
UNIT 11 THE SOCIALIST WORLD*

Structure

- 11.0 Objectives
- 11.1 Introduction
- 11.2 First Socialist Revolution — Why in Russia?
 - 11.2.1 The Political Structure
 - 11.2.2 Peasantry and Working Class
 - 11.2.3 National Self-determination
 - 11.2.4 Ideas and Organizations
 - 11.2.5 The Stages of Revolution
- 11.3 Building Socialism
- 11.4 New Economic Policy
- 11.5 Planning and Industrialization
- 11.6 Collectivization of Agriculture
- 11.7 The Terror and the Purges
- 11.8 Let Us Sum Up
- 11.9 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

11.0 OBJECTIVES

You have so far studied about liberal democracies which was one of three major ideological strands which dominated the polity of Europe in the 20th century. In this Unit we will explain to you the ideology of socialism and the socialist world. As you are aware, socialism as an idea had been in vogue throughout the 19th century. But it was translated into a concrete polity only in 1917 in Russia through a revolution. This Unit talks about the Russian revolution and gives you some information about the years following the revolution till 1928. After reading this Unit, you will learn about the:

- conditions in Russia which led to the first socialist revolution;
- process of building socialism in Russia after the revolution;
- New Economic Policy as significant stage in the building of socialism in Russia;
- nature of planning and industrialization in Russia;
- essence of collectivization of agriculture and its impact on the Russian peasantry; and
- political factors that led to the terror and the purges of the 1930s.

11.1 INTRODUCTION

You have already read something about the socialist vision of society. The linkages that socialist parties developed with the workers' struggles in the early 20th century

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added a new dimension to popular struggles in Europe. Both, the workers' struggles and the activities of the socialist parties became powerful mass movements in the 20th century. Their association generated new symbols of revolution and working class power such as demonstration, general strikes, the workers theatre, the red flag, May Day as workers day, 8 March as International Women's Day. Though their activities were spread throughout Europe, their greatest impact was, however, in Russia where the radical movements assumed an overwhelmingly anti-capitalist stance and a socialist vision. The late 19th and early 20th century was marked by a succession of revolutionary waves culminating in the first socialist revolution. In this Unit we will talk about this first socialist revolution in history, known also as the October Revolution or the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. We will also talk about the first experience of socialist construction and see the ways in which its policies were distinct from those of a capitalist state. This Unit talks about three crucial developments of the 1930s in Russia; planned industrialization, collectivization of agriculture and the purges of the 1930s.

11.2 FIRST SOCIALIST REVOLUTION — WHY IN RUSSIA?

What exactly was happening to Russian society to make all this possible? Karl Marx, in his later years, had appreciatively commented on the rise in revolutionary temper in late 19th century Russia, but the entire thrust of the socialist thought had been towards arguing for revolution in the countries of mature and most developed capitalism. It was envisaged that the capitalist system would be most vulnerable where it was most mature because its' contradictions or conflicts and tension, in the form of private ownership and socialized production were starker in those countries. The working classes there would truly have nothing to lose but their chains! In actual fact, the first socialist revolution was made in 'backward' Russia, a society that was capitalist with strong remnants of feudal social and economic power intact, a working class still linked with land, and a peasantry that primarily aspired to individual land ownership. Essentially, it was the increasing contradiction of late and growing capitalism that created the social premises for the revolutionary outbreak in Russia.

11.2.1 The Political Structure

In Western Europe the growth of capitalism had led to the evolution of liberal-constitutionalism and parliamentary democracies. In Russia right up to 1917 there existed an autocratic form of government, ruled by the Tsar. All the individual, civil and fundamental rights which the citizens of Europe took for granted, and all democratic forms of collective expression such as the right to form organization, strikes and election were not permitted in Russian territory and the Russian speaking people. It also consisted of a number of non-Russian groups and nationalities, such as Ukrainians, Siberians, the Baltic States, etc. The Russian autocracy oppressed all the other nationalities of the Empire, and stood firmly against all democratic movements in Europe, earning for itself the label 'Policeman of Europe'. The nature of the Russian state, therefore, became increasingly incompatible with the new demands that the new changing social and economic forces engendered.

11.2.2 Peasantry and Working Class

Traditionally Russian agriculture was characterized by the practices of bonded labour attached to the land and the landlord. This practice, known as serfdom, was abolished in 1861 and the 'serf' was now replaced by free and mobile peasantry. But the 1861 agrarian reforms did not resolve the 'agrarian question' in the Tsarist Empire. Even as capitalism developed in agriculture, the landed aristocracy remained dominant, the peasant poor, and agriculture still backward. Even as peasant agriculture became commercialized and there emerged a 'kulak' rich peasant strata, the fundamental conflict in the countryside on the urgent question of land, rents, wages and rights over commons remained that between the landed aristocracy, which still held the major portion of the land, and the peasantry as a whole.

The continuing social and economic dominance of the landed aristocracy helped retain the political aristocracy, while the conflict within the post 1861 rural structure led to the creation of a modern peasant movement that grew increasingly political. Expropriation of landed estates and land for the peasant was a demand that neither the Tsarist autocracy nor any other political group, except the Bolshevik, was prepared to endorse. This enabled peasant uprisings and land take-over by them to become the motive force of the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917, as well as for the consolidation of the socialist regime.

The timing and nature of Russian industrialization created scope for a workers movement that was both very militant and political, while the specific features of Russian society and politics contributed to its assuming a revolutionary rather than a reformist character. Late industrialization and the necessity to 'catch up' with Western Europe meant large enterprises in the early stages of industrialization, unlike England or France where it was a gradual and steady development. In turn this resulted in an early and rapid growth of class consciousness and an organized mass movement before the bourgeoisie could assume social and political dominance. In Russia the thrust of the workers movement was as much against the bourgeois as against gentry rule, as much against capitalism as against the autocracy. Besides, in the absence of effective legislation on trade union rights even struggle over economic demands tended to assume political forms because the very act of strike meant breaking the law. The weakness of representative institutions led the working class movement to adopt the revolutionary alternative of overthrowing the system rather than seeking to control it through greater representation for the socialist political groups, as was done in England, France and Germany. Trade-unions were in fact born in midst of the revolution of 1905. The location of big factories in the countryside, outside the limits of city and urban boundaries, and a varied and differentiated working class (skilled artisans, skilled and unskilled factory workers, those engaged in the *kustar* or the domestic system, apart from telegraph, railway, construction workers) a very great percentage of whom retained their links with the land enabled this movement to have a appeal and reach than in just the big urban centres.

