or liberation. The elements (*dharmas*) conditioned by *avidya* and passions that accompany it co-operate with one another so as to present themselves as a stream (*sasrava*) of phenomenal life (*samsara*) marked by the presence of pain (*duhkha*) or else the cause of pain (*samudaya*) and are held in a state of bondage. The elements are open to subjection to the counteracting process of their separation from one another and their suppression through the means of spiritual discipline (*marga*), resulting in the emergence of *prajna*. They are reduced to a state of quiescence, free from the pain and cause of pain, which is the state of *Nirvana*.

The Vaibhasika school classifies dharmas into five: (1) *rupa* (matter) (2) *citta* (consciousness) (3) *cetasika* (states and characteristics of the mind) (4) *citta-viprayukta-samskara* (powers that are neither mental nor material but common to both mind and matter) and (5) *asamskrta dharmas* (the unconditioned dharmas). The realism of the Vaibhasikas is subject to the limitations imposed upon it by the core ideas of Buddhism, namely momentariness (*ksanikavada*), theory of no-self (*nairatmyavada*) and the theory of particularity (*sva-laksana*) as opposed to generality or universality (*samanya*).

The Sautrantikas opposed the Vaibhasika contention that the elements exist in the past, the present and the future. The admission of the continuous existence of things through the past, the present and the future amounts to the acceptance of a form of eternalism, which is unacceptable to Buddhist metaphysics as a whole. The Sautrantikas criticize the Vaibhasika contention that whatever is an object of thought, exists. Whatever exists admits of being thought of but the converse is not necessarily true. The Sautrantikas consider some of the elements admitted by Vaibhasika to be fictitious like *akasa* (space), *niravana*, *citta-viprayukta* (non-mental powers) and the past and future aspects of elements. The Sautrantikas list forty three elements classified under five heads: (1) *Rupa* (matter) comprising four primary forms (*upadana*) and four secondary or derivative forms (*upadaya-rupa*) (2) *Vedana* (feelings) including pleasure, pain and the neutral feeling (3) *Samjna* (signs or sense-organs) consisting of five external sense organs and one internal sense organ called *citta* or *manas* (4) *Vijnana* (consciousness) of six kinds corresponding to the six sense organs. (5) *Samskaras* (powers or forces) numbering twenty in all including ten good (*kusala*) and ten bad (*akusala*) ones. Like Vaibhasikas, Sautrantikas also admit the reality of the twofold world of matter and mind. The Vaibhasikas hold that our knowledge of objective reality is direct and immediate and is yielded by perception while the Sautrantikas regard this knowledge as indirect and mediate, i.e, derivable from inference instead of from perception.

2.5 REALISM OF MIMAMSA

The Mimamsa propounds a metaphysics of ethical action. It advocates qualitative and quantitative pluralism. It substitutes ethical action for God himself. The efficacy of ethical action is a force that creates the forms of the world and is the controller of the world and its organizer. The world is meant for action and is created by action. Dharma is the central concern of the Mimamsa and it is that which supports the universe. Ethical action must be what answers to a Vedic injunction (vedapratipadya). Dharma brings forth the desired fruits of action; if ethically right, it brings forth enjoyment, if ethically wrong, it results in suffering (*adharma*). The

Mimamsa does not regard dharma and *adharma* as qualities (*gunas*), but as constituting a potential force which is extraordinary (*apurva*) and the unseen (*adrsta*). This force or *sakti* resides in the atman of the agent and controls and determines the future life of the atman. Action performed at the present produces its fruit often after a lapse of time. But causation is a continuous process without any time intervening between the processes of the cause and the appearance of the effect. The Mimamsa therefore postulates that the action we perform does not end when our activity ends, but assumes the form of a potential force that remains as a potency until the circumstances become ripe for its fruition. This force called the *sakti* is unseen (*adrsta*) and since it is extraordinary it is called *apurva*. The Mimamsa accepts the reality of the atman as distinct from the mind (*manas*), senses and the physical body. It is identified with the I – consciousness (*ahamdhi*); plurality of the *atmans* is accepted, each atman is regarded as infinite. Consciousness is not regarded as the essential nature of the atman, but arises in it as an adventitious quality when *manas* comes into contact with it. The atman itself is the seer, doer and enjoyer. The problem of God is taken up by Mimamsa in the context of the interpretation of the meanings of the words of the Veda. Jaimini regarded the relationship between the word and meaning as innate and therefore did not feel the need to posit God to fix the meaning of words.

2.6 DUALISTIC METAPHYSICS OF SAMKHYA

Samkhya presents a qualitative dualism of spirit and matter, the material principle being Prakrti and the spiritual element, Purusa. The Purusa which is of the nature of pure consciousness, throws the reflection of its consciousness on Prakrti and this initiates a process of evolution. While Prakrti is one, Purusas are infinite in number. Prakrti evolves the universe through its three constituents (*gunas*): the *sattva* (pure), *rajas* (active) and *tamas* (inert). All the objects of the universe are composed of three *gunas*. The original nature of the *sattva* is pleasantness (*priti*), of the rajas, drive, and of *tamas*, dullness and inertia. None of the *gunas* are found alone without the other two. In the objects of the world, one or the other of the three gunas dominates over the other two. Prior to evolution, the *gunas* remain in equilibrium in *Prakrti*. Due to inexplicable association of the Purusa with Prakrti, the reflection of the Purusa is thrown on Prakrti that destroys the original equilibrium of the *gunas*. Evolution of the world out of *Prakrti* follows. Various theories have been offered in the Samkhya school to explain the nature of the contact between Prakrti and Purusa that vary from each other, but according to all those theories, the contact has no beginning and therefore the universe is beginningless. The Samkhya in its aetheistic form gives twenty five categories (Prakrti and its evolutes + Purusa) that evolve from Prakrti during the course of evolution. They are not the meanings of words (*padarthas*) as in Nyaya-Vaisesika but as ontological entities. The theistic Samkhya adds God in addition to the twenty five.

The Purusa is a pure knower (*drasta*) but not a doer (*karta*). Action belongs to *manas*, *ahamkara* and its evolutes, all of which are evolutes of *prakrti*. The purusa exists by himself, separate and unrelated to everything else (*kaivalya*). The Samkhya accepts a plurality of *Purusas* because it maintains that birth, death and all other physical characteristics are separate for each individual. If Purusas are not many, when one man is born, all others must be born at the same time; if one man knows an object, all the others must know it; if one man acts all the others must act. Similarly enjoyment, suffering, good and evil, must be the same for all. Since Purusa is a pure

witness and never the doer, the existence of different egos implies that they are the reflections of different Purusas. The essential nature of the Purusa is consciousness (*cit*). In the state of bondage after evolution, the Purusa may think that it is happy or miserable but this is due to the lack of discrimination between itself and the higher evolutes of *prakrti* to which the dualities of happiness and sorrow actually belong. It is like the coloring of a pure, colourless, transparent glass by the reflection of some colour. When the Purusa identifies itself as pure consciousness, distinct from all the evolutes of *prakrti*, then it is said to be liberated (*kaivalya*).

2.7 REALISTIC RELATIVISTIC PLURALISM OF JAINISM

The Jaina metaphysics is a realistic relativistic pluralism; it is realistic as it accepts the existence of an extramental reality; it is relativistic as it denies the validity of any absolute predication of reality; it is pluralistic as it accepts the plurality of substances. Jaina metaphysics is metaphysics of substance. Even motion, rest, space, and action are substances.

Jainism regards every object as multi-modal (*anekanta*) and as possessing many characteristics. Jainism distinguishes between the substances that possess the characteristics (*dharmi*) and the characteristics possessed by the substance (*dharmas*). Characteristics are further divided into essential characteristics (*gunas*) and changing modes (*paryayas*). Both change and permanence are real. Every object has both positive and negative characteristics, from one point of view, if an object has the characteristic 'P', from another point of view it has the characteristic '~P'. Every object has the characteristics of origin, duration and decay. Jainism does not accept the view that the reality of an object lies in performing the function for which it is meant (*arthakriyakaritva*). Substance is divided into the extended (*astikaya*) and the unextended (*anastikaya*). Extended substance is further divided into the animate and the inanimate. The animate substance called the *Jiva* is one that displays the characteristics of consciousness (*cetana laksano jivah*). The Jivas are of two kinds: the liberated and the bound. The bound is again of two types: the moving and the unmoving. The non-moving are the plants that have only the sense of touch. Moving *jivas* are of four kinds: those with five senses like human beings, those with four senses like bees, those with three senses like ants and those with two senses like worms. The atman is identified with the Jiva and the relation between the atman and consciousness is both identity and difference. The atman is endowed with both doership and enjoyership. Atmans are infinite in number, yet they coexist. Jainism rejects the reality of God as the Universal spirit and creator of the world. They reject all the proofs for the existence of God. The atman although not a material substance is regarded as extended; it being coextensive with the body that it inhabits. By nature atman is infinite but it has the capacity to expand or contract depending upon the karma that is present in it.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. Give an account of the classification of substance according to Jainism.