11.2.3 National Self-determination

Freedom from national oppression in the Tsarist Empire coincided with the victory of the socialist revolution. Apart from the alienation felt by the peoples of the

Baltic region, Central Asia, Transcaucasia and other areas as a result of political and cultural discrimination, the economic backwardness that Tsarist economic policies entailed for these regions ensured that they remain predominantly agricultural with a strong stake in the land question. There emerged strong movements for national self-determination, demanding right for their own languages, culture, equal opportunities and even a separate political identity. The Bolsheviks supported land for the peasant as well as the right to secession and a voluntary union. The peasantry in these areas, therefore, played a crucial role in the victory of the socialist alternative to the tsarist autocracy, completely by passing all liberal solutions to nationalist aspirations.

11.2.4 Ideas and Organizations

In the early 20th century the main political tendencies were the Socialist Revolutionaries who represented the class interests of the peasantry and looked on the peasantry as the motive force of revolution, liberals of various hues whose blueprint for Russia was the parliamentary democracy of Western Europe, and the Marxists or social democrats (communists) whose inspiration and strategy derived from Marx's Communist Manifesto and his critique of the Gotha Programme. Most radical intelligentsia were moreover, strongly influenced by Marx's critique of capitalism and the experience of the 1848 revolution in Europe in which the bourgeoisie had 'betrayed' the revolution, and the workers had been the most consistent revolutionary force. Therefore, overwhelmingly Russia imbibed from Western Europe its most radical thought rather than liberalism in retreat.

Bourgeois-liberalism was, from the beginning, weak in Russia, and the socialist orientation of the radical intelligentsia and revolutionary leadership a key factor. The Bolshevik victory represented the victory of socialism as state policy of the post-revolutionary regime.

Lenin was the most important leader of the Bolshevik party. The Bolsheviks did not simply transfer Marxism to Russia. They found viable answer to their specific revolutionary problematic in Russia within the framework of Marxism. They argued that in the condition of Russian backwardness and the relative weakness of the bourgeoisie, its role would be vacillating even in bringing about a bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Russian bourgeoisie, faced with the workers movement would not duplicate the role of the French or the English bourgeoisie. The 'hegemony of the working class' was, therefore, necessary in the first bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolutionary, as well as its second socialist stage. Their second major contribution to revolutionary strategy was the 'alliance of the working class and the peasantry' in the context of a numerically small working class and a peasant majority. Thus they preserved the idea of a two stage revolution and the leading role of the working class, while transforming their strategy to bring them about. The revolutionary upsurges from the early 20th century largely vindicated their strategy.

11.2.5 The Stages of Revolution

The Russian Revolution may be said to have gone through three distinct stages and took almost twelve years to complete. The first stage led to the creation of a parliament, called the Duma. The second stage, known as the February revolution in 1917, led to the establishment of a Provisional Government at the centre though

the rule of the tsar still prevailed. Finally, the Revolution completed its third and final stage in October 1917 when the rule of the tsar was overthrown and a peoples' republic was established. Let us look at the three stages in detail.

The first major assault on the autocracy occurred in 1905, sparked off by firing on peaceful demonstration of workers on 9 January 1905. This day came to be known as Bloody Sunday. The workers and peasants began to demand a 'democratic republic'. They also created the first soviets, grass-root, elected political organisations of workers, peasant and soldiers, which Lenin later called the 'embryos of revolutionary power' and which eventually formed the basis of the post-revolutionary state, and from which the socialist state derived its name USSR. World War I which adversely effected the economy and livelihood of the Russian working people, also created greater opposition to the existing regime and contributed to the Russian Revolution.

The final assault on the autocracy came with the February Revolution of 1917. Beginning with a demonstration of women workers over shortage of bread in Petrograd, it spread to other cities and to the countryside. Strikes by all sections of society, peasant uprising, and revolutionary action by the soldiers sealed the fact of the autocracy. The Russian autocracy was overthrown and replaced by a Provisional Government dominated by the liberal bourgeoisie.

The February 1917 Revolution achieved political freedom for the first time. Fundamental and civil rights were created. Hundreds and thousands of pamphlets were distributed by thousands of little organisations, and found their way into factories, barracks, villages, streets. Factory committees, village councils, soldiers, groups became the forum through which the people sought to shape their destiny. Soviets were once again elected — in towns, in villages, at the front, and the Central Soviet once again (as in 1905) emerged as the alternative source of revolutionary power opposed now to the Provisional Government.

The liberal bourgeoisie represented in the Provisional Government had completed its revolution; the working people were only beginning theirs. That was the major contradiction in the new post-February revolution regime, and it could not continue for long. The peasants were disappointed that they did not get any land, the entire working people and soldiers were disappointed that the war still continued.

Discontent expressed itself in the form of strikes and demonstrations, peasants spontaneously taking over lands, riots over high prices and shortage of food, and desertion by soldiers who wanted an end to war and to partake of the land distribution. The Bolsheviks easily emerged as closest to the popular mood with their slogans of:

- land for the peasant,
- immediate end to war,
- workers' control over industries,
- right of nationalities to self-determination, and above all
- bread.

Peace! Land! Bread! Democracy! became the immediate demands. The Bolsheviks gained majority in all the mass organisations, and had the majority

of the workers and soldiers on their side. Contrary to general impression later created by a hostile press, the revolution thus had a popular character, and was almost bloodless. The army — largely peasants — simply went over to the side of the revolutionary forces. The provisional Government was overthrown. The first socialist revolution in history had become a reality. The new state declared itself a workers state. A very vivid account of this October 1917 revolution appears in ‘Ten Days That Shook the World’ by John Reed, an American journalist.

Check Your Progress 1

- 1) How was the political structure in Russia different from that of European countries? Answer in five lines.

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- 2) Write five lines on the different political groups active in Russia.

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- 3) What led to the Russian Revolution? Write in 100 words.

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11.3 BUILDING SOCIALISM

Building socialism in the country of revolution was in many ways as heroic a struggle as making revolution was. There was no model of an actually existing socialist society for the Bolsheviks to model their experiments on. Neither did there exist a detailed blue-print of what socialism in practice entailed, comparable to Marx’s analysis of capitalism. The early Russian revolutionaries had only their ideals to rely on and certain broad principles worked out by socialist thinkers. Russia was still backward in terms of economic development as compared to other European countries, and it was not so easy to chalk out a strategy of economic growth that would outpace capitalist economy. Besides, socialist Russia had to face the united assault of the capitalist countries, hostile and in actual war against the new state, and civil war from former landlords and capitalists within Russia.

Rapid economic growth, social justice, and guarantee of individual fundamental rights were not as easy to combine in real life as it was in theory. There were bitter political differences, debates over strategies and goals, and experiments with successive policies over building socialism. Many dreams remained unfulfilled, many ideals fell by the wayside, many aspirations were denied in the face of the harsh realities of backwardness, hostility of the entire capitalist world and civil war. The revolution in the other countries of Europe did not materialize, although the Bolsheviks predicated many of their policies in Russia on a 'socialist world revolution'. The workers state had to be defended in many ways, and many more people died defending the revolution than in making it. But they succeeded in presenting to the world an alternative model for development and modernity and their achievements were in some respect quite remarkable.

The early legislation aimed at destroying the legal and economic bases of capitalism and in laying the foundation for socialism. It almost meant a reversal of the earlier foreign policy and the entire capitalist ethic of private profit, individualism and consumerism.

Among the earlier measures were the abolition of private resources in industry, and the establishment of workers' control. The factories were taken over by the workers state and experiments made with how workers could keep a check on the production processes through their representatives, while also ensuring the right of workers in their factories. While state ownership of industry remained a consistent and continuing feature of socialist planning in the USSR as well as in other socialist countries, workers control came under severe strain in the conditions of war, and centralized planning in later years.

A second major intervention was in agriculture. By the Land Decree of November 1917 landlordism was abolished, and the entire land was nationalized and given over to peasants for hereditary use under individual production. The amount of land given to a peasant family depended on the number of family members. The income from the land and from the labour on this land continued to be individual or private i.e. of his family members, the only limitation being it could not be sold by them or used in any way to exploit the labour of others. The exploitative relationships that characterized the agrarian sector were thus ended, along with the abolition of private property in land, although production and ownership were not socialized.

On 28 December 1917 all private banks were nationalized, and in February 1918 all shareholders in banks expropriated and all foreign debts repudiated. The Russian Revolution also destroyed class society as we know it. The differences in salary were still there and people did not get as much as they worked and deserved, because of war condition and limited productivity but the demands of social justice were met to a greater extent than under capitalism because physical labour was no longer devalued, the wage differential between workers and 'white collar' remunerations were much less, and no one could derive income without working or by making someone else work for him.

Politically the new state characterized itself as 'dictatorship of the proletariat', i.e. a socialistic democracy. By this was implied the domination of the interest of the majority over the minority, as the working people constituted the majority of the population. Secondly, through it the revolution expressed the political domination of those who work, as opposed to those who, under capitalism and a

bourgeois democracy, live by their private control over the nations resources. Thirdly the new state sought to apply a more positive concept of democracy where state was responsible for a lot more of an individual's needs-incorporating the French heritage-rather than the 'laissez faire' concept where freedom for the individual comes from non-interference by the state, and individual is largely left to fend for himself.

Within a few months of the revolution the government published all the secret treaties of the old government, and proclaimed that all treaties and agreement between Soviet Russia and other countries will be open and public. With the same Decree on Peace they offered peace without any annexation, conquests or indemnities, and withdrew their claims over areas the Tsarist government and also the Provisional government were fighting over. They took a public stand against colonialism, and in support of all national liberation struggles. Without the Russian Revolution there would have been no Wilson's Fourteen Points at the end of World War I. In all the areas that had constituted the Tsarist Empire, the Bolsheviks recognized the rights of all nationalities to self-determination, including the right of secession.

Even as the Bolshevik leadership tried heroically to fulfil its promised mandate of destroying the institutional frame work of the old regime and creating a new one, the workers and peasants were lending their own substance to the revolutionary transformation. The early years carry the imprint of their spontaneous and organised activity at local levels. The land communes, the village gatherings and peasant soviets acted as autonomous organs of social and political transformation in the countryside. The agrarian revolution sanctioned by the Bolsheviks was in actual fact effected by them, and they formed the nucleus of the post-revolutionary rural structure. Within the space of a few years millions of acres of land changed hands and was divided among the peasants. The old state apparatus in the countryside was completely destroyed.

In the cities there was a similar tendency to put into effect the slogan 'All power to the Soviets' and workers control, with two-thirds of the nationalizations of particular factories being local decision, a workers control being identified as workers take-over of factories and production. The vast network of trade union factory committees, workers soviets, and partly organizations achieved the real expropriation of capital.

The trend in general was toward democratization, de-centralization, local initiative and popular decision making. These became the bases of the new institutional framework emerging out of the legislation of the Bolsheviks and the dynamics of the revolution all over the former Tsarist Empire. The Bolsheviks were intrinsically linked with this process, although there were numerous pushes and pulls between these initiatives and the attempts by the central leadership to consolidate the gains of the revolution through the creation of an administrative network, a public distribution system and the institutionalization of the peasant-worker alliance for the entire country.

11.4 NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

The New Economy Policy (NEP) was a response to a political and economic crisis even though at its core was economic changes that marked a change in the

strategy of transition to socialism. NEP, as it came to be known, involved a change in the socio-economic balance of forces.

The decisive change that brought this about began in March 1921. Grain requisition was replaced by a fixed tax on income to be paid in kind, what was much lower than the requisition targets, and the peasants could keep for themselves and trade privately in whatever else surplus that remained with them. Since agriculture was still based on individual production this amounted to allowing 'profit' through exploitation of the labour of others.

In 1924 the tax in kind was replaced by a money tax, followed by legalization of private trade. In 1925 the restrictions on leasing of land and hiring of labour were eased, and the agricultural tax further reduced. The tax now, levied on the net income, varied from a minimum of 5 per cent for those holding less than a quarter of an hectare to 17 per cent for those holding more than three hectares. In spite of this differential rate, the other aspects such as freedom to trade and choose one's customer once the tax had been paid, and to lease more land and hire labour, encouraged differentiation, and the emergence of a significant and rich or 'Kulak' strata within peasantry. It also meant re-introduction to market links between different sectors of economy, greater role for money as medium of exchange, the curtailment of the sphere of centralized distribution system, and individual contracts.