2. What are the constituents of Prakrti? What are their characteristics?

3. Explain the process of evolution of the world according to Samkhya metaphysics.

4. What is the Jaina conception of substance?

2.8 IDEALISM OF VIJNANAVADA SCHOOL OF BUDDHISM

Vijnanavada school of Buddhism maintained that *Vijnana* (idea) alone is real. To the Madhyamika claim that everything is illusory, Vijnanavadins reply that even illusion is a kind of cognition. *Vijnana* cannot be reflected in any kind of dialectical argument. Vijnanavadins argues that since cognition and its object are inseparable, and since we cannot conceive or even speak of an object which is unknown, the external objects which are said to exist independent of cognition, are inadmissible. If the object is external, then there can be no relation of its identity (*sarupya*) with cognition which is demanded by the possibility of its being cognized. The Vijnanavadins argue that the phenomena of illusion, hallucination and dream which involve cognitions without there being any extramental objects corresponding to them, testify to the fact that cognition creates its own object, instead of being determined by objects existing independently of it. Thus the Vijnanavadin concludes that there are no extramental objects

Madhyamika showed that the ultimate reality cannot be described either in the positive or negative terms. Even the phenomenal world cannot be described because none of the categories we use in describing the world has its own nature. Nagarjuna held the theory of naturelessness (nihsvabhavata) and attacked the view that everything has its own nature or character (sarvam svalaksanam). If everything is devoid of its own characteristics and is void then the Absolute reality itself must be void. Whatever is experienced is only an appearance of the void;

appearance is the empirical truth (*samvrtisatya*) and the void is the Absolute truth (*paramarthikasatya*). Then even the Buddha, his doctrine, the aggregates, the bases and the elements are not ultimately true. If the world is not real, it could not have been born and therefore was never born.

2.9 NON-DUALLISTIC ABSOLUTISM (*ADVAITAVADA*)

The metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta of Sankaracarya is centred on the establishment of the reality of only the Brahman, showing that the world cannot have an independent being of its own and demonstrating that the being of the world is rooted in the Brahman. Sankaracarya accepts the reality of Brahman on the basis of the Upanisads. The *svarupalaksana* (defining or constitutive characteristics) of Brahman is *Sat-Cit-Ananda* (infinite being, consciousness and bliss). Advaita introduces the concept of levels of reality which are not levels of truth, but levels of Being (*satta*). Advaita propounds four levels of Being, the lowest of which is the insignificant Being (*tuccha satta*). It includes the merely imaginary, fanciful and self-contradictory like the horns of hare, the lotuses of the heavenly river (sky lotuses), son of a barren woman etc. They belong merely to imagination and are acknowledged as having no place in reality. The next higher level is the illusory Being (*pratibhasika satta*) or apparent Being, the example of which is the perception of an illusory snake. Higher than the illusory Being is the pragmatic Being (*vyavaharika satta*) identified with the empirical reality. It is the product of our past ethical actions (*karmas*) and is meant for future actions. While the illusory being is contradicted by perceptual experience within the world itself and the experience of action, the pragmatic Being is not contradicted either by perception or action, but by dialectical reason and the intuition of Brahman. The innate self-contradictions of the pragmatic world are revealed to the light of reason by its own self reflection. Just as the illusory Being presupposes the pragmatic Being, the pragmatic Being due to its inherent self-contradictions presupposes the ultimate Being (*paramarthika satta*) that is above all contradictions. Uncontradicted and unchanged in the past, present and future, the ultimate Being marks the pinnacle of existence. Each of the lower levels of Being presupposes and is superimposed (*adhyasta*) upon the higher one.

The Advaitins use the word *Maya* to refer to the appearance of the objective world as an existent and its non-existence at a higher level. The world experience is a cosmic illusion whereas the appearance of the snake in the rope-snake illusion, is an individual illusion. The cosmic illusion is identified with *Maya* and the individual illusion is called *avidya*, although most Advaitins use the terms synonymously. *Maya* cannot be accepted as real since the illusion of Brahman sublates it, neither can it be called unreal as it is experienced by one and all until the Brahman is realized. Hence it is ontologically indescribable (*sadasadvilaksana*). Maya is treated as a positive entity (*bhavarupa*), its powers being concealment of the true nature of Brahman (*avaranasakti*) and the projection of the world of multiplicity (*viksepasakti*).

Advaita accepts only that cognition which is uncontradictable (*abhadya*) as absolutely true and only the Brahman stands this test of truth and this justifies the nomenclature of Advaita (non-dualism). The Brahman shines through the individual as the witness of Self, actions, cognitions and the states of the mind. This is called the witness consciousness (*saksi caitanya*). This witness consciousness delimited by the psycho-physical adjuncts is the Jiva. The witness consciousness

is continuous with the Brahman and is non-different from it. The Jiva in its identification as a separate entity distinct from the Brahman is a mere appearance. It is essentially identical to the Brahman. Just as the ego (*ahamkara*) is continuous with the Brahman, so is the personal God Isvara. Sankaracarya uses the term Brahman for both, calling them the higher Brahman (*para Brahman*) and the lower Brahman (*apara Brahman*). The lower Brahman is the same as the higher Brahman, but as facing the world of objectivity, that is with reference to Maya. It is never overpowered by Maya like the Jiva. The Isvara is therefore never in bondage.

2.10 NON-DUALISM OF THE QUALIFIED WHOLE (*VISISTADVAITA)*

Visistadvaita holds the view that Brahman is non-dual but qualified or characterized by the world and the individual spirits, both of which form its body (*sarira*). Visistadvaita broadly divides the categories (*padarthas*) into the means of cognition (*pramanas*) and the objects of cognition (*prameyas*). The objects of knowledge are of two kinds, substance (*dravya*) and non-substance (*adravya*). Substances are of two kinds, the conscious and the unconscious. The unconscious are of two kinds, *prakrti* and *kala*. *Prakrti* is divided into twenty four categories as in the Samkhya. The conscious is of two kinds, the inward (*pratyak*) and the outer (*parak*). The inward is of two kinds, the atman and God. The atman is of three kinds – the bound, the liberated and the eternal. The outward consciousness is of two kinds – the eternal force (*nityavibhuti*) and the attribute consciousness (*dharmabhutajnana*).

Ramanujacarya maintains that the three attributes are not the constitutive qualities of Prakrti but merely their qualities. Ramanujacarya regards Prakrti as eternal and calls it by many names like the non-transient (*aksara*), *avidya, maya* etc. Ramanujacarya accepts the concept of eternal force or energy (*nityavibhuti*) from the Pancaratra. It is same as the pure transparent (*suddha-sattva*) and is also called the pure essence. It is never found mixed with other attributes of Prakrti. It is by nature unconscious (*acetana*), yet thoroughly self-relieving and blissful (*anandatmika*). It constitutes the bodies, the means of enjoyment, the objects of enjoyment and also the process of enjoyment by God, the eternally liberated souls and the liberated souls. God's body has six attributes – knowledge (*jnana*), power (*sakti*), strength (*bala*), lordship (*aiswarya*), heroic quality (*virya*) and splendor (*tejas*). The Concept of attribute consciousness (dharma-*bhuta-jnana*) is an important contribution of Visistadvaita. The 'I' as the knower, reveals itself to itself, but not to the consciousness revealing the object. Thus we have two consciousness, one that reveals itself to another, and the other that reveals itself to itself only. The former belongs to the latter and is called its attribute (dharma). It is called attribute consciousness (*dharmabhutajnana*).

The atman according to Visistadvaita is by nature atomic (*anu*), but its attribute consciousness which is inseparable from it, is infinite. It is dependent on God and is subsidiary to (*sesa*) him, as the body is to the spirit. It is eternal, different for each individual and by nature blissful. It is the knower, doer and enjoyer (*jnata, karta* and *bhokta*). The nature of the atman is to be the 'I' consciousness (*ahamdhi*) and not mere consciousness (*jnana*) or mere witness consciousness (*saksi caitanya*). The atman is of three kinds – the bound, the liberated and the eternal. The bound souls are the ones living in the world of *prakrti*; the liberated are those souls that have freed themselves from *prakrti* and the eternal souls are the eternal servants of God, who live with him and have never done anything against his wishes. The liberated and the eternal souls live

with God, enjoy like him and are similar to him. They are not identical to him and do not have the powers of creation and destruction.

2.11 DUALISTIC ABSOLUTISM OF MADHVACARYA

Madhvacarya proclaimed complete difference between the Brahman and the world and maintained that the non-duality referred to by the Upanisads had to be interpreted as that between a king and his subjects or one who is independent (*svatantra*) and one who is dependent on the former (*paratantra*). Since Madhvacarya rejects any relationship of being between God and the world, his philosophy is dualism (*dvaitavada*). It is primarily a dualism of God and the individual spirit and a dualism of God and the world. The world of matter (*prakrti*) is different from God and the individual spirits. Thus the philosophy of Madhvacarya is metaphysically qualitative dualism and quantitative pluralism. As a quantitative pluralist, he makes use of the Vaisesika doctrine of the particular (*visesa*).

Madhvacarya broadly divides the categories into the independent (*svatantra*) and the dependent (*paratantra*). The only independent reality is God. The dependent category falls into two kinds, the conscious and the unconscious. The individual atmans and supernal beings like the consort of Visnu, Lakshmi are conscious. The supernals are eternally liberated and perform certain cosmic and divine functions. Here Madhvacarya follows the line of traditional Vaisnavite mythology and the Pancaratra. He classifies the individual atmans into four kinds: those that are liberated like the *Hiranyagarba* (the Cosmic soul), who is called the highest soul (*jivottama*), those that are capable of obtaining salvation (*muktiyogyas*), those that are always transmigrating (*nityasamsaris*) and those that are eternally damned (*tamoyogya*), those that deserve only darkness). This classification involves the doctrine of predestination which is unacceptable to many Vedantins. The unconscious reality is of three kinds: *prakrti*, space and time. Another classification enlists nine categories: substance (*dravya*), quality (*guna*), action (*karma*), universal (*samanya*), particular (*visesa*), the characterized (*visista*) or the whole (*amsi*), force (*sakti*), similarity (*sadrsya*) and negation (*abhava*). Substances are said to be nineteen in number: God, his consort (SriLakshmi), innate forces (*samskaras*, *vasanas*), the atman, space, prakrti, the three attributes (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*), mind (*manas*), the senses (*indriyas*), the elements (*pancabhutas*), the subtle elements (*tanmatras*), ignorance (*avidya*), word sounds (*varnas*), darkness (*andhakara*), time (*kala*), reflection (*pratibimba*), cosmic reason (*Mahat*), ego (*ahamkara*) and individual reason (*buddhi*). Madhvacarya's list of qualities include mental and ethical qualities such as self-control (*sama*), mercy (*krpa*), endurance (*titiksa*), gravity (*gambhirya*), beauty (*saundarya*), courage (*saurya*), fear (*bhaya*), liberality (*audarya*), strength (*bala*) and shame (*lajja*). The particular (*visesa*) plays an important role in the philosophy of Madhvacarya. The particulars are found everywhere and exist in all things, eternal and transient, conscious and unconscious, God and the world.

Madhavacarya identifies the atman with the witness consciousness (*saksi caitanya*). It is of the nature of 'I' consciousness (*ahamdhi*) which is different from the ego (*ahamkara*) which is an evolute of *prakrti*. It is the knower (*jnata*), doer (*karta*) and enjoyer (*bharta*) of the fruits of

actions. The atmans are atomic and constitute a plurality, each having a particular (*visesa*). They are absolutely dependent (*paratantra*) on God, who alone is self-dependent (*svatantra*) or independent. By nature, every atman is existent, conscious and blissful (*sat-cit-ananda*). Through ignorance (*avidya*) of its original nature, it becomes entangled in *prakrti*. This entanglement is its bondage. Every atman is entirely different from God, *prakrti* and the other atmans. The Upanisadic statements that speak of the identity of the atman and Brahman, are to be interpreted as meaning that the atman is similar to the Brahman just as the reflection of a face in the mirror is similar to the face. The atman is self-conscious, self-revealing, and self-luminous, yet its consciousness is distinct from itself, just as the specific gravity of a substance is distinct from that substance.

Maya and *avidya* are treated as separate from prakrti in the philosophy of Madhavacarya. He regards Maya as the mysterious will of God (*Isvareccha*) and avidya as the ignorance of the atman. *Avidya* conceals the true nature of the atman and it conceals the Brahman from the atman. The latter results in the atman developing a false notion of independence from God. Like Ramanujacarya, Madhavacarya identifies the personal God with the Brahman. He is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world and has infinite auspicious qualities. Madhavacarya insists upon five kinds of differences (*pancabheda*): (1) difference between the atman (*jiva*) and the Brahman (God); (2) difference between all that is unconscious (*prakrti*, time and space) and the Brahman; (3) difference of every atman from every other; (4) difference of every atman from all that is unconscious (*prakrti*, time and space); and (5) difference of every unconscious entity from every other unconscious entity. Madhavacarya accepts not only the difference of every member of a class from every other member of the same class (*sajatiyabheda*) but also every member of a class from every member of every other class (*vijayiyabheda*) but also the difference of every element of the content of a whole from every other element in that whole and from that whole also. He says that every element is a particular (*visesa*) and is not merely distinguished but differentiated from the others.

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. State the arguments provided by Vijnanavada to conclude that there are no extramental objects.

2. Explain the Visistadvaita conception of *atman*.

3.Explain the Advaita conception of *maya.*

2.12 LET US SUM UP

Every school of Indian philosophy has developed a profound metaphysics of its own which is intertwined with the epistemology and ethics of that school. Indian metaphysics has evolved through a rich tradition of exegesis and dialectics. Ranging from materialism to spiritual absolutism, Indian metaphysics displays a wide range of standpoints.

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UNIT 3 INDIAN ETHICS

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3.0 OBJECTIVES

The objective of this study on Indian ethics is to give a short survey of the ethical foundation of Hindu religious philosophy and of other philosophical schools of India like Buddhism, Jainism and Carvaka. The primary purpose of this unit is to impart the religious and moral instruction to the students of philosophy and to make them aware of the principles of religions and finally to make them adopt certain good principles and avoid certain disturbing elements in order to create a healthy and a peaceful society.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Traditional Indian thinking is mainly spiritualistic with a firm belief that man has a soul within him as his real being. This 'soul' aspect of human person puts before him a goal higher than any other goal to which our natural physical inclinations lead. So man has to adopt a particular point of view which helps him go towards the higher, spiritual plane, the plane of his real, inner being (soul); so adopting the moral point of view is the apt human point of view to attain the goal of the inner being of man, namely, soul.

3.2 VEDIC AND VEDANTIC SCHOOLS OF ETHICS

Here we shall discuss an outline of the ethical vision and moral content of five representative Vedic and Vedantic texts, namely Vedas, the Upanishads, the laws of Manu, the Gita and the Ramayana. The beginnings of ethical vision is traced from the Vedas, particularly Rig Veda. Concept of *Rta,* the concept of Dharma and the concept of Karma become the central moral principles emerging from the Vedas. In the Upaniṣads the atman-centric understanding of morality takes precedence. The Self-realisation as *moksha* is the highest goal reached by good conduct and pursuit of knowledge. The *smrti* literatures like *sastras*, especially *dharmasastras* are moral codes and law books for the Vedic and Vedantic traditions. The practical guidelines and strict injunctions are found for human conduct with respective rights and duties in *Manusmriti,* although from the caste categories. The Dharmasastras, Epics and the Puranas have their own specific goal but they seem to share more or less a common 'ethos' from the point of ethics. The epics teach ethical ideals and thoughts of Hindu system. Much celebrated text of *Bhagavat Gita* focuses on moral actions coupled with attaining *Brahmajnana. Gita* emphasizes both *Karma Yoga* and *Gnana Yoga* for the attainment of the Supreme Bliss. Besides all the scriptural texts, the philosophical schools of Vedic and Vedantic traditions have focused well on the ethical concepts and conduct based on their metaphysical and epistemological positions. Putting them all in one category, despite the subtlety of differences, we have the following concepts.

3.3 DOCTRINE OF KARMA

Karma is of four categories: 1) *Sanchita Karma*, which means the accumulated past actions. 2) *Prarabdha Karma*, which means the part of *Sanchita Karma*, this results in the present birth itself. This is also called pre-destination. 3)*Kriyamana Karma*, which means present willful actions or free will. 4) *Agami Karma*, which means the immediate results caused by our present actions. There is another version of the meaning of *Karma*. This word *Karma* simply means action. And this *Karma* must remind us that what is called the consequence of an action is really not a separate thing but it is a part of the action and it cannot be divided from it. The consequence is the part of the action, which belongs to the future but yet the part is done in the present. For instance, when a person is wounded, at the time of accident he will not feel any pain but after sometime when he is quiet, he will feel the pain. Pain is the part of the action 'falling down' and 'wounding' but it is felt later though done in the present. When a man sins, he feels no suffering at the time of sinning, but later he feels the suffering. Thus we can conclude the theory of *Karma*, saying, whatever a man sows he shall reap.

3.4 TRANSMIGRATION OF SOUL

The doctrine of Karma and transmigration of soul are so closely bound up together. After the death of the body the life of the individual is continued in another body and so on in indefinite series. According to this theory, the soul though pure and blessed in itself, gets entangled in the *Samsara* (cycle of birth and rebirth). It is because of the karma it passes through innumerable

births (transmigration) before it regains its original state. The purpose and mechanism of rebirth is elaborated in the Chandogya Upanishad. According to Chandogya Upanishad a man after his death reaches the moon with the merit he has acquired during his life. He remains there as long as there is residue of his good works. And then he returns to space, from space he goes to mist and cloud etc. After having become cloud, he rains down. Then he is born as rice, trees, beans etc. If someone or the other eats him as food he develops further and finally those who are of pleasant conduct enter either the womb of a Brahmin or a Kshatriya, or a Vaisya and those who are of stinking conduct, enter either the womb of a dog or of a swine, or of an outcaste (*Chandala*).