There were accompanying changes in the industrial sector and its organizational forms. On 17 May 1921 the decree nationalizing small scale industry was revoked and smaller units were actually de-nationalized, some of them being resorted to their former owners. Only banking, foreign trade and large scale, heavy industry remained state controlled – those that Lenin called the 'commanding heights of economy'. By July 1921 every individual citizen was given the right to organize small scale industrial enterprises although on lease. State enterprises were to operate on the basis of commercial accounting, services and wages were to be paid in cash. Industrial enterprises were supposed to make their own arrangements for acquiring raw materials and marketing to their products through independent contracts with other industrial enterprises or agricultural producers. All this entailed a degree of de-centralization of decision-making, competition, and commercialization, and the recreation of a new class of private entrepreneurs. It promoted a capitalist ethos and ethic which affected even the cooperatives and the large scale state structure that still controlled major production.

The NEP (New Economic Policy) changes made possible economic recovery in the ensuing years and also won the confidence of the majority of peasants. Like the policies of 1918-21, it carried over into the future much that was designed to be temporary. The economic recovery which began after 1920 after an initial impact of famine, reached 1/3 of the pre-war level by 1923. But if we compare with the War Communism phase, agricultural productivity increased by around 40%, the total sown area by 45 per cent and the grain area by 39-43 per cent by 1928. This rate of growth was much higher than the rate of growth in industry, with the result that prices of industrial goods went up, and there was a sizeable widening of the gap between the price levels of industrial and agricultural goods in favour of industry which, however, also created marketing difficulties. This potential for conflict again between town and country, the peasants and working class, was avoided by putting pressure on industry to reduce prices. The problem however, remained in a long term sense, given the fact that the private sector

was predominant in agriculture throughout NEP, and a lot of industry was still a state monopoly.

Secondly, the NEP changes could not resolve the problems and social contradictions that derived not merely from the war situation or specific policies but from the larger social contradictions that arise when the revolutionary working class is called upon to build socialism in the midst of a vast peasant majority. In individual peasant economy while there is little scope for class exploitation, nevertheless it is an expression of bourgeois relations. As long as land is held individually, worked on individually as a family and income derived from it privately, there is little incentive for the peasantry to transform agriculture along socialist lines. The NEP solution was that through cooperation peasantry would voluntarily realize the benefit of collectivism. But cooperating to buy tractors or work agricultural machinery collectively on land held together did not resolve the problem, because cooperative and collective forms functioned on the same principles of market and profit as the individual peasant did.

The introduction of market and the consequent stratification in agriculture, and the emergence of the individual entrepreneur worked against the egalitarianism inherent in communist ideology. Voluntarism was replaced by economic incentive. Rather than see the fruits of his/her labour transformed into collective social benefits, it promoted in the peasant individual solutions to social problems.

Advanced socialism where each could derive goods/benefits according to need, required increased industrial productivity. NEP provided little scope for transfer of resources to the socialized sector from the individual or private sector of economy. Given the fact that Soviet Russia was not open to exploitation of colonies this was a major problem. From all evidence the transformation of Soviet Union into an advanced socialist society, the transformation of the quality of life of individual citizens, and creation of a more human, scientific and equality oriented man was unlikely through the NEP changes. When trade-units, soviets and other popular organizations gained greater rights they were already dominated by the spirit of economic incentive as opposed to voluntarism. It is in this larger context that we must see the later debates within the Party, the collectivization drive, and the conflicts between party and popular organizations.

Check Your Progress 2

- 1) What were the new measures taken by the socialist state in USSR? Write in ten lines.

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- 2) Write a note on the New Economic Policy.

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11.5 PLANNING AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

The idea of a long-term plan of ten to fifteen years dates from 1920. Annual plan forecasts were drawn up as Control Figures from 1925. From 1926 various drafts of prospective five-year plans were made both by the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) and by the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh). This had a dual significance. It marked the beginning of a commitment to industrialization and state direction of that development through a comprehensive plan. Secondly, it adopted a medium term period to put it into operation.

By 1926, most of Soviet industry had been restored to 1913 levels of production and some industries had even exceeded that level. Thereafter, the main strands of government industrial policy were:

- rapid industrialization in a socialist manner, and
- a pattern of industrialization where large-scale industry manufacturing machinery would dominate the national economy.

The construction of Socialism in One Country, surrounded by 'a hostile capitalist world, imperatively required that Soviet industry must become 'self-sufficient', in the sense that it should not depend on the capitalist countries for any major type of product. A vital objective was to achieve and surpass the most advanced capitalist countries in a relatively minimal historical period.

This required the establishment of a capacity to produce capital-equipment, chemicals, and other advanced products which were lacking in the industry inherited from the tsarist period. Closely associated with the principle of self-sufficiency was the further requirement that Soviet industry should be based on the most advanced technology. It was also agreed that a substantial proportion of new Factories should be located not in the traditional centres of modern industry in northwest and central European Russia and in the Ukraine, but in the Urals and Siberia, and in backward Central Asia. The needs of defence required the construction of iron and steel, engineering, and armaments industries in these relatively inaccessible areas of the Soviet Union.

The First Five Year Plan, 1929-33

Since 1928 was a successful year for industrial growth, earlier plan targets were revised upwards. In reality no one had the statistical information or the theoretical understanding to predict the workings of a whole economy. As the dominant Soviet leader Stalin became more and more impatient with the rates of growth within the market economy of the NEP, careful planning gave way to the demands of politics. Instead of a planned economy running according to carefully formulated estimates of economically practicable targets, there appeared a 'command' economy running according to the political orders and priorities of the government.

The first five year plan focused on iron and steel, but tractor plants also had high priority. The machine tool industry was rapidly expanded in order to free the country from dependence on machinery imports from abroad.

The Soviet leadership led by Stalin nursed certain obsessions that were detrimental to planning as a process of balanced and realistic economic growth. The first has

been referred to as ‘gigantomania’, or the demand to build gigantic industrial complexes on a scale beyond the available resources to construct or operate. Consequently, they took longer to complete than was economical and then were constantly subject to breakdowns, or were left unfinished. The obsession with size was accompanied by an unrelenting insistence on haste, captured in the slogan, “tempos decide the whole thing”. To illustrate this, the first five year plan was formally adopted in mid-1929; simultaneously backdated to October 1928, when it was retrospectively deemed to have begun; and finally declared in January 1933 to have been fulfilled, not in five, but in four and one quarter years.

Plan targets were usually set in terms of volumes of production or quantitatively. The Plan gave only the vaguest indication of where the real material resources for increased production were to come from. Industry was exhorted to over fulfil the Plan rather than simply to carry it out. This Plan was not meant to allocate resources or balance demands but to drive the economy forward pell-mell. The quality of output dropped alarmingly, and there was abundant evidence of the rapid deterioration of expensive new machinery.

The First Plan had mixed results. Although everything was sacrificed for metal, the output of coal, oil, iron ore and pig iron fell short of expectation. The targets were surpassed only in machinery and metal working, and this was partly caused by statistical manipulation. The goals for steel production were fulfilled only in 1940, for electric power in 1951, and for oil in 1955. Consumer goods, agriculture and, temporarily, military strength were sacrificed to a rapid growth in heavy industry.

The organization of supply and distribution was possibly the most formidable task assumed by the state during the first five year plan. As it had unsuccessfully and temporarily done during the Civil War a decade earlier, the state took over almost total control of the urban economy, distribution and trade. This time the take-over lasted until the 1980s. Curtailment of private manufacturing and trade began in the late 1920s and the process gathered speed with a drive against ‘NEP’ men’ (private traders) – combining vilification in the press, legal and financial harassment, and numerous arrests of private entrepreneurs for ‘speculation’ – in 1928-29. By the early 1930s, even the artisans and small shopkeepers had been put out of business or forced into state-supervised co-operatives. An alternative structure of trade and distribution had not been established yet. With the simultaneous collectivization of agriculture, the mixed economy of the NEP, combining state and private sectors, disappeared.

The Second Five Year Plan, 1933-37

The second five year plan was adopted in February 1934. Its three guiding principles were:

- consolidation,
- mastering techniques, and
- improving living standards.

In this plan the principle of rational planning came closer to realization. More moderate and realistic production targets were set. In industry the watchwords were now to be raising productivity and acquiring skills.

This plan envisaged a large increase in the output of, and investment in, consumers' goods rather than producer's goods. Urban real wages were expected to double as a result of an increase in money wages and a simultaneous fall in retail prices.

The large number of new industrial enterprises built during the second plan meant that by 1937 more than 80 per cent of all industrial products were manufactured in new or entirely reconstructed enterprises. During this plan, the heavy industrial targets were mostly met and the output of machinery and electric power rose dramatically.

The production of consumer goods, however, rose less than expected and per capita consumption of these essential items of household use in 1937 was lower than in 1928. Completed metallurgical works in Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk, and Zaporozhye further reduced Soviet dependence on foreign capital goods, relieved the strain on the balance of payments, and permitted repayment of earlier debts. By 1937, the basic tools of machinery and defence were being built in the USSR. During this plan there was a conscious effort to develop the more backward national republics in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, although it was not economically the best way of using scarce resources there.

The Results of Planned Industrialization

In the decade after 1928, Soviet industry developed at a rate and on a scale entirely without precedent in world economic history. Industrial production in 1937 reached 446 per cent of the 1928 level according to official Soviet figures, and 249 per cent according to the most conservative Western estimate; the corresponding annual per cent rates of growth were 18 and 10.5.

On the basis of official Soviet figures, the Soviet share in world industrial production amounted to 13.7 per cent in 1937, compared to 3.7 in 1929 and 2.6 in 1913. The USSR achieved these gains while the western countries experienced a terrible depression and mass unemployment. In 1928 Soviet industrial output was comparable to that of second rank capitalist countries, such as Germany, France and Great Britain. By 1937, it was second only to the United States. By then, the Soviet Union had twice the productive power of the major European powers. Soviet industry became large scale industry: while one-third of Soviet industrial production came from small-scale industry in 1913, by 1937 the proportion had fallen to a mere six per cent.

Major new industries were established with the assistance of substantial imports of machinery and know-how from the West. By 1937, the Soviet Union could produce in substantial quantities its own iron and steel-making and electric power equipment, tractors, combine harvester, tanks and aircraft, as well as almost all types of machine tools; and the level of technology rose throughout industry. Labour productivity (output per person employed) increased annually on an average by six per cent, much more rapidly than in Britain or the USA at any time in the nineteenth century.

The Third Five Year Plan, 1938-41

The period between 1938 and 1941, when the Germans invaded the USSR, covers three and a half years of the third five year plan. The plan was interrupted by the Second World War in June 1941 and never completed. In intention it aimed at an

impressive per cent increases over the five year period: 92 in industrial output, 58 in steel, 129 in machinery and engineering. Priority was once again given to heavy industry rather than consumer goods industries.

Check Your Progress 3

- 1) What do you understand by planned industrialization? Answer in five lines.

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- 2) How did the first two five year plans affect the Russian economy? Answer in ten lines.

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11.6 COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

The previous section on industrialization has depicted the successful effort of the Soviet leadership to rapidly transform the country into an advanced industrial economy. Industrialization, however, could not have succeeded without major changes in agriculture. In spite of substantial improvement in output after the Civil War, Soviet agriculture was more backward than that in any other major European country, in terms of both yields per hectare and labour productivity. While the state had succeeded in extending and consolidating control over the greater part of industry by nationalization, the predominance of private peasant farms meant that production and marketing decisions in agriculture remained beyond central planning and therefore state control.

The Bolsheviks were convinced that socialized or collectivized agriculture had to be promoted against private farms of capitalist agriculture. Larger farms would be more productive because better machinery and fertilizers could be used on them. They would generate the agricultural surpluses essential for industrialization. In addition, larger farms would even out the differences in wealth between peasant households by pooling productive resources within a single farm. It was assumed by the Bolsheviks that converting the peasants to this belief in collective or socialized agriculture would be a long and arduous process. In one of his last articles, 'On Co-operation', Lenin had argued that the government would have to gradually persuade peasants to give up their private farms and join together in collective farms. This would have to be done by providing peasants with modern equipment, credit and agronomic support.

The advanced technology that would induce the peasant to choose collectivization was absent through the NEP. Until such time as Soviet Russia acquired tractors, most Bolsheviks believed that a number of measures preparatory to socialist agriculture had to be adopted. The peasants must be led through a series of intermediate steps from simple co-operatives for selling consumer goods, the marketing and supply of agricultural products, and credit, to production co-operatives for machinery, seed, reclamation, construction, and finally to collective farms.

During the 1920s agronomists and land-consolidation experts occasionally succeeded in persuading the households involved in the consolidation of landholdings divided into strips to set themselves up as collective farms. But such collective farms tended to be small and few. Hoping that co-operatives inculcate collective habits in the peasantry, the Soviet state offered the co-operative movement easy credit, tax exemptions and priority in the delivery of scarce manufactured goods. But co-operatives too attracted small number of peasant households.