3.5 SUPREME GOALS (*PURUSHARTHAS*)

The dominant interest of the Indian thought is in the highest value of human life. There are four values, which give meaning to human life. They are called Purusharthas: 1) *Dharma* 2) *Artha* 3) *Kama* 4)*Moksha*.

Dharma

The term '*dharma'* gathered more and more meaning down the ages and it became a term of complex and varied meanings. For dharma the dictionary suggests the terms like virtue, righteousness, duty, right, morality, justice, good, characteristics, tradition, ordinance and law etc. But dharma is essentially a human value operating in the universe of human ideals. The Brahadaranyaka Upanishad identifies 'dharma' with truth. That which is justice is truth. And justice and truth are the same (1.4.14). Sankara in his own way interrelates the three concepts *rta*, *satya*, and *dharma*. He says 'rta' is the mental perception of truth. Satya is the expression of truth in words as perceived by the mind. Dharma is the observance of truth in the conduct of life. And thus dharma is the way of life embodying the truth perceived. Dharma is usually distinguished into *sadharana dharma* and varnashrama dharma. *sadharana dharma* refers to the duties of the universal scope and validity. There are ten cardinal virtues known as sadharana dharma according to Manu; endurance, Patience, self-control, integrity, purity, restraint of senses, wisdom, learning, truth and absence of anger or non-violence. The varnasrama dharma refers to the duties of persons according to the castes and the stages of life. Thus 'dharma' is considered to be a means for attaining personal integration in the spiritual level or liberation.

Artha (Wealth)

The term 'artha' generally indicates the attainment of riches and worldly prosperity, advantage, profit and wealth. It means the whole range of tangible objects that can be possessed, enjoyed or lost and which we require in daily life for the upkeep of a household, raising of a family and discharge of religious duties. By the term 'artha', Kautilya in his book *Artha Sastras* IV 9 means both economic and the political aspects of man's life in the society. The materialistic aspects of life have great significance, because the absence of economic well-being of man is a great hindrance to the pursuit of personality integration and good life. Absence of economic well-being may also lead a man to adopt or to do immoral deeds to satisfy himself. The Mahabharata stresses the great importance of wealth saying that poverty is a state of sinfulness. All kinds of meritorious acts flow from the possession of great wealth. From wealth springs all religious acts,

pleasures, and heaven itself. From wealth one's merit increases but the man who has no wealth, has neither this world nor the next. The man who has no wealth succeeds not in performing religious acts. Kautilya in *Artha Sastra* recommends that the state should punish those who renounce the world without having first satisfied the claims of society and family. Kautilya would not even allow ascetics to enter into the villages of the kingdom for fear that they may cause disturbance in the economic activities of the villagers. Hindu philosophers are not uncritical about the admirers of wealth nor are they fanatical supporters of its abolition. They say virtues themselves are impractical without wealth. Without wealth neither virtue nor desire can be won.

Kama (**Satisfaction of Desires**)

Kama is a comprehensive term, which includes all desires: desires ranging from the cravings of the flesh and the yearnings of the spirit. The Hindu view is that man should only gradually overcome the insistent cravings of the flesh. The only human end is the attainment of pleasures and the Hindu view holds very strongly and it is an accepted principle that any spiritual aspirant should not try to achieve his realization by forcibly starving his normal biological desires, that is to say, he should not suppress the desires of the flesh very violently. In Hindu thought there is always a clear emphasis on the enjoyment of secular pleasures along with the emphasis on the realization of spiritual values. Vatsyayana in his book *Kama Sutra* gives a great treatise on erotic enjoyment. It deals with the various aspects of sex life and the natural strivings of human heart. However Vatsyayana suggests that the satisfactions of sexual desires are to be followed with moderation and caution. Hindu philosophers do not exclude anyone of the branches of human enjoyment, sex or arts, singing, playing on musical instruments, dancing, writing, drawing, tattooing, colouring the hair, nail, and so on. The uniqueness of the concept of *kama* and enjoyment in the Hindu ethics is that all of them are to be related to the spiritual goal of human existence and so the Indian ethics insisted on a regulated enjoyment.

Moksha (**Liberation**)

In every school of philosophy in India the first three *Purusharthas* are treated as the instrumental values, which directly or indirectly promote the *Parama Purusharthas*, the highest values of human life namely *Moksha*. *Moksha* is also known as by other names such as *mukti*, *apavarya*, *kaivalya* and *nirvana*. The concept Moksha has a negative as well as a positive side. In its negative aspect it signifies complete freedom from sorrow and in its positive aspect it stands for the plenary happiness or bliss. In the Vedic age the idea of Mukti was not in evidence. What the Vedic man sought was length of days on earth and life in heaven in company with gods. But it was in the Upanishads for the first time we find the full-fledged doctrine of Mukti or liberation. This liberation is intimately bound up with the karma samsara, the doctrine of transmigration. Almost all Indian schools of thought accepted the theory of karma and rebirth and the ideal of Moksha is conceived as liberation from the cycle of births and deaths.

As an ideal, moksha is pursued by an individual as a personal value. It is a spiritual perfection understood by the intellect, loved by the will and actualized in the daily life. It is understood as Jivanmukti in Advaita Vedanta. The man who has attained liberation in this life is called

Jivanmukta. Different schools propose different ways to attain Moksha. Advaita Vedanta of Sankara holds that knowledge or Jnana is the means of attaining Moksha. Here Moksha refers not to a new state to be attained but it is the realization of what has always been namely the realization of the Universal Self (*Brahman*), in one's own self (*Atman*). For this no morality is needed. The dualistic and pluralistic systems insist that the bondage of the individual can be removed by the Bhakthi Marga or path of devotion to God. There is another way promoted by the Gita to attain the ultimate realization in life and liberation from the cycle of births and deaths, which is known as Karma Yoga (Path of activity). The *Gita* has described this way as the method of disinterested action (*NishkamaKarma*). To attain *Moksha* one has to be freed from the bondage to one's own actions. Thus the *Gita* suggests the golden rule that actions should be done with the spirit of non-attachment to their fruits.

From all this understanding of Moksha one thing is clear that Moksha cannot be reached by bypassing morality or ignoring it, and a good life is indispensable and absolutely necessary for attaining spiritual perfection and Moksha.

3.6 SOCIAL STRATIFICATION (VARNASHRAMA DHARMA)

Varna-Dharma stands for social stratification or caste system. Before getting into discussion on the four-caste system we need to discuss the evolution of the Jivatma; Jivatma is the human person. The evolution of Jivatma is divided into four great stages. These four stages are universal and common to all human beings irrespective of caste, creed, colour.

The first stage is that which embraces the infancy, childhood, and the youth of the Jivatma. During this stage he is only fit for service and duty, and scarcely he has any responsibilities. The second stage is the first half of his manhood, during which he carries on the ordinary business of the world. He bears the burden of household responsibilities, such as accumulation, enjoyment, and proper disposal of wealth, together with the heavy duties of organizing, training and educating his younger ones in all the duties of life. The third stage occupies the second half of his manhood, during which he bears the burden of national responsibilities, the duty of protecting, guiding, ruling and subordinating his individual interests to the common good even to the willing sacrifice of his own life for the lives around him. The fourth stage is the old age of the Jivatma. In this stage, his accumulated experiences teach him to see clearly the valuelessness of all earth's treasures. And thus in this stage, he becomes rich in wisdom, compassion. He becomes the selfless friend of all, the teacher and counselor of all his younger ones. These four stages are universal and they are the foundation of a social polity; they have been represented by four external castes or classes.

The first stage is represented by Sudra caste, in which the rules are few and the responsibilities are light. The one great duty of Sudra caste is service and the virtues of the Sudra caste are obedience, fidelity, reverence, industry like that of a youth in his pupilage. The second stage is represented by the Vaisya, the typical householder, on whom the social life of the nation depends. He comes under strict rules, designed to foster unselfishness and the sense of

responsibility to nourish detachment in the midst of possession; he is made to feel the nation as his household. His virtues are diligence, caution, prudence, discretion and charity.

The third stage is represented by the Kshatriya, the ruler, warrior on whom depends the national order and safety. He also lives under strict rules, intended to draw out all the energy and strength of his character and to turn them to unselfish ends, and to make him feel that everything he possesses even life itself must be thrown away at the call of duty. His virtues are generosity, vigour, courage, strength, power to rule and self control.

The fourth stage is represented by the Brahmana, the teacher and the priest who lives under the strictest of all rules directed to make him a centre of purifying influence, physically, morally and spiritually. He must be devoted to study and he must be learned and wise. He is to be the refuge of all creatures, and their sure help in the time of need. His virtues are gentleness, *Pati*ence, purity, self-sacrifice. The Jivatma (human person) in any nation, at anytime who shows these types of virtues, belongs to the stage of which his type is characteristic. If he were to be born in India as a Hindu he should be born into the corresponding caste. Throughout the world, we can see that the broad dividing lines of classes follow these lines of caste system in India. The manual labour class (proletariat - Western term) should consist of Jivatmas in the Sudra stage. The organizers of industry, merchants, bankers, financiers, large agriculturist, traders, should be Jivatmas in the Vaisya stage. The legislators, warriors, the judicial and administrative services, the statesmen and rulers should be Jivatmas in the Kshatriya stage. And the teachers, clergy, the spiritual leaders, should be Jivatmas in the Brahmana stage.