The spread of rural capitalism, by the differentiation of the peasantry, was worrying to the Soviet leadership. Rural capitalism would benefit a *kulak* or rich peasant at the expense of the peasantry as a whole. Differentiation occurred in three ways, namely the leasing of land, the loaning of money, animals, implements and machinery; and, the hiring of labour. In defining the kulak, the following criteria were adopted: the systematic employment of hired labour; the acquisition of land by purchase or lease; extensive ownership and the leasing of agricultural means of production; and, income from commercial and financial activity. But no clear or convincing definition of the kulak was ever produced.

The Weaknesses of NEP Agriculture

Peasant farming methods and technology under NEP had remained extremely backward. In 1927, 88 per cent of all arable land was in small peasant holdings, and less than five per cent of farms were wholly or partly enclosed. The small size and fragmentation of farms prevented modern farming methods and the use of better implements. Three-field rotation systems predominated with autumn-sown rye or wheat, spring-sown wheat or other grain, followed by fallow; even more primitive two-field or shifting systems of cultivation were found in many areas. This resulted in the fact that one-third of land was not sown at any given time.

Improvements in technology were eagerly sought by the regime but not easily brought into practice. Almost one-quarter of peasant households in the Russian Federation had no horses or oxen in 1927 and almost one-third of them lacked ploughing implements. Most households owned or used no horse-drawn machines. Machinery was concentrated in the major grain growing regions of the country.

Grain Harvests and Marketing

Although grain production had recovered to pre-war levels by the mid-1920s, much less grain was marketed in the 1920s than before the First World War. This was partly a consequence of the increase in rural population: while this was six million higher in 1926 than in 1913, per capita grain was 16 per cent lower than it had been in 1913.

A real problem was that there was more than one market for the sale of agricultural products. The state agencies and the co-operative network only accounted for part of the overall market in grain and other crops, with the private market offering dispersed and profitable alternative to producers. It was more advantageous for peasants to sell on the private market, with its higher prices, than to state collection agencies. The problem for the state was to attract a greater share of the marketed harvest to its own collection agencies rather than to private traders.

The term of trade, or the relationship between industrial retail prices and state agricultural procurement prices, were much less favourable for peasants than before the war. In addition to the unfavourable price ratios for his products, the peasant also had less easy access to industrial goods than before the war. Throughout the 1920s, industrial goods were expensive, of poor quality and scarce.

Prices paid by the state for procurements (*zagatovki*) of grain were low and often failed to cover the cost of production. Prices for livestock products and industrial crops were much more favourable for peasants and discouraged grain marketing.

Another reason for the decline in agricultural marketing was the changed social and economic organization of the countryside after the agrarian revolution of 1917-20. The re-division of the large private estates removed those farming units which were most oriented towards the market.

The Procurement Crisis of 1927-28

Despite a good harvest the autumn of 1927, peasant marketing and state procurement of grain fell far below expectation to a level that was insufficient to feed the towns and the army, and export grain in order to pay for the import of machinery. If the state had chosen to raise its procurement prices for grain, to match private market prices, funds available for industrial expansion would have suffered.

The rapid rise in industrial investment during 1927-28 was a major factor leading to the grain crisis from October 1927. Consumer goods became even scarcer (the “goods famine”) as investment shifted to heavy industry; and, they cost more to buy as state procurement prices for grain remained low.

In answer to this goods famine, the peasants went on what the regime called a “production strike” by refusing to market at state prices the quotas of grain set by the state. Instead, the peasants chose either to sell to private traders at higher prices or to meet their tax obligations by selling higher priced industrial crops or livestock products.

In other words, the crisis of 1927 was not an *economic* crisis in the sense of a failure of market mechanisms or a decline of productive capacity. This is clear from the fact that a high share of the harvest was marketed, but often to private traders. The peasants were willing and able to produce a surplus if they could buy industrial goods with the proceeds.

In December 1927 Stalin had argued that the process of consolidating the peasants’ small, scattered strips of land must be carried out ‘gradually, steadily eschewing forcible methods, through demonstration and persuasion’. By the next month, in January 1928 he said that “We cannot allow our industry to be dependent on

kulak whims; (collective farms) must be developed to the full ... so that within 3 or 4 years (by 1931 or 1932) they would supply at least one-third of all the grain requirements of the state.”

The Party leadership decided on a policy of confrontation rather than conciliation of the peasantry. From early in 1928, markets were closed and grain was seized from peasants and traders alike. Those guilty of speculating in grain or concealing it rather than delivering it could be imprisoned and their property confiscated. As a result the state managed to procure a substantially greater amount of grain.

In the summer of 1928 the Party launched an all-out drive to collect more grain more rapidly than in any previous year. In November the authorities called for the comprehensive collectivization of the main grain-surplus regions within five months. In 1928, there was a harvest failure in the Ukraine and North Caucasus, important grain producing regions. The best harvests had been in the distant, eastern parts of the country (Volga regions, Kazakhstan, Urals and Siberia), precisely where the state procurement apparatus was weakest and the communications infrastructure least developed and especially slow in winter. This crisis was compounded by manufactured goods shortages. Grain marketing declined sharply and grain collections by state agencies were a failure. The shortfall in state collections of rye and wheat, food staples, forced the state to curtail grain exports and to reintroduce rationing during peacetime.

Soviet leaders faced two alternatives. They could continue with the New Economic Policy — balanced industrialization, gradual collectivization, and adjust agricultural delivery prices to induce the peasants to market more grain; this was the policy advocated by leaders like Bukharin. Or they could institute a radical new policy of accelerated collectivization and forced industrialization. Stalin opted for the second alternative.

Collectivization policy was now aimed at the formation of large collective farms covering whole villages and districts. In the spring of 1929 a scheme was launched for the establishment of a few ‘districts’ of comprehensive collectivization in which all or a majority of households were collectivized. By early July, eleven such districts were recognized.

There were no plans for mass collectivization immediately prior to its introduction. Even the first five year plan still marked no radical departure in agricultural policy. It was envisaged that three out of every four peasant farms would still be private farms in 1934, and their output would contribute more than one-half of grain marketing. When the decision to introduce mass collectivisation by force was made, it was done quickly and without legal backing or party discussion.

The *kulak* was to be liquidated as a class and the collectivization campaign was to sweep through the countryside in tandem with a ‘dekulakisation’ campaign. The campaigns for procuring grain and for forcing peasants into the kolkhozes were merged together.

No guidance was available about the structure and organization of the collectives; nor on how decisions were to be taken, not even how payment should be made to the members. Within seven weeks, by February 1930, about half the peasantry had been herded into collectives.

The peasants met forced collectivization with large-scale passive resistance and sporadic armed resistance. Active peasant resistance to the regime and its representatives took the form of mass demonstrations involving thousands as well as 'terrorist acts', a term that covers murders, beatings-up and arson. By and large, however, peasant protest was local and vocal rather than semi-military. Resistance was evidently most stubborn on the part of the richer peasants, but it is clear that every section of the peasantry was affected and participated in the resistance to collectivization.

Rather than hand over their animals to the kolkhoz, many peasants slaughtered them (despite the decree of 16 January 1930 that prohibited such slaughtering on pain of confiscation of property and imprisonment or banishment) or rushed to the nearest town to sell them. As a result, in 1933 there were only one-third as many sheep, half as many horses and pigs, and 54 per cent as many cattle as in 1928.

The attack on the peasant economy was accompanied by a fierce campaign against the Orthodox Church, the centre of traditional peasant culture. Historic Russian churches became the object of destruction or wrecking and many priests were arrested. The monasteries were closed, although many of them had operated as model agricultural co-operatives, and thousands of monks and nuns were deported to Siberia. By the end of 1930, roughly 80 per cent of village churches are said to have been closed. Dekulakisation deprived about one million peasant households (an average of about one household per village), or about five to six million individuals of their land and houses.

This was a veritable civil war raging in the Russian country side. The surviving livestock herds and the spring ploughing were in jeopardy because of the lack of seed grain. The regime thus faced a disastrous situation. In March 1930, in an article called "Dizzy with Success", Stalin blamed local officials for excesses he had authorized. He called for a temporary halt to the collectivization drive, ordered that most of the collectivized animals (except those of kulaks) be returned to their original owners, and that attempts to completely eliminate the peasant market be ended. Interpreting this as repudiation of compulsory collectivization, the majority of peasants hastily left the collectives. The percentage of peasant households officially collectivized throughout the USSR dropped from 56 to 23 between 1 March and 1 June 1930 and then to 21.4 in August.

In another concession, a new model statute for the kolkhoz allowed its members to keep a cow, sheep and pigs, and the implements to work private plots of their own. The peasants' real efforts were reserved for these small private plots, whose food sustained them and whose sales augmented their paltry earnings.

The collapse of the collectivization drive was only temporary. The climate was kind and the harvest was good in 1930. As soon as the grain was safely in state storage, the collectivization drive resumed but with clearer guidelines this time. Tens of thousands of communists and urban workers were urgently mobilized to work in the countryside as kolkhoz organizers and chairmen. Villagers were steadily persuaded or coerced by discriminatory taxation to return to the collectives. By 1937, 86 per cent of sown area had been brought within the kolkhozes and collective farms accounted for 89 per cent of the grain harvest and 87 per cent of grain procurements by the state.

Nature of Collectivization

Collectivization, sometimes called the “Second Revolution”, changed the peasant way of life more radically than did the Bolshevik Revolution. The fact that it was not carried out by peasants voluntarily, but by a largely urban and proletarian Party, and by force, meant that it was authentically a ‘revolution from above’. The lynchpin of the difference between peasant life before and after collectivization was that the collective farmer had no control over the grain and cash crops that were produced on the collectivized land. As most collective farms coincided with the former communes, the parallels with serf villages were close. The ban on travel outside the farm without permission reinforced the impression in peasant minds that collectivization meant a new form of serfdom. Peasants joked bitterly that the initials of the All-Union Communist Party (VKP in Russian) spelt out ‘second serfdom’ (*Vtoroe Krepostnoe Pravo*).

Collectivization was a process which enabled the state to increase its procurement of grain, potatoes and vegetables and the flow of peasant labour to industry, at the expense of livestock, the harvest retained in agriculture and the living standards of the rural and urban population. It was not able to bring about an expansion of agricultural production to a degree corresponding to the growing demand and to this extent it was a failure.

Grain harvests, yields and state procurements

Years	Grains harvest Million tons	Yield Quintals per hectare	Procurements
1909-13	72.5	6.9	—
1928-32	73.6	7.5	18.1
1933-37	72.9	7.1	27.5
1938-40	77.9	7.7	32.1

Source: Moshe Lewin, *The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia*, London: Methuen, 1985, table 6.2 p.167

11.7 THE TERROR AND THE PURGES

The rigours of collectivization and industrialization were followed not by any period of improvement in the lives of the Soviet population, but by a renewal of the ‘revolution from above’, culminating in a reign of terror. This was directed not against peasants and the survivors of capitalism, but in successive waves of arrests, trials and purges against industrial workers, the Communist Party and finally the secret police itself, the executors of the purges and the terror.

Historians have identified at least three political needs Stalin nursed in the 1930s. The first was to overcome opposition to and criticism of his policies within the Communist Party. In 1933-34 this functioned as pressure for relaxing the industrialization and collectivization drives, for making concessions to the working population and for reconciliation with former opponents. His second need was not only to defeat the opposition but to attack and root out the source of all potential opposition and criticism in the democratic traditions of party leadership. The logical conclusion of this, and Stalin’s third need, was to move from a single-party to a single-ruler state. The only reason Stalin advanced for

his action was a huge conspiracy to overthrow the regime, involving not only the party organization throughout the country, but other post-revolutionary elites and networks, like the secret police and the armed forces. The menacing international situation and the danger of war were used to lend substance to the threat. But not a single authenticated case of a spy or traitor was ever identified among the victims of the purges and terror.

The Four Trials

Among the most dramatic aspects of the purges were the four show trials of 1936, 1937 and 1938.

- 1) At the “Trial of the Sixteen” (August 1936), Prosecutor Vyshinsky accused Kamenev, Zinoviev and others of conspiring with Trotsky to overthrow the regime and to remove Stalin and other Politburo members. After confessing and incriminating the “Right” Opposition, the defendants were convicted and shot.
- 2) At the “Trial of the Seventeen” (January 1937), featuring Piatakov, Muralov and Radek, the accused confessed to treasonable dealings with Japan and Germany. They too were executed.
- 3) The military chiefs, especially Marshall Tukhachevskii, who had made the Red Army an effective fighting force, apparently had been highly critical of the trials. In May 1937, he and other prominent Generals were arrested, accused of treasonable collaboration with Germany and Japan, and shot.
- 4) “The Trial of the Twenty-one” (March 1938), included Bukharin, Rykov and Iagoda. Foreign espionage agencies, claimed the prosecutor, had set up a bloc of “Rightists and Trotskyists” on Soviet soil to bring a bourgeois-capitalist regime to power and detach non-Russian regions from the USSR.