There are three gunas (quality) of human mind. The human beings according to these innate qualities fall under one of the four castes. These three gunas are sattva, rajas, and tamas. Sattva (Real) is the noblest guna. The word ‘sattva’ means that which exists, that is real. It is the principle of goodness, happiness, bliss, luminosity and knowledge. Manifestation of consciousness is due to sattva guna. The Brahmins are those in whom the sattva or sattvika qualities are very much dominant. Rajas (Foulness) is the principle of activity, energy, motion. It leads to a life of feverish enjoyment and restless effort. Those people in whom sattva and rajas qualities are powerful are called Kshatriyas. Tamas (Darkness) is the principle of inertia, matter, resistance, passivity, negativity etc. It resists activity and produces the state of apathy or indifference. It leads to ignorance and sloth. Those people in whom rajas and tamas qualities are predominant, are called Vaisyas. And those people in whom tamas is very dominant are called Sudras. According to Manusmrti, this caste system functioned as the superstructure both in the legitimation and delineation of moral life. In order to protect the universe, the human beings are assigned separate duties and occupations according to their castes. Purusa Sukta speaks about the whole universe as the manifestation of the Universal Self called Purusa. The Brahmins sprang from the mouth of the Universal Self. The Kshatriyas sprang from his two arms. The Vaisyas sprang from his two thighs and finally the Sudras sprang from the feet of the Universal Self Brahman. Since mouth is the seat of speech, it stands for learning, arms stand for strength, and thighs stand for productive works. Feet stand for other works of labour. Thus the duties and functions are assigned to the four castes by the very nature of their birth.

In *Bhagavad Gita* IV.13, we read that the four castes were emanated by me, by the different distribution of energies and actions; know me to be the author of them. Rig Veda X. XC. 12, we see, the Brahmana was his mouth, the Rajanaya was made of his two arms, and the Vaisya was made of his two thighs. The Sudra was born from his two feet. In Manusmrti we read I. 87-91 about the occu*Pati*on of each caste very clearly. Teaching and studying the Veda, sacrificing and guiding others in offering sacrifices, gifts and receiving of gifts are assigned to the Brahmanas. The protection of the people, bestowing of gifts, offering sacrifices, studying the Vedas (not teaching), practicing non-attachment amid the objects of the senses are assigned to Kshatriyas. The protection of cattle, bestowing gifts, sacrificing, studying the Vedas (not teaching), involving in commerce, banking and agriculture are assigned to the Vaisyas. And finally serving the three castes ungrudgingly is assigned to the Sudras.

Thus the teaching of Vedas is only assigned to the Brahmanas, but the duty of studying the Vedas is assigned to Brahmanas, Kshtriyas, and Vaisyas who are regarded as the twice-born because they have undergone the initiation ceremony (Upanayana), which is the rite to study the Vedas. Since the Sudras are not mentally equipped, they are denied of Upanayana. But yet a Sudra is eligible for receiving the knowledge about Vedas through secondary sources like Puranas and Itihasas. Manusmrti says, a man who does not show forth the dharma of his caste is not regarded as belonging to his caste, if they do not practice their own duties; they only bear the names alone as Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas. And again Manu says, X.65 the Sudra becomes a Brahmana and a Brahmana becomes a Sudra by their very conduct. So too it applies to Kshatriya and Vaisyas. In Mahabharata, Vanaparva c1 xxx 21, 25, 26, we read, a man is called a Brahmana, when in him there are truthfulness, forgiveness, good conduct, gentleness, austerity and mercy. If they are not found in him, he is not a Brahmana, he is regarded as a Sudra, so also if these qualities are found in a Sudra, he is not a Sudra but a Brahmana. Shridhara Swami says, by birth everyone is Sudra but by Samskara he becomes a twice born and even then Brahmans and others are to be recognized by *Shama* and other qualities and not by their birth alone. The famous *Shloka* in Mahabharata, *Vanaparva*, ccc xiii 108 says, “not birth, nor Samskaras, nor study of Vedas, nor ancestry are the causes for Brahmanhood, conduct alone is verily the cause of Brahmanhood. So anyone can attain Brahmanhood by their conduct. For example, Valmiki Vyasa, Vasistha, and Narada who were all the children of Sudras.

Check your progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. Describe the theory of karma and its relation to the transmigration of soul.

2. The Supreme goals of human life in Vedic ethics - explain

3. Is the caste system a healthy system in Indian society – Comment?

3.7 ETHICS IN BUDDHISM

Buddhism brings about the four noble truths and eightfold path as the way of life intended for all people. This way of life is offered to all mankind without any distinction. This is the moral foundation of Buddhist ethics. The core of Buddhist belief is contained in the four - noble truths. The core is that there exists suffering and there is a way to escape suffering: a) Life is full of suffering; b) The cause of suffering is desire or craving; c) Eliminating suffering is liberation; and the final is the means for attaining *Nirvana* is eightfold path. The eightfold path as follows,

- Right Knowledge about four-noble truths
- Right Aim towards salvation
- Right Speech – right speech reflects our character. We need to avoid speaking false, slanderous, belittling words
- Right Conduct - no killing, stealing, lying, committing illicit sexual acts, consuming of alcohol
- Right Livelihood - having the profession of good nature, no butchering, slave dealer, prostitutes and trading of weapons
- Right Effort- one must have will-power to burn desires and develop virtues.
- Right Mindfulness- one must examine his behaviour and the thoughts from which it comes. By improving awareness one can become virtuous.
- Right Meditation - proper mental, physical preparation helps a person to attain nirvana. Salvation comes only from following four - noble truths and eightfold path. No god, no ritual and no type of outside power can save humanity.

Buddhist ethics are not arbitrary standards invented by man for his own utilitarian purpose nor are they arbitrarily imposed from without. Man-made laws and social customs do not form the

basis of Buddhist ethics. Buddhist ethics finds its foundation not on the changing social customs but rather on the unchanging laws of nature. Buddhist ethical virtues are intrinsically a part of nature and the unchanging law of cause and effect. The Buddhist ethics are based on and rooted in natural law and so its principles become useful and acceptable to the modern world.

Morality in Buddhism is essentially practical and it is only a means leading to the final goal of ultimate happiness. Buddhist ethics are not founded on any commandments, which men are compelled to follow. The Buddha advised men on the conditions, which were most wholesome and conducive to long term benefit for self and others. The theory of Buddhist ethics finds its practical expression in the various precepts. These precepts or discipline are nothing but general guides to show the direction in which the Buddhist ought to turn to on his way to find salvation. The morality found in all the principles can be summarized in three principles: to avoid evils; to do good, to purify the mind. To make distinction between what is good and what is evil, Buddhism says, whatever actions that have their roots in greed, hatred and delusion and that spring from selfishness are called bad; they are called Akusala Kamma. And all those actions, which are rooted in the virtues of generosity, love and wisdom, are meritorious and good. They are called Kusala Kamma.

3.8 ETHICS IN JAINISM

In general Jaina morality consists in the essential observance of Pancamahavrtas (*panca-maha-vratas*) which are the ingredients of right conduct. For the attainment of Moksha, Jainism prescribes a threefold path known as Triratna (Three Jewels). They are right faith (*Samyag Darsana*), right knowledge (*Samyag Jnana*), and right conduct (*Samyag Caritra*). All these three are essential for the attainment of *Moksha* but Jainism gives primary importance to the third without which it is useless to observe the former two.

The Threefold path as Moral Values for Moksha

From the practical point of view Jainism necessarily invites us to have firm belief in the seven principles. Belief in the seven principles is known as right faith. The seven principles are: 1) Soul (*Jiva*) 2) Non- Soul (*Ajiva*) 3) Inflow (*Asrava*) 4) Bondage (*Bandha*) 5) Checking (*Samvara*) 6) Shedding (*Nirjara*) 7) Liberation (*Moksha*). All the objects and modifications of the universe come under the first two principles, soul and non-soul. Feeling, perception, consciousness are found in the impure soul. Body is included in the non-soul. Pain and its cause are described by the two principles inflow and bondage. Cessation of pain is liberation. The means of cessation is included in the other two principles checking and shedding.The good and bad activities of mind, body and speech are the causes for the inflow of karmic matter; these activities are the causes for bondage. Removing this bondage is liberation. The means to remove the bondage is checking and shedding the bad activities. This is the way to attain Moksha. Now coming to the right knowledge, it is nothing but having right knowledge about the seven principles mentioned above.

Right conduct means giving up bad engagements and following good engagements. Five vows, five carefulness and three restraints have been said to be practical conduct by Jina. Five vows are called pancamahavrata: They are non-injury (*Ahimsa*), truth (*Satya*), non-stealing (*Asteya*), chastity (*Brahmacarya*) and non possession (*Aparigraha*). Five carefulness are called five *Samiti*: They are carefulness in walking, speaking, eating, handling and casting refuse. Three restraints are called three Gupti: they are control over mind, body, and speech. These thirteen kinds of conduct are for the monks from the practical point of view. But whether a householder or a monk, he has to follow *pancamahavratas* faithfully. Among these five vows, ahimsa is given a very wide connotation in Jainism. Ahimsa is to be practical not only in deed but also in thought and words. Keeping ill will against anyone in thought or speaking harsh words to anyone is also *himsa*. It is equal to inflicting any bodily injury to anybody. Even forcing someone to do something against his will is *himsa*. Similarly causing injury to someone due to negligence is also himsa. Practicing *ahimsa* in Jainism is not very easy; it is a kind of tapas. Sometimes the Jains go to the extreme of not burning light or cooking meal after sunset, so that no worms could be attracted towards light and thereby killed. Thus Jainism in line with Buddhism and Hinduism and in more stringent manner prescribes virtues meant for internal purity of the individual to lead him ultimately to *Moksha*. However social virtues like love, compassion etc are not neglected in Jainism. The three virtues of mahavratas, non-injury, truthfulness and non-stealing show the direct concern of the Jainas for social virtues.

3.9 HEDONISM IN ETHICS OF CARVAKA

In Tune with Buddhism and Jainism it criticizes the Vedic ritualism and ceremonialism. Carvaka school is the most ardent and ruthless critic of the Vedas. In its ethical teaching Carvaka is equated with Epicureanism and Hedonism. According to this school, attaining and enjoying maximum pleasure in this life is the only goal of man, because there is no other world or life beyond the present one. The Carvaka system says the Vedas have falsely and deceitfully shown the attraction of heaven for the attainment of which various kinds of rituals and sacrifices are prescribed. The Carvakas make a fun of and ridicule all Vedic prescriptions regarding rituals and sacrifices. According to them these are all innovations of the Brahmins to deceive people and to serve their own selfish ends. But the Carvaka system is purely materialistic, hedonistic and anti-Vedic doctrine and so it has very little impact on the general spiritualistic trend of the Hindu ethical ideas. It never had any recognizable effect on the moral thinking of the Indian people.

3.10 LET US SUM UP

To conclude the essential Buddhist virtues and Jaina virtues consist respectively in Pancasila and Pancamahavrata. Both Buddhism and Jainism give their virtues of individual purity. They give more emphasis on the individual morality. Buddhism and Jainism reject Vedic ceremonialism and ritualism and they do not speak of Varnashrama Dharma of Hinduism. They both prescribe qualities of character and conduct which are equally applicable to all. They make distinction only between the duties of an ordinary man and those of a monk.

Check your progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. Give your views on Buddhist teachings on ethical life.

2. Explain about three fold path of Jainism as foundation of Jaina ethics.

3. Carvaka: do you advocate any value in this system of Indian philosophy?

3.11 KEY WORDS

Artha: Wealth. As a goal of life, it is pursuit of goods

Dharma: Righteousness

Moksa: Liberation.

3.12 FURTHER REFERENCES AND READINGS

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UNIT 4 INDIAN AESTHETICS

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4.0 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this Unit is to study the origin and development of art appreciation and experience, classified under the title 'Aesthetics' as a distinct branch of Philosophy. 'Aesthetics' a borrowed term from Greek, used in Germany for the first time to deal in the field of art experience is most often contrasted to the Indian Art-experience popularly known as '*Rasa*'. In this unit, we shall begin with an analysis of the word 'Aesthetics' and its employment in the field of Art. We shall then take a look at the literary development of Indian Aesthetics. In two sections, we shall briefly learn the theory of rasa followed by various other theories primarily dealing with the mechanism of art appreciation and experience. Finally, we shall see the role of Aesthetics in Philosophy and its distinct place as Aesthetico-Philosophy.

By the end of this Unit you should be able:

- to understand the role of Aesthetics
- to get a broad outline of the Aesthetic literature
- to appreciate the various theories of Aesthetics and
- to relate Aesthetics and its Philosophical implications

4.1 INTRODUCTION TO AESTHETICS

Let us begin with the analysis of the word 'Aesthetics'. Generally, it is associated in the field of Art. The art-appreciation is also known by the word 'Aesthetics' and also the art-experience. Though the words 'appreciation' and 'experience' are inter-related and overlapping, they are

distinguished in the field of art. However, anything related to Art suggests the use of the word 'Aesthetics'. In this context, let us see what the word 'Aesthetics' means. It is a Greek word which means 'sense-perception'. Anything that is given to the senses is known as 'Aesthetics' and later it was used in the plural as 'Aesthetics'. In 1735, this word was for the first time formally used by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten in the sense of 'Science of Sensitive Cognition' in the field of Arts. Later, this Science of Art, namely, Aesthetics came to be recognized as a distinct branch of Philosophy under the head 'Philosophy of Art'. In the Indian context, we have simply borrowed the term 'Aesthetics' and broadly applied in the field of Indian Art and thus we say 'Indian Aesthetics' generally refers to the art-appreciation and art-experience of art forms. In order to understand the function of aesthetics in art, let us first survey the classification of art forms.

Art forms

In the Indian context, the art forms like music, dance, architecture, painting etc., are found mentioned in the earliest available works like the Vedas, Puranas, Itihasas etc. Thus, it is tedious to place historically the advent of art forms, but, we have in a span of 100 years, (18th-19th cent AD) located and arranged one of the earliest treatises dealing specifically with the art form and the mechanism of art-experience known as *Natya-Shastra* attributed to Sage Bharata. The period is roughly from 5th century BC to 3rd century AD. By this time, the art form is classified into three arts, namely, Poetry (*Kavya*), Drama (or Theatre) (*Natya*) and Music (*Gana*). We find classification of arts into 64 that includes stringing flowers, face-painting etc., but the identification of the three arts seems to enhance the study of art-experience elevating it from the physical plane to a spiritual plane. Even among these three, Bharata in the *Natya-Shastra* shows that the highest form of art-experience is Poetry and it can be well brought out by acting. The *Natya-Shastra*, deals with the three main arts and defines the art-experience as "*Rasa*" and provides the mechanism of what came to be known later as rasa-experience. This word '*Rasa*' though profound, reaching beyond the sensitive cognition, however over a period of time has come to be identified with the word 'Aesthetics' of Western origin. Now, in the light of the three main arts, we shall survey the literary development in these three art forms. We do have much literature in the other art forms, here; we restrict to these three arts basically to understand the evolution and development of Aesthetics in the Indian context.

4.2. A SURVEY OF AESTHETIC LITERATURE

We shall classify the Literature on Indian Aesthetics broadly into three based on the above classification of three art forms, viz., *Kavya*, *Natya* and *Gana*. Firstly, we present the earliest available treatise, that is, *Natya-Shastra* that commonly presents *Rasa*, the experience of any art form and specifically the three mentioned art forms.

Natya-Shastra and Its Commentaries

The treatise *Natya-Shastra* attributed to Sage Bharata, deals with the Science of Dramaturgy and we have at least three different editions with 36, 37 and 38 chapters. Considering the 36 chapters work as the earliest, we find the description of characteristics of poetical works (*Kavyalakshanam*) in the 17th chapter, different types of dramas (*Natakas*) also known as

Rupakas, in the 20th chapter and music (*dhruvas*) in the 32nd chapter. The famous definition of *Rasa* in the aphoristic (*sutra*) form is given in the 6th chapter of *Natya-Shastra*. This is later referred to by the Aestheticians as '*Rasa-Sutra'*.

The available commentary to the *NatyaShastra* is that of Abhinavagupta (10th-11th cent. AD). The commentary is known as Natyaveda-vivritti and most popularly as Abhinavabharati. Abhinavagupta comments this treatise in the background of Pratyabhijna Shaiva system that is said to have prevailed widely in Kashmir. From this available commentary, we come to know that there had been several earlier commentators to *NatyaShastra*, like, Udbhata, Bhatta Lollata, Shri Shankuka, Bhattanayaka, Kirtidhara, Rahula, Shri Harsha and others. Basically the commentators differed in the interpretation of the *Rasa*-sutra and evolved their theories of *Rasa*. We shall deal with the theories of *Rasa* in 1.3 of this unit. The other features of the commentaries are the different viewpoints on the nature of drama (*rupaka*), dramatic presentation (*vritti*), histrionics (*abhinaya*), and different aspects of music and poetical compositions. In the broad platform of *Rasa* theory developed various views on "aesthetically sound" poetic compositions. We shall now see some of the literary contributions in the field of poetry that took a prime place in the gamut of Aesthetic study.