This was only the tip of the iceberg. For two full years in 1937 and 1938, top communist officials in every branch of the bureaucracy — government, party, industrial, military and finally even police — were arrested as ‘enemies of the people’ and disappeared into prisons and labour camps. Those who were tried and executed, or died by other means, included all surviving members of Lenin’s Politburo, except Stalin. A former Prime Minister, two former chiefs of the Communist International (Comintern), the trade union head, and two chiefs of the political police were executed.

Purges and the Communist Party

Proportionately, the purges hit the Party worst of all. They shattered the group of Communist Leaders formed in the pre-revolutionary underground, the Civil War and the period of collectivization and the first five year plan. When Russia entered the Second World War in 1941, her connections with the leadership of the Russian Revolution had practically ceased to exist. The terror thus destroyed the old Communist Party, which was not seriously rebuilt until Khrushchev’s time. It assured Stalin’s complete control of the Party, the government and the country.

Purges and the Armed Forces

The Party was not the only institution that was destroyed; also destroyed was the established military elite. The Great Purge decimated between 35 and 50 per cent of the entire officer corps of the Soviet armed forces. Well-known members

of the General Staff, such as Marshals Tukhachevsky and Bluecher, and Generals Gamarnik and Yakir were killed along with most members of the Supreme War Council: three of five Marshals, 14 of 16 Army Generals, and all full Admirals. Also affected were the commanders of all the military districts, practically all brigade commanders, one half of all regimental commanders, and all but one fleet commander.

These purges were an insult to Red Army patriotism and a grave weakening of the armed forces. More senior officers were killed during the purges than during the entire war with the Nazis.

Purges and the Soviet Society

The terror of the 1930s permeated the everyday life and the most intimate experience of the Soviet people. Most estimates agree that about five per cent of the population was imprisoned during the period, making a total of some eight million persons, of whom perhaps ten per cent were killed. By 1938, almost every other Soviet family had had one of its members imprisoned. The proportions, however, were substantially higher, the more educated the group.

The terror of the 1930s differed from that of the collectivization in that it was directed against the urban population, against political and military elites, and against the better educated intelligentsia. Action was taken against people for their supposed readiness to do injury to Soviet society. This was inferred on the basis of their social category: social origin, nationality or group membership. This social category determined a person's fate.

The question of how many people were arrested and died in the purges is difficult to answer accurately because of the secrecy that still guards the relevant files. In 1990, Soviet researchers claimed that between 1931 and 1953 government tribunals sentenced almost four million people, of whom about one-fifth were executed. But since many more died unrecorded, and the records were tampered with, lost or destroyed, this figure is necessarily an underestimate of the truth.

Check Your Progress 4

- 1) How was the collectivization of agriculture carried out? Write in ten lines.

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- 2) How did the Peasants respond to the collectivization drive? Answer in fifty words.

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- 3) What according to historians were the main political priorities of Stalin in the 1930s? Write in five lines.

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- 4) How did the Purges of the 1930s affect the Communist Party and the armed forces? Answer in five lines.

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11.8 LET US SUM UP

This Unit has focused on important aspects related to the creation of the socialist world: the situation prior to the socialist revolution, making of the socialist revolution, and the functioning of the socialist state with all its constraints and problems.

As you are aware, socialism as a vision of human society had dominated the thinking of many intellectuals in Europe in the 19th century. The socialist revolution, the first of its kind, actually occurred in 1917 in the Russian empire only. This Unit talked about the factors which created a revolutionary situation in Russia and finally led to the revolution. The revolution occurred in three stages— with the creation of a parliament in 1905 to the creation of a liberal bourgeois regime in February 1917, to finally the capture of power by workers soviet under the leadership of the Bolsheviks in October 1917.

The new socialist state was confronted with tremendous problems and opposition — a hostile capitalist world and a civil war led by the old order in Russia. It resorted to a phase of a War Communism which continued from 1918 to 1921. In 1921 began yet another phase called the New Economic Policy, which was to last till 1928. But the consolidation of the new socialist state was far from over.

This Unit has also discussed three crucial aspects of the Russian economy and polity between the period 1928 and 1941: industrialization through planning,

collectivization of agriculture and the purges of the 1930s. Planned industrialization meant setting targets for industrial production for a period of five years and systematically going about achieving the targets. Collectivization of agriculture stood for a transformation of plots of agricultural land under individual possession into large collectives which could be exposed to modernized farming through state initiative. Large scale opposition to Stalin's policies both within and outside the party coupled with a desire to convert Russia from a single party rule to single ruler state led to the purges of the 1930s. In these purges a number of trials took place in which old Bolsheviks, members of Lenin's politbureau, a number of army officers and many state officials were executed. Virtually anyone who did not agree with Stalin's policies was put to death. All dissent was suppressed. Whereas the victims of collectivization were invariably members of the rural population, the purges of the 1930s targeted mainly the urban population, the military and the political elites and the educated sections of the population. It can be said that a Russian society paid a heavy price for the official policies of the 1930s.

11.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISES

Check Your Progress 1

- 1) You should mention the absence of liberal constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy in Russia. See Section 11.2
- 2) You should refer to the socialist revolutionaries, liberals and social democrats as some of the leading political groups in pre-revolutionary Russia. See Sub-section 11.2.4.
- 3) You should emphasize the different stages from 1905 onwards through which the revolution was carried out. See Section 11.2.5

Check Your Progress 2

- 1) You should mention the change brought about through legislation and popular initiative. See Section 11.3.
- 2) You should point out in your answer changes in policy to face political and economic crisis. See Section 11.4.

Check Your Progress 3

- 1) Planning in industrialization meant deciding before hand the direction of industrial development and setting targets for output for a period of five years. See Section 11.5.
- 2) Soviet Russia achieved unprecedented industrial growth in a very short time. See Section 11.5.

Check Your Progress 4

- 1) Cultivable land, which, under NEP, was under the control of kulaks (rich peasants) was brought under the control of the collectives. All land could thus be exposed to modern farming. See Section 11.6.

- 2) Where as all sections of the peasantry resisted the collectivization drive of the Soviet government, the richer peasants resisted more vigorously as they had more to lose. See Section 11.6.
- 3) In your answer you should refer to Stalin's desire to eliminate all political opposition so as to move from a single party to a single ruler state. See Section 11.7
- 4) The purges destroyed the old Communist Party and also the military leadership of the times of revolution. See Setion 11.7.