Works on *Kavya* (Poetry)

Bharata describes alamkaaras literally known as embellishments that which gives rise to a beautiful poetry. Based on this later Aestheticians built up theories on producing a beautiful poetry by refining and re-defining the alamkaras. In that order, we enumerate here some of the important works in the Alamkara literature, that fall under the Aesthetic Theory of Poetry. The Bhamaha's Kavyaalankaara describes *Kavya* and divides it into three based on the language as Samskrita, Prakrita and Apabhramsha. Bhamaha is considered as the oldest extant exponent of the Alamkara School of Poetics. By this time, *alamkara* has evolved as a distinct school of Aesthetics in par with *Rasa*. Dandin, in his *Kavyadarsha* divides *Kavya* as *gadya* (prose), *padya* (poetry) and *mishra* (both prose and poetry). In the work *Alamkara-sara-sangraha*, the author Udbhata deals with 41 *alamkaras* with 90 illustrations. The author Vamana in his work *Kavya-alamkara-sutra*, declares *riti* or the special arrangement or combination of words, as the soul of poetry. The *Kavya-alamkara* is an extensive work of Rudrata. It consists of 16 chapters and reviews the whole field of poetics. He was the first to attempt a scientific classification of the figures as based on certain definite principles. In about, 9th-10th cent AD, the famous work *Dhvanyaloka* of Anandavardhana took a new form which settled the principles to be followed in poetics. It is considered as the epoch-making work in the history of poetic literature. He introduced the two senses in poetry, viz., expressed and implied. The term he uses is 'dhvani' that brings out the poetic beauty in a suggestive language. Rajashekhara's Kavya-meemaamsa serves more as a practical handbook for poets. Kuntaka in his *Vakroti-jivita*, is said to have elevated poetic expression with extra-ordinary charm known as vakroti. In the late 14th to 16th centuries we find standard works like Sahityadarpana of Vishvanatha and works of Jagannatha and others that seem to embellish further the theories of poetic compositions. We shall deal with the theories of Aesthetics in the light of poetry in 4.4 of this unit.

Works on *Natya* (Dramaturgy)

Some of the independent works on Dramaturgy is traced to the early 10th cent.CE, the famous work being *Dasharupaka* of Dhananjaya, commented by his brother Dhanika. It deals with the ten main types of rupaka as found in *NatyaShastra*. Another work is the *Nataka-lakshana-ratna-kosha* of Sagaranandin which also deals with dramatic elements. The *Natyadarpana* of Ramachandra and Gunachandra of early 12 cent AD also focuses on the elements of acting. We find a mention of *Natakamimamsa* by Ruyyaka, a Kashmiri Pandit but so far this work is not traced. The *Bhavaprakasha* of Sharadatanaya highlights the bhava or the emotion at the mental level. The *Rasarnava-sudhakara* of Simhabhupala treats dramatic elements in the closing section of the work. Vishvanatha in his *Sahityadarpana*, 6th chapter deals with acting and other dramatic elements.

Works on *Gana* (Music)

The work on music is traced to Pre-Bharata period. Dattila, a Pre-Bharata Aesthetician, seems to have recorded about 18 jatis (species of melodies) while dealing with music. Bharata, in the *NatyaShastra*, deals with 18 jatis in connection with rasa and bhava. The work '*Brihaddeshi'* of Matanga is considered as the forerunner of works on music. Matanga for the first time introduces the term "*raga*" from the root *ranj* to please. He defines *raga* technically and assigns the role of deshi music. Another important work on music is '*Sangeeta-Makaranda'* of Narada. Here, based on emotional feeling or rasa, the ragas are divided as masculine (*raga*) and feminine (*raginis*).

In this background, as theories of Aesthetics we shall deal with the following important Schools: *Rasa*, *Alamkara*, *Riti*, *Vakroti*, and *Dhvani*. Though mostly, they deal with the aesthetic sense in poetry, to some extent the mechanism of aesthetic pleasure can be extended to other art forms. A distinct Aesthetic theory representing every art form is yet to develop.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1) Define Aesthetics. What are the three major art-forms?

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2) Survey the development of Literature of Indian Aesthetics.

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4.3. AESTHETIC THEORIES - 1

Bharata's *Rasa*-Theory

Bharata defines '*Rasa*' in an aphorism in the sixth chapter of *Natya-Shastra*. It runs as follows: *Vibhava-anubhava-vyabhichari bhava-samyogaat-rasa nishpattihi.* 'The rasa is established by the combination of the determinants (vibhava), consequents (anubhava) and transitory emotions (vyabhichari bhava)'. Let us explain this further – In the definition we find terms like vibhava, anubhava and vyabhichari bhava that commonly have the word 'bhava' with different prefixes. So, let us try to understand the term 'bhava' first. Bhava, is generally translated as 'expression'; that is, bhava is that which conveys a particular rasa through various techniques. The vi+bhava, is the determinant, that is, the rasa to be conveyed is expressed in the form of stage-settings, character's costumes etc. The anu+bhava, is the consequent, that is, the rasa to be conveyed is further expressed by gesticulation at the physical, verbal levels. The evoked *rasa* is further sustained by the *vyabhichari+bhava* or the transitory emotions. Bharata classifies about 33 *vyabhichari bhavas* also known as *sanchari bhavas*. The three combined, that is *vibhava+anubhava+vyabhichari bhava* constitutes in the establishment of *rasa*. Further, Bharata says that the unexpressed emotion at the mental level (known as *sthaayi-bhava*) alone when expressed results in rasa. Thus, there is a kind of cause-effect relation between the *sthayi bhava* and *rasa*. Bharata enumerates eight *sthayis* and its corresponding eight *rasas*.

STHAYI-BHAVA (unexpressed emotion at the mental level)	*RASA* (the experience of expressed emotion through gesticulations etc.)
RATI	*SHRINGAARA* (Sentiment of Love)
HASA	*HAASYA* (Sentiment of Laughter)
UTSAAHA	*VEERA* (Sentiment of Valour)
VISMAYA	*ADBHUTA* (Sentiment of Wonder)
KRODHA	*RAUDRA* (Sentiment of Anger)
SHOKA	*KARUNA* (Sentiment of Pity)
JUGUPSAA	*BEEBHATSA* (Sentiment of Disgust)
BHAYA	*BHAYAANAKA* (Sentiment of Fear)

The meaning of the words under the *Sthayi bhava* means the same as that of rasa, the difference is that the *sthayi* is unexpressed at the mental level and rasa is the experience of the expressed emotion. Further, *Natya-Shastra* conveys nine *rasa* (popularly known as "*navarasas*"), wherein '*Shaanta'* is the ninth *rasa* and its *sthayi* is identified as '*nirveda'*. Later, number of Aestheticians added to the number of *rasas*, '*bhakti'* (devotion), '*vaatsalya'* (motherly love) etc., that are more or less off-shoots of *Shringaara rasa* and we have schools that enumerate of more

than 41 *rasas*. But, the two distinct schools of *rasa* are 1. eight *rasas* (excluding *Shaanta* as a *rasa*) and 2. nine *rasas* (inclusive of *shaanta* as a *rasa*).

Let us try to apply the definition in an art-form, say, visual gesticulation (acting). If the rasa proposed to be conveyed is, say, *Bhayanaka* (fear), then the stage-settings and light systems create a fearful condition – this is known as *vibhava*, which prepares the audience to the *rasa* that is going to be conveyed. Hence, *vibhava* is said as the determinant. The consequent or *anubhava* is carried by the actors; their physical movements expressed in the face, limbs etc., convey the fear. The *vyabhichari bhava* helps to sustain the *bhayanaka rasa* that is evoked. Now, the puzzling question for centuries and the continued debate is to the locus of rasa and *sthayi-bhava* and their relation. This continued debate gives rise to various theories of *rasa*.

Theories of *Rasa*

The Bharata's definition of *Rasa* is quite ambiguous, in the sense, it does not explicitly state the "*sthayi-bhava*" (unexpressed emotion in the mind) nor does it clarify the word "*nishpatti*" (establish) that occurs in the aphoristic rasa-definition. Thus, it gave rise to many theories of *rasa*, and we find four main theories recorded in the commentary of Abhinavagupta to *Natya-Shastra*. We shall examine briefly, each of these theories one by one. These theories mainly differ in identifying the locus of *sthayi-bhava* and the *rasa*.

Bhatta Lollata's *Rasa-utpatti-vada* (The Generation Theory of *Rasa*)

Lollata is said to have flourished between 5th – 6th cent. A.D. He is considered as a Mimamsa Philosopher and also as well-versed in Shaiva philosophy. His commentary seems to be the earliest on *Natya-Shastra*. He is believed to have commented on the entire treatise, but the work is lost and his theory of rasa is structured from the commentary of Abhinavagupta. According to Lollata, the sthayi-bhava is in the historical character who is portrayed on the stage. When the actor assumes the role of that character, then there is a rise of that sthayi-bhava secondarily in the actor. Then, through the vibhava, anubhava and vyabhichari bhavas this sthayi gets expressed that results in rasa. The word 'nishpatti' is understood by Lollata as 'utpatti' or produced. So, he states, the sthayi bhava is produced in the original character. Hence his theory of rasa is known as 'rasa-utpatti vada' or the theory of generation.

Shri Shankuka's *Rasa-anumiti-vada* (The Inferential Theory of *Rasa*)

The Logician, Shri Shankuka (6th-7th cent.AD), presented his theory of rasa opposing the view of Lollata. Shankuka tried to explain the rasa-theory on the inferential ground. So, he presents the paksha – the locus consisting of the reason; hetu – the reason that is directly perceived, sadhya – the result or the indirect perception of a thing is arrived at by a universal concomitance or vyaapti. Shankuka applies this inferential syllogism in the following manner;

Paksha – The actors are the locus

Hetu – the various gesticulations by the actors are directly perceived by the audience

Sadhya – the sthayi-bhava is inferred

Vyapti – gesticulations by the actors are possible only when there is *sthayi-bhava* in the mind of the actors

By the inferred *sthayi-bhava*, the audience relish the *rasa*. This is the *rasa-anumiti-vada* or the inferential theory of *rasa*.

Bhatta-Nayaka's *Rasa-bhukti-vada* (The Enjoyment Theory of *Rasa*)

Bhatta-Nayaka (9th-10th cent AD) is considered as a Samkhya philosopher who interprets the rasa-sutra by introducing for the first time the concept of 'generalization' or (*saadhaaranikarana*). He states, the *sthayi-bhava* in the whole enactment is general; it is identified by the spectators who then enjoy the rasa. He extends the concept of *saadharana* to the other elements too, like the *vibhava*, *anubhava* and *vyabhichari bhavas*. According to Nayaka, the art forms contain the emotional fervour in general and that is communicated to the audience. Further, for Nayaka, the rasa is relished only when the mind of the audience is calm (*vishranti*) and detached (*samvit*).

Abhinavagupta's *Rasa-abhivyakti-vada* (The Revelation Theory of *Rasa*)

Abhinavagupta (10th-11th cent AD) is well-known Pratyabhijna Shaiva Philosopher (popularly known as Kashmir Shaivism). He opposed the above three views on *Rasa* and borrowing the concept of saadharana from Bhatta-Nayaka and the concept of dhvani from Anandavardhana, and in the background of Pratyabhijna Shaivism, developed his theory of *rasa*.

According to Abhinavagupta, the *vibhava* etc., portrayed to the spectator suggests the sthayi-bhava as belonging to someone (as in real life) and the by the imagination (pratibha) of the spectator, these accessories are reconstructed leading to the general or sadharana state. Here, Abhinava postulates the sthayi-bhava in the mind of the viewer too, which gets connected with that of the character portrayed through the actor. There is an emotional experience by the viewers through identification (tadatmya) with the character. There is revival of sthayi-bhava in the mind of the viewer; who is now not conscious of himself, in fact, he gets freed from the ego. Abhinava equates this ego-less state to chamatkara of Pratyabhijna system. Thus, for Abhinava, rasa is the manifestation of the intrinsic bliss of oneself aroused by the sthayibhava freed from obstacles. Thus, sthayi bhava is said to be transferred to rasa, there is the revelation of bliss or rasa. This is the Revelation Theory of *Rasa*.

4.4. AESTHETIC THEORIES - 2

Now, we shall briefly see the other theories of Aesthetics that developed into distinct schools primarily addressing the *Kavya* or poetry as the main art form.

Alamkara

The definition of a good poetic composition conditioned with 36 qualities included *alamkara* or embellishments in the form of figures of speech in Bharata's explanation of poetry. Later, Vamana (800 AD), identified the word '*alamkara'* as a 'thing of beauty'. Dandin and a host of other Aestheticians used '*alamkara'* in a wider sense. Dandin classified the various aspects connected to *alamkara*. Bhamaha divided *alamkara* as word (*shabda*) and meaning (*artha*). Thus, there emerged two kinds, *shabda-alamkaras* and *artha-alamkaras*. In course of time, from the four *alamkaras* mentioned by Bharata, as much as more than 100 kinds of *alamkaras* were introduced by the end of 17th cent AD. The school of *alamkara*, sub-ordinated the *rasa* and positioned *rasa* as one aspect of *alamkara*.

Riti

Vamana, the foremost Aesthetician, developed the concept of *riti* as the soul of poetry. *Riti* means diction, a particular arrangement of words. This special arrangement is again based on defined excellences (*guna*) of a composition. He gives three kinds of *riti*: *Vaidarbhi, Gaudi* and *Panchali*. The *Riti* school suggests the enquiry as to what constitutes the essential beauty of poetry. It includes *rasa* among the necessary feature of poetic works. Thus, here too, *rasa* takes a sub-ordinate position.

Vakroti

The theory of poetical work further developed which gave rise to another distinct school spearheaded by Kuntaka in his theory of *Vakroti*. *Vakroti* means 'strikingness in expression different from the general mode of speech'. *Vakra* or turn/twist in the words of poetry was considered as the life of poems. The words in poetry which get a particular twist (*bhangi* or *vakrata*) in their use by a skilled poet are seen as poetic embellishment. This *vakroti*, for Kuntaka, demands greater skill and maturity of treatment.

Dhvani

Anandavardhana (who influenced Abhinavagupta and many others) propagated the theory of *dhvani*. *Dhvani* theory is seen as an extension of *Rasa* theory. It entrenched the theory of *rasa* in the field of poetry. Anandavardhana states in his famous work Dhvanyaloka that words can convey apart from its conventional meaning, a suggested meaning. In a composition, when the suggested sense prevails it is called *dhvani*. That is, a suggestive poetry is called *dhvani*. Anandavardhana tried to show that *rasa* can be best conveyed through *dhvani*.

4.5. AESTHETICO-PHILOSOPHY

In presenting various theories of Aesthetics, it is highly held that the theory of rasa as re-defined by Abhinvagupta is the best ever presented theory. His theory is inclusive of the ingredients contributed by his predecessors: there is focus on the character to be portrayed as given by Lollata, there is indirect conveyance method of Shankuka, and the sadharana of Bhatta-Nayaka. Abhinavagupta includes the theory of dhvani, as the method of communication as given by Anandavardhana. Thus, his theory is seen as a standard theory of *rasa*. In addition to all, it is

Abhinavagupta who elevates the aesthetic to a philosophical plane in the background of Pratyabhijna Shaivism. Thus, here we shall see the application of philosophical thought that brings about the difference, from aesthetics to what is called "meta-aesthetics".

In the Pratyabhijna Shaiva system, the universal self is Maheshvara; considered in itself, it is Shiva, of the nature of luminosity (*prakasha*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ananda*). There is the universal energy (*shakti*) inseparable from Shiva. Shiva is bliss and also possesses bliss. An individual being is only a manifestation of Shiva. The bliss nature of self is forgotten because of concealment by impurities like ego (*ahamkara*) etc. Abhinava shows in his theory of rasa that the art form is instrumental in removing the obstacles and there is bliss (*ananda*) of the self that gets manifested which is termed as rasa. Following Abhinavagupta, there are other Aestheticians who give this philosophical bent to the aesthetic theories.

In this line, we find many philosophers present the aesthetic theory in the light of Vedanta. One such theory we find in the works of Shri Narayana Guru, identified as one of the contemporary Indian philosophers. In the background of Vedanta, Narayana Guru shows that the sense of beauty enjoyed (which we call *rasa*), is one Atma or self, that manifests as the object, instrument and the enjoyer. He terms the subjective enjoyer as '*ahanta'* and all the objective enjoyables as 'idanta'. In the moment of enjoyment, he says, there is forgetting of the subjective and the objective conditioning leading to oneness, that is *atma*. This he calls as the mysterious ways of the functioning of atma. He describes the creative process of God, in his *Darshana-mala*, as an art-work. He talks about the horizontal kind of beauty-experience, that is, the experience of beauty is an enjoyer – enjoying and enjoyable. He considers that in both the beautiful and the ugly, the enlightenment is nothing but the unfoldment of one ananda-atma. In this sense, he perceives the entire universe of enjoyment of Shiva as comparable to an epic conceived by a poetic genius. He speaks of both ecstasy and mystery in nature that reflects in art-works.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1) Define Bharata's *Rasa* and examine the theories of *Rasa.*

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2) How do you understand the development of "Meta-Aesthetics"?

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4.6. LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have tried to present the Indian Aesthetic growth beginning from the treatise of Bharata, that is, *Natya-Shastra*. This is the starting point of any Aesthetician in the Indian context. We have tried to re-define the perspective of Indian Aesthetics and its extension to the Meta-Aesthetics by the interpretation by Philosophers. In this unit, we have covered the literary development in Aesthetics. We have briefly seen the rasa-sutra of Bharata and the meaning of the various terms that occur in the rasa-sutra. We have covered the theories of rasa, mainly four as recorded in the commentary of Abhinavagupta. Then we saw the theories of Aesthetics in the light of poetry that took the prime place in history of Aesthetic development. The philosophical approach of an earlier philosopher, Abhinavagupta in the background of Pratyabhijna system and the approach of a modern philosopher, Narayana Guru, in the background of Vedanta, gives an insight into the Aesthetico-Philosophical outlook. However, this field of knowledge is to be further explored. The position of Indian Aesthetics is yet to be proved as a distinct identified branch of a systematic philosophy in the Indian context.

4.7. KEY WORDS

Rasa – sentiment; feeling; emotional experience through art forms

Bhava – expression of sentiments

Alamkara – figure of speech

Riti – diction; a particular arrangement of words in poetry

Vakroti – striking turns in words that is used in poetry

Dhvani – suggestion; words conveying suggestive expression other than the conventional meaning.

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